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en:brochures:unclassified:kipros_ethniko_ethnikismos [2025/01/06 11:06] – no_name12en:brochures:unclassified:kipros_ethniko_ethnikismos [2025/04/20 19:33] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
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-=====1. The "national issue", the far left and "milieu" =====+=====1. The "national issue", the far left and the "milieu" =====
  
 The "national issue" (which in this case expresses the occupation of Northern Cyprus by the army of the Turkish state and the "plots of the imperialists" against us) has been a key pole of reference of the Cypriot far left, which has timidly emerged after '74 and which for some parts of it is still of course the PROBLEM. The "national issue" (which in this case expresses the occupation of Northern Cyprus by the army of the Turkish state and the "plots of the imperialists" against us) has been a key pole of reference of the Cypriot far left, which has timidly emerged after '74 and which for some parts of it is still of course the PROBLEM.
  
-In a first phase, immediately after '74 and in a situation that smelled of general upheaval, the slogan of "conscription" of society, for a "popular defence" etc. was raised. Talking about a far left movement at this time is a bit of a stretch, of course. But the first processes had begun among various individuals and groups, [[en:groups:aristeripteriga|both within EDEK]], which strongly expressed these currents at that time, and among AKEL members and unionists. It is also the period of efforts to [[en:groups:anasistasi|constitute the CPC]].+In a first phase, immediately after '74 and in a situation that smelled of general upheaval, the slogan of "conscription" of society, for a "popular defence" etc. was raised. Talking about a far left movement at this time is a bit of a stretch, of course. But the first processes had begun among various individuals and groups, [[en:groups:aristeripteriga|both within EDEK]], which strongly expressed these currents at that time, and among AKEL members and unionists. It is also the period of efforts to [[en:groups:anasistasi|reconstitute the CPC]].
  
 EDEK, which also had the tradition of "resistance" to the coup, expressed for a time this willingness to reject any compromise with timid proposals for state socialist measures, in the face of the policy of social peace and appeasement adopted by AKEL and the state. EDEK, which also had the tradition of "resistance" to the coup, expressed for a time this willingness to reject any compromise with timid proposals for state socialist measures, in the face of the policy of social peace and appeasement adopted by AKEL and the state.
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 In the end, the argument of the promotion of entertainment and social peace was identical to that adopted by the "subversives". Yes, we need "conscription", but conscription without "national unity" is not possible, and of course "national unity" and "social conflict" are mutually exclusive. In the end, the argument of the promotion of entertainment and social peace was identical to that adopted by the "subversives". Yes, we need "conscription", but conscription without "national unity" is not possible, and of course "national unity" and "social conflict" are mutually exclusive.
  
-The contradictions of the EDEK(1) as soon as it was forced to take a "responsible" position were indicative of the situation. In this context (and with the simultaneous decline of some of the "militant" mood that existed among the youth), frustration, and the realization that much of that whole ideology of "conscription" was determined by the ruling ideology, led several individuals to reject the whole issue. In particular, the realization of our personal misery (sexual, psychological, etc.) led to a rejection that carried with it a demand for a life that seemed completely unrelated to the political schizophrenia of the politicians. Of course this development was not general. Within EDEN a "rearguard battle" continued for a time, until the party left all pretext behind and threw out the Trotskyists, "entryists" and other leftists en masse. +The contradictions of EDEK(1) as soon as it was forced to take a "responsible" position were indicative of the situation. In this context (and with the simultaneous decline of some of the "militant" mood that existed among the youth), frustration, and the realization that much of that whole ideology of "conscription" was determined by the ruling ideology, led several individuals to reject the whole issue. In particular, the realization of our personal misery (sexual, psychological, etc.) led to a rejection that carried with it a demand for a life that seemed completely unrelated to the political schizophrenia of the politicians. Of course this development was not general. Within EDEN a "rearguard battle" continued for a time, until the party left all pretext behind and threw out the Trotskyists, "entryists" and other leftists en masse. 
  
 [[en:groups:aristeripteriga|"Aristeri Pteriga [The Left Wing]"]] followed its own disintegrating course afterwards, to finally leave the "pure-bloods" to publish [[en:magazines:sosialekfrasi|"Sosialistiki Ekfrasi [Socialist Expression]]]". "Conscription" still plays a key role in this group, only now charged with a more explicit "class" and at the same time "internationalist" component. The issue for them is to unite with the Turkish Cypriot workers and to take on the bourgeoisie and the occupiers all together in unity. [[en:groups:aristeripteriga|"Aristeri Pteriga [The Left Wing]"]] followed its own disintegrating course afterwards, to finally leave the "pure-bloods" to publish [[en:magazines:sosialekfrasi|"Sosialistiki Ekfrasi [Socialist Expression]]]". "Conscription" still plays a key role in this group, only now charged with a more explicit "class" and at the same time "internationalist" component. The issue for them is to unite with the Turkish Cypriot workers and to take on the bourgeoisie and the occupiers all together in unity.
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 In the spectacular "left-right" polarisation, the Trotskyist spokesmen have aligned themselves with the so-called left (AKEL - EDEK) and have tried to "re-revolutionise" it with their entryism and party units(2). In the spectacular "left-right" polarisation, the Trotskyist spokesmen have aligned themselves with the so-called left (AKEL - EDEK) and have tried to "re-revolutionise" it with their entryism and party units(2).
  
-From another point of view, various individuals passing from the effort for the [[en:groups:anasistasi|reconstitution of the CPC]] or other Marxist-Leninist groups or carrying an Enosis tradition or discovering the light of truth in Psyroukis [Νίκος Ψυρούκης], jumped to the other extreme, and started looking for the revolutionary subject among the far right unionists(3). This milieu presented at one stage an interesting intervention, as it brought together people from the left (but not from AKEL) and from the former far right, thus presenting itself as an attempt to break the whole spectacular left-right polarisation. However, it was a game played on the ideological sophistry of the AKEL-Enosis polarisation. AKEL once supported Enosis, e.g. which means that Enosis is a demand of the popular movement (hence revolutionary) and that the popular movement was revolutionary at the time. In these contexts the national issue held the key status, but at the same time it had new dimensions. These Marxists put the problem of Enosis as a national problem and made various attempts to tie it to the occupation and the "imperialists". In a first step they argued, for example, that the coup and the invasion would not have taken place if the Union had taken place. In a newer step, the view of "what's done is done" was thrown out, but because the "Turkish bourgeoisie" is aggressive, the only way to save ourselves is Enosis (even if it is a double one).+From another point of view, various individuals passing from the effort for the [[en:groups:anasistasi|reconstitution of the CPC]] or other Marxist-Leninist groups or carrying an Enosis tradition or discovering the light of truth in Psyroukis, jumped to the other extreme, and started looking for the revolutionary subject among the far right unionists(3). This milieu presented at one stage an interesting intervention, as it brought together people from the left (but not from AKEL) and from the former far right, thus presenting itself as an attempt to break the whole spectacular left-right polarisation. However, it was a game played on the ideological sophistry of the AKEL-Enosis polarisation. AKEL once supported Enosis, e.g. which means that Enosis is a demand of the popular movement (hence revolutionary) and that the popular movement was revolutionary at the time. In these contexts the national issue held the key status, but at the same time it had new dimensions. These Marxists put the problem of Enosis as a national problem and made various attempts to tie it to the occupation and the "imperialists". In a first step they argued, for example, that the coup and the invasion would not have taken place if the Union had taken place. In a newer step, the view of "what's done is done" was thrown out, but because the "Turkish bourgeoisie" is aggressive, the only way to save ourselves is Enosis (even if it is a double one).
  
 What is amazing about this situation is the impression that something terribly new has been discovered. In fact, apart from the Marxist sauce that adorns the arguments, the substance is essentially the same as what we have all heard thousands of times in the schools of Greek-Christian education. As for dual Enosis, which is going to become a revolutionary solution for some, it was proposed by the Turkish state since the 1950s and by the Americans since '63. What is amazing about this situation is the impression that something terribly new has been discovered. In fact, apart from the Marxist sauce that adorns the arguments, the substance is essentially the same as what we have all heard thousands of times in the schools of Greek-Christian education. As for dual Enosis, which is going to become a revolutionary solution for some, it was proposed by the Turkish state since the 1950s and by the Americans since '63.
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 The "Greek-Christian History", which has been served to us for years by the intellectuals of the state and of "social peace", has been based on two main axes. The "Greek-Christian History", which has been served to us for years by the intellectuals of the state and of "social peace", has been based on two main axes.
  
-α) The existence and uniqueness of this phenomenon called "hellenism".+a) The existence and uniqueness of this phenomenon called "hellenism".
  
 b) In a conception of history as a straight line, extending from antiquity to the present, and whose unchanging essence was the phenomenon of "hellenism". In this context, the relationship between the people who were supposed to embody this phenomenon (hellenism) and other peoples and cultural groups was a surprisingly asymmetrical one. The Greeks were "civilizing" or "liberating", while the rest of the world was corrupting or "barbarically conquering" this now metaphysical phenomenon. b) In a conception of history as a straight line, extending from antiquity to the present, and whose unchanging essence was the phenomenon of "hellenism". In this context, the relationship between the people who were supposed to embody this phenomenon (hellenism) and other peoples and cultural groups was a surprisingly asymmetrical one. The Greeks were "civilizing" or "liberating", while the rest of the world was corrupting or "barbarically conquering" this now metaphysical phenomenon.
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 According to this position, the struggle of the Cypriots against colonialism and imperialism (embodied by England) becomes the struggle of the Greek people for independence. The bourgeoisie, which is selling out Greece to foreigners, is betraying the struggle of the Greek Cypriots. (Typical cases for Psyroukis are the refusal of the English offer in '14, the condemnation of the Oktovriana by Venizelos and the non-inclusion of Cyprus in the "national processes" in '45.) According to this position, the struggle of the Cypriots against colonialism and imperialism (embodied by England) becomes the struggle of the Greek people for independence. The bourgeoisie, which is selling out Greece to foreigners, is betraying the struggle of the Greek Cypriots. (Typical cases for Psyroukis are the refusal of the English offer in '14, the condemnation of the Oktovriana by Venizelos and the non-inclusion of Cyprus in the "national processes" in '45.)
  
-Thus, the bourgeoisie loses the leadership in the struggle for ethnogenesis and it must be taken over by the working class. In this context, Enosis could not be achieved simply by ceding the island to Greece. On the contrary, the demand of Enosis (a demand that expresses the dynamic of Greek ethnogenesis and the anti-imperialist struggle of the nation) has an explosive dynamic that overturns the balance and challenges imperialist-capitalist dependence.+Thus, the bourgeoisie loses the leadership in the struggle for ethnogenesis and it must be taken over by the working class. In this context, Enosis could not be achieved simply by ceding the island to Greece(13). On the contrary, the demand of Enosis (a demand that expresses the dynamic of Greek ethnogenesis and the anti-imperialist struggle of the nation) has an explosive dynamic that overturns the balance and challenges imperialist-capitalist dependence.
  
 And Psyroukis observes that in the 1950s the Cyprus problem was the issue that challenged the nationalist right and gave a new impetus to the movement of the Greek left. And in Cyprus, in the 1940s, AKEL was at the forefront of the struggle for Enosis. Here then, always according to Psyroukis, is the working class slowly taking the lead in the struggle for ethnogenesis. And Psyroukis observes that in the 1950s the Cyprus problem was the issue that challenged the nationalist right and gave a new impetus to the movement of the Greek left. And in Cyprus, in the 1940s, AKEL was at the forefront of the struggle for Enosis. Here then, always according to Psyroukis, is the working class slowly taking the lead in the struggle for ethnogenesis.
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 Patriarchy of course pre-exists nationalism. But at least as we know it in the European region, patriarchy has changed significantly in recent centuries. Whereas before it was founded on the personal power of the man-patriarch-father in the family context (we will call this relationship communal patriarchy), it has now spread and diffused, in 'modern society' with the infusion of modern, mass institutions and power ties (e.g. state-patriarchy, pornography) with its own characteristics (social patriarchy) (26). Patriarchy of course pre-exists nationalism. But at least as we know it in the European region, patriarchy has changed significantly in recent centuries. Whereas before it was founded on the personal power of the man-patriarch-father in the family context (we will call this relationship communal patriarchy), it has now spread and diffused, in 'modern society' with the infusion of modern, mass institutions and power ties (e.g. state-patriarchy, pornography) with its own characteristics (social patriarchy) (26).
  
-This differentiation, between communal and social patriarchy, is not something static or divisive like capitalism-feudalism.(27). Although it has some things in common with the above distinction (based on class relations), it is nevertheless much more complex. Patriarchy in any society (whether modern or older) is the main lever of social consensus and perhaps the archetypal power relationship. And the family is one of the key institutions of this power structure (a structure that extends from culture to economics and politics). In this sense both the family and the social diffusion of patriarchy are historical phenomena. However, in modern society, with urbanization, the gathering of thousands of people in cities, the spread of mass media, the breaking of blood ties, the 'extended family', etc., are leading to a crisis of traditional patriarchy, the family, traditional morality, etc.(28).+This differentiation, between communal and social patriarchy, is not something static or divisive like capitalism-feudalism(27). Although it has some things in common with the above distinction (based on class relations), it is nevertheless much more complex. Patriarchy in any society (whether modern or older) is the main lever of social consensus and perhaps the archetypal power relationship. And the family is one of the key institutions of this power structure (a structure that extends from culture to economics and politics). In this sense both the family and the social diffusion of patriarchy are historical phenomena. However, in modern society, with urbanization, the gathering of thousands of people in cities, the spread of mass media, the breaking of blood ties, the 'extended family', etc., are leading to a crisis of traditional patriarchy, the family, traditional morality, etc.(28).
  
 Nationalism appears in Europe (and later on globally) at about the same time that communal patriarchy seems to be disintegrating under multiple pressures (patriarchy itself seems to be in crisis in some cases).(29) In this crisis of patriarchy, which is also a crisis of the ideological imaginaries of society, nationalism does not appear as an irrelevant parallel phenomenon. It is essentially the ideology that helps to reconstruct and consolidate patriarchy at new levels. In any of its forms, whether as warlike masculinism or as a cultural turn to the roots of patriarchal culture, nationalism reestablishes social consensus on imaginaries directly identified with patriarchal configuration. Nationalism appears in Europe (and later on globally) at about the same time that communal patriarchy seems to be disintegrating under multiple pressures (patriarchy itself seems to be in crisis in some cases).(29) In this crisis of patriarchy, which is also a crisis of the ideological imaginaries of society, nationalism does not appear as an irrelevant parallel phenomenon. It is essentially the ideology that helps to reconstruct and consolidate patriarchy at new levels. In any of its forms, whether as warlike masculinism or as a cultural turn to the roots of patriarchal culture, nationalism reestablishes social consensus on imaginaries directly identified with patriarchal configuration.
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 The fact is that Cyprus was orphaned by the death of Makarios, it lost its personal patriarch. But there remained his state, which, despite the efforts of Kyprianos, no longer seems to need its personal patriarch so much. Perhaps, finally, the death of Makarios will unleash the dynamics of the contradiction. The fact is that Cyprus was orphaned by the death of Makarios, it lost its personal patriarch. But there remained his state, which, despite the efforts of Kyprianos, no longer seems to need its personal patriarch so much. Perhaps, finally, the death of Makarios will unleash the dynamics of the contradiction.
  
-**///b)//** The ideology of racial purity, the perception that there is a pure race-nation (the Greek one in this case) that is in danger of degeneration, corruption, pollution, is a basic characteristic of nationalism, not only of the far right but also of leftist nationalism (the latter of course being more sophisticated). As various scholars of the Nazi phenomenon have observed, this tendency to "purity" has deep roots, reaching back to repressed sexuality in the context of the patriarchal family. At the same time, the ideology of racial purity is based on an archetypal relationship within the patriarchy.+**//b)//** The ideology of racial purity, the perception that there is a pure race-nation (the Greek one in this case) that is in danger of degeneration, corruption, pollution, is a basic characteristic of nationalism, not only of the far right but also of leftist nationalism (the latter of course being more sophisticated). As various scholars of the Nazi phenomenon have observed, this tendency to "purity" has deep roots, reaching back to repressed sexuality in the context of the patriarchal family. At the same time, the ideology of racial purity is based on an archetypal relationship within the patriarchy.
  
 On the tendency to objectify an Other as something hostile and subversive that must be subjugated. The woman, as Simone de Beauvoir observes, is the typical case of the Other in patriarchal culture. John Chrysostom, from our own Greek-Christian culture, says it quite clearly: "Woman is a necessary evil, a natural temptation, the danger of the home, a deadly charm."  On the tendency to objectify an Other as something hostile and subversive that must be subjugated. The woman, as Simone de Beauvoir observes, is the typical case of the Other in patriarchal culture. John Chrysostom, from our own Greek-Christian culture, says it quite clearly: "Woman is a necessary evil, a natural temptation, the danger of the home, a deadly charm." 
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 +----
 +
 +=====notes=====
 +
 +1. In 1976-77 when Makarios and AKEL begin to accept bi-zonal bi-communal federation. EDEK, despite theoretically crying out against this course of action, practically went along with it as it ran on a joint ticket with AKEL and all it did against the Makarios-Denktaş agreements (which bound the Greek Cypriot state to the bi-zonal one) was to "express reservations".
 +
 +2. The official line of "Socialist Expression" was the need for a left-wing government (AKEL - EDEK).
 +
 +3. There was a perception that this stratum (unionists), which opposed the Cypriot state (on the basis that its existence excluded Enosis), was revolutionary - somewhere some people were calling these strata unconscious anti-statists!!! (see Pentadaktylos No.4 "The State in Cypriot society").
 +
 +4. This is the group that the magazine [[en:magazines:mavrespinelies|"Mavres Pinelies"]] put out and for which this text was originally written and discussed.
 +
 +5. For more analysis of this issue and its function within the patriarchal family see the piece on patriarchal reconstruction.
 +
 +6. It would be nice if pro-Enosis Marxists would take a look at socialist Zionism. Perhaps they might see some correlations with their own case and the implications of such "marriages" - where socialism is sacrificed to the need for the "national interest", or how many people with such views were used to make the state of Israel what it is today.
 +
 +7. DISY and AKEL got about as much in the '81 elections.
 +
 +8. The last thing I heard in the various tragic-comedic "whining" threads is that the government maintains 1-2 camps with shacks (and pays refugees to stay there) for official visitors.
 +
 +9. The Cypriot economy has been "on its feet" since '74, largely due to foreign aid. In this context, we should also mention the huge financial aid from Greece, which was among the highest. The continuation of this aid is funny and to some extent scandalous. The standard of living in Cyprus is higher than in Greece - the money that people in Greece are deprived of in a time of economic crisis is largely given to sustain nationalist illusions.
 +
 +10. Despite Makarios' maneuvers and theories of feasibility, the ideological charge was so great that no one dared to openly take on the "national centre". Makarios was a typical case, he tolerated for years conspiracies in the army and propaganda against him in schools, in the hope of avoiding conflict with the "national centre" (even when it was the Junta). When he decided that he was going no further it was already too late.
 +
 +11. The pro-Enosis Marxist perspective, which dates back to the 1960s and the first appearance of Greek Maoism, has found its spiritual father in the historian Nikos Psyroukis. The emphasis in the analysis, which follows Psyroukis and RIXI (rather than the Cypriot pro-Enosis Marxists), is because they seem to have largely determined the ideology of the Cypriot comrades. Also, it should be stressed that pro-Enosis Marxists do not necessarily have a single view on all issues or even a single ideology. I use the term pro-Enosis Marxist as a term generally accepted by them (see also RIXI No.14). As for the analysis, I rely on their theoretical and views expressed without encountering a contradiction among them (e.g. dual Enosis).
 +
 +12. R. Olympios, Tetradia no.1. "The influence of the Cyprus problem on the thought of the left-wing militants."
 +
 +13. Here, Psyroukis is taking things too far and completely disregarding historical reality. For the mentioned refusals of Greece were made at times of particular historical circumstances and in no case was Enosis erased. It is simply that the politicians in Athens postponed the issue for a better opportunity. Let us not forget, it was the "communist-eater" Papagos who began to somewhat move the diplomatic nets for Enosis. And in Cyprus, the Enosis struggle in the 1950s was clearly led by the ruling classes. It is a stretch to interpret diplomatic circumstances and political contradictions as social or historical contradictions.
 +
 +14. P. Prodromou "Our reaction to Turkey's expansionist plans", Apopsi no. 8-9. page 4.
 +
 +15. It should be noted in this context, that the theory of "national integration" and ethnogenesis goes out of the window with regard to the Northern Epirus. But this is a matter of "right-wing nationalism". And then Albania is "socialist" and for years was Maoist.
 +
 +16. During this period (as well as others) it is debatable whether the Orthodox (the ancestors of the Greek Cypriots) were the majority. Mr. Graikos notes that in a population of about 180,000, there were 70-80,000 Armenians and Maronites - alongside them must be added the Latins and Syrians. Also in the 17th century, in an official census, the Mohammedans were the majority. Although this majority included the Linobambaki who were an independent community, it nevertheless highlights the point that the Orthodox, even if they were the largest religious community, were not the majority.
 +
 +17. Neo-Cypriots like an idyllic picture of cohabitation until the evil nationalists came along and lured the "uneducated people" etc.
 +
 +18. These "leaders" appeared after the popular mobilisations to "lead" the military struggle. And it is no coincidence that the Neo-Cypriot and Greek-Christian historians, each trying to justify their state, argue over the moods of the 3 leaders instead of the popular tendencies that were admittedly common (Christian-Muslim) and with obvious implications of a final conflict (and the elites of course responded in unison. Archbishop Panaretos blessed and justified the massacres of Christians and Muslims in Paphos after the suppression of the movement). Anyway, anyone who wants to justify modern institutions of power will look no further than the embryonic power mechanisms (leaderships) that were created in the movements.
 +
 +19. The uprisings, beyond the class edge, also had the prospect of more rapprochement between the two communities after political equality regardless of religion. Hill, for example, observes that Gavür Imam was perhaps named so because he promised Christian-Muslim equality.
 +
 +20. The claims of the Greek-Christians that the movements were of an Enosis nature are far-fetched to say the least. The rebellion of the more "Enosis" leader (Nicholas Theseus) was quickly dispersed and it is unlikely that the insurgents (including many Turks) had any idea of the ideas of the self-proclaimed "military leader". The same applies to Ioannikios, who even collaborated with Gavür Imam, and whose (Ioannikios') last comrades were 40 Albanians. As for the other "self-proclaimed" leader, Gavür Imam, his intentions are not yet clear. The Neo-Cypriots want him to be the most genuine popular leader, while L. Piggouras, in a study-distraction for the Neo-Cypriots, suggests that he had links with Egypt and that he was a 'Cypriot Ali Pasha'. Although from a historical point of view all this is interesting, we hope that in the future our historians will solve the problem of "good" and "bad" leaders (theirs and others) and also deal a little with the class movement (as many of them claim to be Marxists anyway).
 +
 +21. Studies by two American psychologists among Cypriot youth in the 1960s. Among other things, they found a more pronounced nationalism among high school youth than among older people or private school students. Also, in a thematic analysis of school textbooks, nationalism and anti-Turkism were among the most projected values.
 +
 +22. Cyprus: A case study
 +
 +23. Not to imply that this is only the practice of right-wing nationalist movements, anyone who is interested should look at Stina's book "EAM, ELAS, OPLA" to see the practices of a left-wing nationalist movement against ideological opponents, marginalised people, prostitutes, etc.
 +
 +24. The reference to EOKA and the criticism of this organisation is not made at the level of the A or B fighter. It is a criticism of the ideological climate that gave birth to and tolerated EOKA - and on an individual level to its initiators and organizers - Makarios and, more importantly, Grivas. Beyond that, there is no doubt that beyond the interest-seekers who sought a position in the Cypriot state (Giorkatzis) or the ideological fascists (Grivas), there were also people who believed and fought for freedom and the anti-colonial struggle. If more people thought like the quote from Matsis below, things might have been different: "That's why I don't care if this land is lived on by Turks or Greeks. What has value is that it is lived by those who water it with their sweat, standing on it free..."
 +
 +25. The description of EOKA as an "elite of male heroes" does not mean that EOKA had no female followers or even members. Grivas in '56 ordered the creation of women's groups - which, despite their training, of course always remained as reserves. It is also worth reading the book by Eleni Seraphim Loizou (the only woman who was allowed to turn "wanted in case of need" (i.e. a partisan) and one of the few (were there any others?) female section leaders of EOKA. The way she talks about the " leader", phrases like "the earth opened up to swallow me" when she was congratulated by the " leader" in front of the male section commanders, the fact that in order to convince the men to take on a mission, she threatened them that if they didn't, she would "send girls", etc. say a lot about the mentality in EOKA, especially when said by a woman who had risen on its ranks somewhat. It is in these contexts that the elite man-hero critique is made. Like the mentality, ideology and power structure of the organization - which were clearly male issues - women, like the people, were at best the reserves.
 +
 +26. Both communal and social patriarchy have their own distinctions.
 +
 +27. For those who like sociological definitions, the classical distinction between Gemeinschuft and Gessellschaft (for all its drawbacks) is closer to the distinction of patriarchy proposed here.
 +
 +28. For a first reflection on the issue of changing morals, crisis of the family, etc. in the period of change, see Edward Shorter's classic study 'History of the modern Family'. Shorter observes that the first sexual revolution that took place in this period was made by the lower classes (the proletarians).
 +
 +29. It enters a crisis in the sense that the pressure and struggle of women goes beyond the interpersonal level, it is brought into the political problem. It is no coincidence in this context that modern feminism appears from the French Revolution onwards and goes hand in hand with other social movements (e.g. worker's movement). As pointed out in the study "Fire in the minds of Men", between the two major revolutionary currents of the 19th century (socialist - nationalist), women revolutionaries had more fields of expression and a preference for the former.
 +
 +30. It is not clear whether the intensification of the "pseudomoral" campaign coincided with an intensification of the crisis of communal patriarchy and the dimensions of this crisis. The lack of a lot of data and of a socio-historical analysis creates problems of identifying the historical phases of the reconstruction. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming is the near absence of studies and analysis of the position of Cypriot women in various historical phases. The little evidence that does exist, such as the large number of dialogues in the archbishopric codes (see Kirris), the existence of " children of the street", etc., points to a model with many similarities to the European ones that have been analysed in depth. Certainly, however, much more is needed in this area. - One of the few studies of women in the 18th and 19th centuries presented in the "popular university" is a collection of extracts (mostly from foreign observers) without a theoretical-analytical framework.
 +
 +31. This trend has been observed by several scholars. Al Habri, for example, attributes it to man's attempt to make up for the fact that he cannot give life like the woman in childbirth. When this effort is placed in the context of a power relationship (such as patriarchy), it turns into perpetuation and immortality on the basis of domination.
 +
 +32. Libertarian anarchist movements developed in the 20th century in intense competition with nationalist movements. Suffice it to mention two classic anarchist movements, the Makhnovist movement in Ukraine in 1918-21 and the revolution in Catalonia (and other Spanish regions of course) in 1936. In both cases, both the Makhno movement and the CNT had to confront the nationalists, who ultimately played a role in the defeat of the revolution. It is necessary to stress that in both regions there was a "national" problem (of autonomy from the Russian or Spanish state). The anarchists and the nationalists offered completely different solutions to the problem (the former decentralized-separate federation of regions, the latter the creation of a nation-state). Without responding to the national issue, at the level it was presented, the anarchists formed an autonomous 'discourse and sphere', insofar as their counter-power could be counterposed against the state and the nationalists, and opened up new solutions.
 +
 +33. See the persecution of Rebetiko when it was a live singing practise or the modern persecution of "Turkish gypsy" music, "gypsy" music etc.
 +
 +34. The impression is often cultivated that the English did everything to de-hellenise the Greek Cypriots. This is a far-fetched fairy tale from the nationalist period. Without caring much for the Cypriots, the English nevertheless increased the power of the Greeks and for various reasons encouraged the Greek-Christian movement in its early days (see Churchill's statements in '12, Governor Storrs' writings, etc.). In the first period (up to '14 when the annexation took place and some up to '30) several Englishmen through a Eurocentric racism (against the eastern Turks) or for reasons of political expediency (since until '14 England was just a placeholder in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Empire) emphasized quite clearly the Greekness of Cyprus.
 +
 +35. Although the Greek Christians live with this nightmare, the Neo-Cypriots have not yet proposed it. Their two demands, which aroused the holy wrath of our Greeks (and the pro-Enosis Marxists, of course), were the proposal to officially establish only the Cypriot flag as the state flag (i.e. to do away with the Greek flag) and to create a Cypriot national anthem. Yearnings that these people have.
  
  
 +{{tag>
 +Condition:"Needs Translation":"Needs Turkish Translation"
 +Condition:"Unclear Archiving"
 +"Pamphlets"
 +Groups:Undefined
 +"Decade:Decade 1980-1989"
 +"Year:1984"
 +Areas:Athens
 +Subject:"Cyprus Problem" Subject:"Nationalism"}}
en/brochures/unclassified/kipros_ethniko_ethnikismos.1736161561.txt.gz · Last modified: 2025/04/20 19:43 (external edit)