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-This translation was created for the purposes of archiving and does not originate from the original creators of the text.
+This translation was created for the purposes of archiving and does not originate from the original creator of the text.
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-====== 80 Years on the Right's Tail: AKEL according to Andreas Ziartides (Online Article)======
+====== 80 Years as the Right's Tail: AKEL according to Andreas Ziartides (Online Article)======
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 As can be seen from Ziartides' words, AKEL's main concern at that time was to avoid "the stigma of being anti-national", in order to become a mass party. There was the notion of reducing the suspicion that existed in the world about communists. So, for mainly opportunist reasons, AKEL adopted the nationalist demand of enosis. (46) Instead of attempting to elevate the nationalist consciousness of the working class into a class anti-capitalist consciousness, AKEL bowed to the existing consciousness in order to win supporters. This choice goes against the very basics of the Marxist ideology that AKEL was supposedly espousing at the time. As Lenin points out, the working class alone can only acquire a workers', trade unionist consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it must fight the employers for its own immediate daily interests and demand workers' legislation from the government. The task of a socialist/communist party is to raise the consciousness of the proletariat to a class consciousness, i.e., a consciousness of the necessity of overcoming capitalism. For this, according to Lenin, "we must take up actively the political education of the working class and the development of its political consciousness."[2]
-AKEL's pro-enosis nationalism is clear in the 1940s. In 1944 Sir Cosmo Parkinson visited Cyprus in order to negotiate with representatives of the Cypriot people the future of Cyprus after the Second World War. AKEL was strong at the time, controlling two municipalities and the rising trade union movement, so it could take the lead in the talks. According to Ziartides, however, AKEL was the most fanatical supporter of the position that there should be no contact with Sir Kosmos: "AKEL organised mass militant demonstrations at the time under the slogan 'Down with Sir Cosmo', 'Long live national restoration and the Union [Enosis] of Cyprus with Greece'. (57) In 1947, AKEL changed its stance and dared to participate in the Diaskeptiki, the only political force in the country to do so. As Ziartides testifies, the right wing waged a fierce struggle against Diaskeptiki, "charged with anti-AKEL and anti-leftist propaganda, [...] charged with epithets against the participants, as traitors, as people who undermine the basic desire of the Cypriot people for Enosis." (59) AKEL could not withstand this demagogic attack by the right and withdrew from the Conference: "The weight of this demagogy and the attack we suffered resulted in our yielding." (60) The need for acceptance by the nationalist right and the nationalist working class proved stronger than any ideological, theoretical and strategic positions of the party on the national question.
+AKEL's pro-enosis nationalism is clear in the 1940s. In 1944 Sir Cosmo Parkinson visited Cyprus in order to negotiate with representatives of the Cypriot people the future of Cyprus after the Second World War. AKEL was strong at the time, controlling two municipalities and the rising trade union movement, so it could take the lead in the talks. According to Ziartides, however, AKEL was the most fanatical supporter of the position that there should be no contact with Sir Kosmos: "AKEL organised mass militant demonstrations at the time under the slogan 'Down with Sir Cosmo', 'Long live national restoration and the Union [Enosis] of Cyprus with Greece'. (57) In 1947, AKEL changed its stance and dared to participate in the Diaskeptiki [Consultative Assembly], the only political force in the country to do so. As Ziartides testifies, the right wing waged a fierce struggle against Diaskeptiki, "charged with anti-AKEL and anti-leftist propaganda, [...] charged with epithets against the participants, as traitors, as people who undermine the basic desire of the Cypriot people for Enosis." (59) AKEL could not withstand this demagogic attack by the right and withdrew from the Conference: "The weight of this demagogy and the attack we suffered resulted in our yielding." (60) The need for acceptance by the nationalist right and the nationalist working class proved stronger than any ideological, theoretical and strategic positions of the party on the national question.
 Ziartides regretted in retrospect the uncompromising pro-enosis stance of AKEL towards both Sir Cosmos and during the Diaskeptiki, as it undermined the relations between the two communities in Cyprus.(65) It is important to note, however, that he regretted it for tactical, rather than ideological anti-nationalist reasons. Until his death, Ziartides considered the goal of enosis to be a correct position on the part of AKEL; the mistake for him was that AKEL and the Greek Cypriot side in general misjudged and underestimated the reactions of the Turkish factor in Cyprus and ignored the existence of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. (217-9) He believes that AKEL and the Greek Cypriot side should have been more pragmatic and focused on demands for political and democratic rights that would gradually lead to self-government and eventually to Enosis. (218) The only mistake was AKEL's maximalism: "We made the mistake of insisting on the maximum of our demand, which was enosis, and closed our eyes to the possibilities that existed for democratic developments in our country." And: "We continued to push for enosis and found ourselves in the position of being powerless to control the spontaneity of the popular masses, whose spontaneity we cultivated." (218)
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 The above assertion that the logical consequence of trade-unionism is cowardice and hesitation at crucial moments is proven by the overall history of AKEL. AKEL has over time been unprepared and incapable of taking the lead in the political life of the country, something that Ziartides himself admits. As he very tellingly says: "this feeling of self-preservation, this feeling of being 'careful' not to provoke measures of repression of the Movement, distinguished our Party, I would say, at every critical moment." (81) I dare say that this defensive self-preservation and caution in the face of the Right is the main characteristic of AKEL as a political party, the main element of its identity.
-There are many examples of AKEL's weakness and unpreparedness at crucial moments in Cyprus' history. First of all, there was the aforementioned withdrawal from the Diaskeptiki Conference due to pressure from the Right. In 1955, AKEL was caught unprepared by the start of the EOKA struggle, and 'quite unjustifiably' according to Ziartides, as Ezecias Papaioannou had received information in 1954 that an armed struggle was being prepared. (74) In the coup, AKEL 'was left completely unprepared and completely unsuspecting,' with the Party's Epawachung being more concerned with monitoring possible dissident members than with political developments in the country (84): 'Essentially the Party's leadership was paralysed'. (87) Nor did AKEL ever put its hand on the fire on the Cyprus issue, culminating in the NO to the Annan Plan.
+There are many examples of AKEL's weakness and unpreparedness at crucial moments in Cyprus' history. First of all, there was the aforementioned withdrawal from Diaskeptiki due to pressure from the Right. In 1955, AKEL was caught unprepared by the start of the EOKA struggle, and "quite unjustifiably" according to Ziartides, as Ezekias Papaioannou had received information in 1954 that an armed struggle was being prepared. (74) In the coup, AKEL "was left completely unprepared and completely unsuspecting," with the Party's 'Vigilance' group being more concerned with monitoring possible dissident members than with political developments in the country (84): "Essentially the Party's leadership was paralysed". (87) Nor did AKEL ever put its hand on the fire on the Cyprus issue, culminating in the NO to the Annan Plan.
+Perhaps the best proof that AKEL was nothing more than a bourgeois party is that it did not enter into a particular crisis after the fall of the Soviet Union, unlike its counterparts such as the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). There was the small split with ADISOK, but AKEL managed to maintain and even increase its numbers at that time. Ziartides explains this phenomenon by saying that Cypriot workers were particularly loyal to AKEL and the trade union movement because of the significant benefits it brought them, (186) but I believe the main reason was that AKEL was not a party with a communist ideology, and thus did not fall into crisis with the collapse of 'actually existing socialism'. It was fully integrated into the Cypriot political establishment.
+It remains to reflect a little on the reasons for AKEL's inability to behave like a communist party. This is a long chapter which needs a lot of study and thought which I have not done. However, there are some factors that are relatively self-evident. First of all, AKEL lacked a theoretical background and underestimated the importance of theory. Ziartides repeatedly mentions "the low theoretical and political level of the Party leadership in general", not excluding himself. Particularly low was the theoretical and political level of the General Secretary of AKEL, Ezekias Papaioannou. (167-8) Ziartides accuses Papaioannou of "belittling the Party's intelligentsia in a deferential and unacceptable way. I heard him repeatedly say: "I will not exchange, not one PEO worker, not one builder, a member of PEO, for ten Party intellectuals". He often said that." (169) Papaioannou's attitude most probably lies in the fact that he himself had insecurity and an inferiority complex towards left-wing intellectuals because of his own lack of a theoretical background.
+The lack of theoretical knowledge is a big problem in a communist party and in a workers' movement, since, as Luxemburg prominently says, "the entire strength of the modern labour movement rests on theoretic knowledge."[13] The formula of Marx in 'The German Ideology', Lenin in 'What Is to be Done?' and Luxemburg in 'Reform or Revolution' is that the revolution will only be achieved by the unity of the intelligentsia with the workers' movement: "Only when science and the workers, these opposite poles of society, become one, will they crush in their arms of steel all obstacles to culture."[14] Only when the workers acquire class consciousness, i.e., historical consciousness of capital, i.e., theoretical knowledge, can they succeed in overcoming capitalism. The proletarian movement is based both on its organisation and on its consciousness and understanding of the present in which it is called upon to act.
+AKEL's lack of theoretical background has led it to a wooden, dogmatic rhetoric. According to Ziartides, there was a real circulation and flourishing of leftist ideas in Cyprus until 1945 or 1950, but after that the party strictly applied the wooden Stalinist dogmas of the time, such as the constant invocation of imperialism as the source of all evils: "There is also a tendency to blame all the problems the country faced, all the unpleasant events that occurred, regardless of whether they occurred because of our own mistakes and our own recklessness, on imperialism." (227) And: "if [one] examines the party documents, the speeches of the party leaders, especially the speeches of the General Secretary, from 1955-1960, and here too you will see a constant reiteration of the same positions, the same slogans." (226-7)
+Another problem of AKEL was its authoritarian way of functioning and its lack of self-criticism. Ziartides repeatedly referred to these characteristics of AKEL. AKEL never reconsidered its position on Diaskeptiki, despite Ziartides' urgings, with the excuse that it was not the time to scratch the wounds of the past. (61) After the coup, "no responsibility was claimed by the party's 'Vigilance' group, nor was there any self-criticism." (85) With the rise of Eurocommunism in the 1970s, several members of AKEL, including Ziartides, openly flirted with it, and Ziartides suggested that the issue of Eurocommunism be discussed in the party's plenary session, so that the pros and cons could be heard and a formal Central Committee decision on the issue could be made. It was decided to discuss the matter within the Central Committee, but this decision was never carried out. "All that was raised was: From time to time when the Central Committee met and the General Secretary or other members made a political contribution they also referred to Eurocommunism, which they anathematized." (160-1)[15]
+Papaioannou himself behaved in a very authoritarian manner and shouted at anyone who dared to disagree with him. (125, 173) The party also tended to conceal ideological problems from its rank and file, (184) and even the Politburo and the Central Committee were not informed of everything the General Secretary of the Party and the 'Vigilance' group discussed with the Soviet Embassy: "We are never informed". (89) In this way of functioning, AKEL cultivated in its members blind, uncritical obedience to its leadership instead of critical thinking and conscience.
+AKEL's lack of theoretical background, its authoritarian mode of operation and its allergy to self-criticism are all typical characteristics of the stalinised parties from the 1940s onwards. Nevertheless, there are important differences between AKEL and other Stalinist parties such as KKE that are worth investigating and discussing. AKEL seems very much influenced by the tradition of British Trotskyism, unlike other Stalinist parties. Also, I don't know how many Stalinist parties there have been that were so blatantly acting as tails of a bourgeois, nationalist establishment. Another interesting question is whether and how AKEL could have acted differently and acquired a different identity as a party from the one it eventually acquired. The answer to these questions is beyond the scope of this text.
+** 5. Epilogue: What Is to be Done?**
+In this text I have attempted to show that the main characteristic of AKEL, since its foundation in 1941, is that it acts as a tail of the Cypriot nationalist right. The thread that runs through Ziartides’ autobiography 'Without Fear and Passion' is AKEL’s cowardice and acting as a tail in the face of the Cypriot nationalist right. This characteristic of AKEL is evident in almost all the chapters of the book, constituting their connecting link and ultimately showing that in essence AKEL was a bourgeois party that was was the tail of the right.
+The question is what do we do from here on, those of us who identify ourselves as Cypriot leftists and communists. I quote relevant excerpts from my earlier text //[[en:digital:justice:akel_problem|The Problem of AKEL]]//[16]:
+"The extra-parliamentary left claims that we need a strong AKEL against the right and the extreme right. What it avoids mentioning is that over time we have had a strong AKEL, with the party coming first or second in every election since the founding of the Republic of Cyprus, without this threatening the hegemony of the right on the island. Over the years we have seen neither a class counterattack nor the promotion of the socialist perspective. AKEL went so far as to elect its general secretary as president of 'democracy', and his administration proved that AKEL has no alternative socio-economic proposal to neoliberalism, ultimately leading us into a memorandum. In the last election it didn't even have the courage to run its own left-wing candidate, running with the technocrat Malas, and seriously flirting with supporting the neoliberal businessman Mike Spanos. It also found himself embroiled in corruption scandals more than once, the latest being the passport scandal, and fully embraced the Anastasiades government's authoritarian anti-constitutional measures for Covid-19, until the mass protest of [[el:groups:osdame|Os Dame]] indicated that it was in its interest to change his stance (a little).
+In the coming years, AKEL will complete its transformation from a bourgeois party with popular policies to a bourgeois party with anti-popular policies but with social sensibilities. Its political base will be not so much the poorer sections of the population but the progressive and liberal people of the island. As the political situation in Cyprus will not improve, new populist and/or far-right parties such as ELAM will continue to grow, and with a pro-popular discourse they can win over many traditional AKEL voters. At the same time, the Cypriot extra-parliamentary left will be increasingly pushed towards AKEL in the name of anti-fascism. It will thus become the most vocal supporter of the establishment."
+"The reasons that lead the extra-parliamentary left to support AKEL are various: some people are emotionally attached to AKEL from a young age, many follow the logic of the lesser evil, and I suspect that many support it out of desperation, having lost faith in the possibility of a revolutionary left on the island. In all cases, however, the result is the same: the individuals and groups/collectives in question unwittingly support an establishment party, foster illusions in that party (and by extension the establishment), and ultimately prevent the working class from realising the need to self-organise and take its fate into its own hands. AKEL can take the people of this area as his given supporters, without serious pressure to pursue more left-wing policies. Particularly now, with the rise of ELAM and the shift of DISY to the right, it can easily present himself as the lesser evil that will prevent the rise of fascism."
+"It is imperative to build a left political force that can express the direct interests of the working class, proposing its own popular reforms to the government's reactionary approach. A left political force that will simultaneously cultivate class consciousness in the world and link any reformist struggles today with the need for revolutionary transformation of society tomorrow, in cooperation with similar forces internationally."
+**Phedias Christodoulides**
+//The views expressed are the personal opinions of the authors.//
+//Phedias Christodoulides is a PhD candidate in philosophy at Northwestern University and a member of the 1917 group. He is also involved in the Platypus Affiliated Society. He can be contacted at ph.christodoulides [at] gmail [dot] com.//
+----
+[1] The autobiography is in the form of an interview with Ziartides' friend and fellow traveller Panikos Peonides. All page references are to the book Andreas Ziartides - Without Fear and Passion, Synergetic Printing House, Nicosia 1995.
+[2] V. I. Lenin, What Is to be Done?, Themelio Publications, Athens 1964, p. 72  [Translator's Note: For the purposes of this translation, I have replaced all quotes by Lenin and Luxemburg and with the same quotes as they appear on the English version of the Marxist Archive. References to page numbers for Luxemburg have also been adjusted to refer to the Marxist Archive PDF].
+[3] Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution, Korontzi Publications, Athens 1984, p. 57
+[4] Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution, p. 8
+[5] Trade-unionism is the purely economic trade union struggle that has no political implications.
+[6] Before the split of the Second International, the communist movement called itself social democracy. The meaning of the term has since changed.
+[7] V. I. Lenin, What Is to be Done?, p. 71-2
+[8] Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, Ergatiki Dimokratia Publications, 1997, p. 91
+[9] Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, p. 95
+[10] Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, p. 70
+[11] Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, p. 89
+[12] https://cyprus.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/CyprusEconomicCrisis_gr_v02_DIGITAL.pdf
+[13] Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution, p. 9
+[14] Luxemburg quoting Lassalle in the introduction to Reform or Revolution.
+[15] It is worth mentioning that AKEL has never in its history been to the left of Eurocommunism, despite its anathemas about the latter.
+[16] https://1917.com.cy/2021/09/10/%cf%84%ce%bf-%ce%b1%ce%ba%ce%b5%ce%bb%ce%b9%ce%ba%cf%8c-%cf%80%cf%81%cf%8c%ce%b2%ce%bb%ce%b7%ce%bc%ce%b1/
+The image taken from the following Sigmalive article: https://www.sigmalive.com/news/kypriako/724534/to-enotiko-dimopsifisma-to-akel-kai-i-enoxlisi-akintzi
+{{https://web.archive.org/web/20221010124647if_/https://1917magazine.files.wordpress.com/2022/10/15a5c725434093.jpg?nocache}}
+[**Note:** Banner in Image Reads 'NATO No, Enosis Yes'.]
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