

EDITED BY ANTONIS PASTELLOPOULOS

THE HEROES BACK IN THEIR GRAVES



TEN RADICAL TEXTS
ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE

FAURA BOOKS

The Heroes Back in their Graves
Ten Radical Texts on the Cyprus Issue

EDITED BY ANTONIS PASTELLOPOULOS

**THE
HEROES
BACK
IN
THEIR
GRAVES**

**TEN RADICAL TEXTS
ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE**

FAURA BOOKS

For the faura [itch] of radical ideas

Faura Books prints and distributes material with the aim of sharpening movement discourse, both on theoretical and practical issues. Our goal is to maintain a structure capable of publishing printed material from individuals and collectives. Agreement with the content is not required.

We stand against the logic of intellectual property. We encourage the free use of our publications for the purpose of intensifying class and social struggle.

*The Heroes Back in Their Graves: Ten Radical
Texts on the Cyprus Issue
Edited by Antonis Pastellopoulos*

Typesetting: faura books

The title and cover image are taken from the fifth issue of the anarchist magazine “Traino stin Poli” [Train to the City], which was published in Limassol in September 1988.

Printed in 250 copies in Greek and 150 in English in Nicosia, June 2025.
Distributed on a free contribution basis.

faurabooks@riseup.net
faurabooks.noblogs.org

*This collection is dedicated to the memory of
Phedias Christodoulides.*

Contents

Terms Appearing in the Texts	9
Introduction (A. Pastellopoulos)	13
Cyprus, the National Issue and Nationalism: A Libertarian Analysis (Anonymous)	42
Neither Davos nor non-Davos (anarchist group “Anafentos”)	106
The Main Enemy is “Our” Bourgeoisie (Workers’ Democracy)	122
The “Self-evident Truths” of Social Patriotism (Workers’ Democracy)	130
Federation or Death (M. Trotsky)	154
In Relation to the Annan Plan (Cypriot Anarchist Kernel)	160
5 positions on the reunification process (Falies)	166
Oh Yes! Federation! (Syspirosi Atakton)	174
Nationalism, Natural Gas, Bi-communal Struggles (antifa lefkosha)	180
Towards a Marxist Approach to the Cyprus Problem Today (Ph. Christodoulides)	188

Terms Appearing in the Texts

AKEL: The “Progressive Party of Working People” (AKEL) is the largest left-wing political party and one of the two largest parties in the Republic of Cyprus. It was founded in 1941 and is the oldest active party on the island.

Anafentos, anarchist group: Anarchist group from Limassol, active in the 1980s. It is considered the first anarchist group on the island.

Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III: Archbishop of Cyprus from 1950 until his death in 1977. He was one of the initiators of EOKA, and later signed the London and Zürich Agreements, representing the Greek Cypriot community. He served as President of the Republic of Cyprus from 1960 until his death.

Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF): UN-backed framework for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, which was formally decided as a common basis by the two communities with the signing of the 1977 High-Level Agreement by Archbishop Makarios III and Rauf Denktaş. All Cyprus resolution processes since 1977 have been based on this model, including the Annan Plan. A solution to the Cyprus Problem based on a bizonal bicommunal federation presupposes the geographical and political reunification of Cyprus through the creation of two internally autonomous polities, which would be under the control of a bicommunal central government.

EDEK: The United Democratic Union of the Centre (EDEK) was founded in 1969 by Vassos Lyssarides as the second left-wing

Greek Cypriot political party on the island. It was renamed in 1974 to “Socialist Party EDEK”. After the events of 1974 it saw a systematic increase in both registered members and electoral results until the 1980s. It was ideologically aligned with the current of third world socialism, combining social democratic economic policy with left-wing nationalism. It remains an active party on the island.

EOKA: The “National Organization of Cypriot Fighters” (EOKA) was a Greek Cypriot nationalist military organization that acted against the British during the last years of British colonial rule, with the aim of uniting Cyprus with Greece. It had a strong anti-communist character. The leader of the organisation was Georgios Grivas.

EOKAB: The “National Organization of Cypriot Fighters B” (EOKAB) was an illegal Greek Cypriot nationalist military organization founded in 1971 by Georgios Grivas. It promoted the union of Cyprus with Greece and took part in the coup d’état against the President of the Republic of Cyprus in 1974.

GC, TC: Abbreviations used in some texts for the words ‘Greek Cypriots’ and ‘Turkish Cypriots’.

Left Wing of EDEK: Also known as “Socialist Expression” or simply as the “Left Wing”, the “Left Wing of EDEK” was originally the Trotskyist wing of the Socialist Party EDEK. Its members were expelled from the party in the 1980s, driving the Left Wing to extra-parliamentary politics.

Republic of Cyprus: Independent Cypriot state declared in 1960 after the signing of the 1959 London and Zürich Agreements. It was bicomunal in character until the events of 1963, when it came under the absolute control of the Greek Cypriot community. It remains the only recognised independent Cypriot state on the island.

TMT: The “Turkish Resistance Organization” (TMT) was a Turkish Cypriot nationalist military organization founded in 1958 with

the aim of partitioning the island. After 1974 it was integrated into the security forces of the TRNC.

Train in the City: Cypriot anarchist magazine which was published irregularly from 1987 to 1994 in Limassol. A total of 11 issues were published, one of which was a double issue.

TRNC: The “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) was self-declared an independent Turkish Cypriot state in 1983. It was recognised only by the Republic of Turkey, with the geographical area claimed by the TRNC being legally considered part of the Republic of Cyprus, the only internationally recognised Cypriot state on the island.

Within the Walls: A Cypriot left-wing magazine of the extra-parliamentary milieu that was published in Nicosia from 1985 to 1990. A total of 42 issues were published.

Workers’ Democracy: Trotskyist political group created in the 1970s that developed vigorous political activity in the 1980s.

Introduction

Nationalism remains indisputably linked to the political and social reality of Cyprus. If the phenomenon is characterised by any uniqueness within the Cypriot context, this is found in the preservation and reproduction of the Cyprus Problem as the dominant civil and political issue on the island at least since the 1950s, rather than in the dominance of national identities, the preservation of national political discourse or the reproduction of national myths, as these manifestations of nationalism are reproduced through the structures of every modern nation-state and the everyday life that surrounds them. The process of consolidating the Cyprus Problem as an integral part of Cypriot everyday life remains intertwined with the downgrading of social demands on the island, mediating political, social and economic contradictions through an endless appeal to national unity in the face of the unbridgeable “national problem”. In these circumstances, the luxury of political action independent of the Cyprus Problem repeatedly proves to be an extremely difficult, if not impossible undertaking, with the need for some kind of positioning vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem taking the form of an imposed necessity rather than a personal or collective choice.

For the small (Greek) Cypriot anti-nationalist radical milieu, the deconstruction of the modern Cypriot experience presupposed the critical analysis of nationalism both on a theoretical and on a historical level, forming in parallel new readings of the Cyprus Problem. A significant part of the theoretical texts of the (Greek) Cypriot extra-parliamentary left and the anti-authoritarian milieu

historically engaged with the theoretical analysis, documentation and promotion of Cypriot identity, using various terms of reference, often taken from the academic research and political rhetoric of the period, such as the terms ‘Cypriot consciousness’, ‘Cypriotism’, ‘Cypriotness’ and ‘Cyprocentrism’. These terms have been used both as references to theoretical schemas that attempt to develop political, sociological and historical analyses independent of the dominant Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, and as ideological terms of self-reference, usually signalling opposition to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism, support for the reunification of the island on the basis of a bizonal bicomunal federation and; more generally, identification with the geographical space and cultural sphere of Cyprus as a whole.

We can mention here, among others, the various texts published in the leftist magazine “Entos ton Teihon” (Within the Walls) (1985-90) and the anarchist magazine “Traino stin Poli” (Train in the City) (1987-94), the magazine “Eks Iparhis” (From the Beginning) (1999-04), which offered an important space for the discussion of Cyprocentric ideas at the beginning of the 21st century, as well as the pamphlet “Cypriot Consciousness: Dialogue for an Experience Without a Name” by Andreas Panayiotou, published in 1992. Cyprocentric approaches are often (though not entirely) characterised by a critical approach to the role of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism in shaping historical events on the island, by the theorisation of a Cyprocentric historical subject which is dialectically placed in a position of resistance in relation to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism, and by the production of a new genealogy based on this dialectic, where historical figures and events acquire new meaning through new readings of modern Cypriot history.

These ideological currents were initially formed in the aftermath of 1974 and specifically in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, a period during which new political ideas emerged in the Republic of Cyprus, influenced by the different currents of the New Left that were developing in Western countries in the 1960s and 1970s. It was within this post-war current of politicisation that anarchism first appeared on the island, while feminist, Trotskyist and Maoist

organisations and groups emerged, which were mainly active outside the political processes of the state. After multiple ideological conflicts and theoretical confrontations with the various tendencies of left-wing Greek Cypriot nationalism, Cyprocentric positions managed, if not to dominate, at least to become identified with the radical (Greek) Cypriot milieu and to remain an integral part of it.

Radical anti-nationalist approaches were not, however, historically limited to the Cyprocentric political and theoretical analyses developed around Cypriot identity. A more comprehensive reading of the theoretical and political material of the Cypriot radical milieu reveals a number of texts that deviate from dominant Cyprocentric approaches, both in their emphasis of critique and in their theoretical orientations. This collection aims to make the content of these texts accessible to a new audience, bringing to the surface the alternative radical approaches through which the (Greek) Cypriot radical milieu has analysed and deconstructed the Cyprus Problem, as well as the Cypriot experience in general.

SELECTION PROCESS

The selection of texts depended on a number of key criteria. Firstly, the texts had to focus on the Cyprus Problem and express a critical perspective stemming from the political traditions of the Cypriot extra-parliamentary radical milieu, such as Marxism, anarchism or anti-authoritarianism. Second, the texts had to avoid placing the notion of the ‘nation’ (or of the ‘people’) at the centre of their analysis, situating them outside a national reading of the Cyprus Problem. Thirdly, the texts had to contain analysis and not just political rhetoric. Fourthly, texts that focused on notions of Cypriot identity were excluded, as they were based on the notion of a Cypriot people linked to an alternative imagined community. For this reason, their inclusion would contradict the second main selection criterion. It is worth mentioning here that the publication of an anthology of Cyprocentric texts in 2022¹ (sadly, only in Greek)

1 The full title of the publication is “Anthology of Historical Texts and Analyses on the evolutionary course of positions on Cyprocentrism, Cypriot Consciousness, Cypriot identity and Cypriotism”. It was published in 2022

has made some of the most important Cyprocentric texts available to a wider audience, filling the gap that existed in the literature.

Apart from meeting the basic selection criteria, no attempt was made to achieve ideological coherence. Instead, the collection presents texts with different perspectives, ideological backgrounds and theoretical starting points. This heterogeneity reflects the general spirit of this publication, which aims to broaden the debate on the Cyprus Problem through the inclusion of radical analyses, rather than by promoting a specific interpretation. In its original conception, the collection was intended to present radical texts originating throughout contemporary Cypriot history, including texts published by the “Communist Party of Cyprus” (1926-44) and the “Trotskyist Party of Cyprus” (1947-49).² However, this proved difficult due to the absence of texts from the 1950s and 1960s meeting the selection criteria. The decision to focus on the post-1974 period allowed for a more focused publication that is more directly linked to the current political reality in Cyprus. As the texts presented here were written after the de facto partition of the island, they focus on issues and concerns that remain relevant today, making the texts more accessible. Another point to note is the absence of Turkish Cypriot texts from this collection, as well as texts published by Cypriot immigrants.³ Therefore, we should note

by the New Cyprus Association. It was edited by Andreas Panayiotou, Nikos Moudouros and Anna Misiaouli. The Anthology includes a large number of texts from the modern history of Cyprus, both by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

2 I am referring here to the pamphlet “Some Current Political Issues” written by Charalambos Vatiliotis (Vatis) and published in 1931 by the Communist Party of Cyprus, and the article “Which is the Real Path Towards our National Liberation?”, which appeared in 1947 in the third issue of the newspaper “Ergatis” (The Worker) of the Trotskyist Party of Cyprus. The texts can be found, in both English and Greek, on the website of the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org). They have also been included in the publication “the remainder of a division”, published in 2024 by “Faura Books”.

3 Various left-wing political texts were published in the UK in the 1970s, while other texts occasionally appeared in Greece after 1974. Locating such texts has proved particularly difficult, but their existence should at least be mentioned. Some of these texts are in the archives of the Marx Memorial Library in London. With regard to Turkish Cypriot texts, the most immediate limitation was the absence of a sufficient number of translations.

that this collection primarily reflects extra-parliamentary radical ideas within the Greek Cypriot community of the island, that were developed mainly within the Republic of Cyprus after 1974.

The locating of the texts was based on long-term archival research based on the archive that was maintained by the group “Sypsirosi Atakton” in social space “Kaymakkin” in Nicosia, private archives of individuals who are politically active in the extra-parliamentary milieu, as well as on material archived by the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org). The main political magazines examined were “Mavres Pinelies” (Black Brushstrokes), “Entos ton Teihon” (Within the Walls), “Traino stin Poli” (Train in the City), “Thkianema”, “Hade”, “Eks Iparhis” (From the Beginning), “Kalemi” (Kalem), “Falies Online Magazine”, “Voukolos” (Bucolic), “Falies OFFLINE”, “Anatropi” (Overturn), the student magazine “Skapoula”, “Entropia” (Entropy) and “Antifa Tropikal”, as well as the newspapers “Sosialistiki Ekfrasi” (Socialist Expression), “Ergatiki Dimokratia” (Workers’ Democracy) and “Anafentos” (Without a Master),⁴ while a significant number of political pamphlets, brochures and online articles were also examined. The texts presented were digitized based on the original material, with the exception of those published after 2009, which had already been released digitally. With the exception of the texts of “Sypsirosi Atakton” and “Falies”, which constitute official translations by the groups themselves, all other translations presented in this collection originate from contributions located in the Cyprus Movements Archive.

The spelling and grammar of the collected texts was attempted to be preserved in their original version, with the exception of some minor corrections. Footnotes have been added at various points, providing additional information. These footnotes are accompanied by a comment explaining that the footnotes originate from the editor. The remaining footnotes are part of the original texts. Rather than presenting each text in the intro-

4 The newspaper “Anafentos” was a publication of the “Anarchist Union”, a political group that was active in 2010-11. It is not related to the anarchist group “Anafentos”, which was active in the 1980s.

duction, additional preliminary notes have been added at the beginning of each text.

BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT RADICAL MILIEU⁵

The history of the extra-parliamentary milieu in Cyprus has not yet been written. What we have at our disposal is a collection of fragmentary academic contributions, primary sources and occasional media coverage, which cannot, however, simply be transformed into a comprehensive historical narrative. Understanding and analysing the development of the Cypriot extra-parliamentary radical milieu requires both a detailed awareness of the political, economic and social history of Cyprus and a comprehensive access to the ‘insider’ knowledge of the milieu itself. Such an analysis, in turn, presupposes systematic historical research that extends beyond the boundaries of the Cypriot radical milieu as such. What is attempted below is not a historical analysis, but a first brief account of the political groups and events that unfolded within this milieu after 1974. This presentation is organized in periods, based on the available archival material and my personal knowledge. I hope that the presentation below can be replaced in the future with an analysis capable not only of documenting, but also of explaining the historical development of this political milieu.

First Period (1974-1994)

The events of 1974 created an unprecedented crisis in the Republic of Cyprus on multiple levels. The integrity of the state was directly challenged by the Turkish invasion and the coup of the Greek junta. The occupation of a third of the island’s territory and the forced displacement of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots simultaneously created a huge humanitarian crisis, with one in three Cypriots being displaced from their homes, leading

5 This account was written in 2023. Because of this, some of the groups mentioned have now either been officially dissolved (antifa lefkosha, Aeriko) or have remained inactive for an extended period of time, to the point that we can consider them to have faded out (AKTHO, Agkarra, Nea Skepsi, Syspirosi Atakton, ASYLA Re Alexis, A.C. Errico Malatesta and Kores Xapolytes).

to the creation of two ethnically homogenised areas, which separated the two communities completely until the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. The loss of land and infrastructure created an unprecedented economic crisis in the Republic of Cyprus, reducing the country's productive capacity in agricultural and industrial production, laying the foundations for its subsequent shift to a service economy. As a result of the war, a large part of the population was proletarianized, a process that seems to have triggered the mass entry of women into the labour market, altering in a short period of time the dominant gender relations, in parallel eroding traditional values.

In relation to the Cyprus Problem, the balance of power shifted in favour of the Republic of Turkey, with the Greek Cypriot community losing the military advantage it enjoyed over the Turkish Cypriot community after the intercommunal violence of the 1960s. However, diplomacy replaced military engagement, with the Republic of Cyprus using its influence as a recognized state to prevent the recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state, successfully continuing the political and economic embargo it imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community over the previous decade. In parallel, the Turkish Cypriot leadership aimed to establish its own recognised state on the island by forming its own administrative structures, continuing its policy of *taksim* (partition), built on the spoils of war and the de facto control of the northern part of the island. The new political reality changed fundamentally the institutional framework for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. The 1977 High-Level Agreements established bizonal bicomunal federation as the agreed model for the future reunification of the island, replacing the bicomunal unitary state of 1960. Despite the establishment of the federal model as the agreed framework for resolving the conflict, the political leaders of the two communities proposed different, even contradictory visions of the structures that would accompany such a federation. Different approaches around federalism emerged in both communities, ranging from its acceptance as a necessity to its outright condemnation as a prospect.

This changing context was accompanied by a parallel ideological crisis. With the achievement of the Turkish Cypriot na-

tionalist aim of *taksim*, the Greek Cypriot nationalist aim of union with Greece (*enosis*) was simultaneously laid to rest. In the public discourse, *enosis* had been maintained in both variants of Greek Cypriot nationalism, continuing to define the community's vision in Greek Cypriot political life until 1974. For the pro-Grivas faction, which represented the most extreme nationalist tendency, *enosis* remained an immediate political goal, while for the dominant pro-Makarios faction, which publicly supported the maintenance of an independent Cypriot state, *enosis* remained an abstract, long-term aim in its ideological formulations. The participation of the Grivas faction in the coup, which triggered the Turkish invasion, led to the equation of *enosis* with fanaticism, extremism, and treason, leading to its abandonment from public political discourse. This abandonment, however, also displaced the dominant ideological vision of Greek Cypriot society from the public sphere, a vision that presented the historical course of the island as evolutionary, with the final stage being the ultimate national "realization" of the Greek Cypriot community.

A similar ideological crisis was developing within the Greek Cypriot left. For AKEL, which had remained dominant within the Cypriot left since the late 1940s, Cyprus was in a struggle for national self-determination after independence, fighting against the forces of imperialism. From the perspective of the party leadership, this condition presupposed the maintenance of national unity against imperialist interventions, while the achievement of self-determination was presented as a basic precondition for the socialist transformation of society. Through this logic, AKEL supported the state in all the violent developments of the 1960s, promoting the efforts of the Greek Cypriot government to resolve the conflict on terms favourable to the Greek Cypriot side. While Greece's role in the *de facto* partition of the island evaporated any expectations or support for *enosis*, a parallel disillusionment, albeit on a smaller scale, seems to have unfolded within the left as well, with AKEL proclaiming the resolution of the Cyprus Problem as a necessary precondition for the socialist transformation of Cypriot society, shifting the possibility of a post-capitalist society into an unknown, unpredictable and undefined future.

The ideological vacuum created by the decline of Greek Cypriot nationalism was filled by Cypriotism in the 1970s and 1980s, an ideology that openly supported the independence of Cyprus and was primarily associated with the political centre and the left. Broadly speaking, Cypriotism based its positions on the principle “that Cyprus has its own *sui generis* character and, thus, must be viewed as an entity which is independent from both the motherlands of the two main communities of the island, that is, Greece and Turkey”.⁶ At the level of political discourse and public symbolism, these ideological changes had their significance, as the flag and symbols of the Cypriot state were integrated within a broader patriotic symbolism, while Cyprus’ independence began to be publicly celebrated as a monumental historical event. This ideological shift reflected the general shift towards support for an independent Cypriot state and the identification of the Greek Cypriot community with it. That a new political consensus was emerging was evident from the form that (right-wing) Greek Cypriot nationalism took when it re-emerged as a major political force in the 1990s. While the national, cultural and social character of the state remained a field of fierce dispute between Cypriotists and nationalists, the acceptance of the existence of an independent (Greek) Cypriot state was no longer contested by the political forces within the community.

The ideological crisis that accompanied the events of 1974 allowed for the reinterpretation of the past and the formation of alternative visions of the future. The post-1974 period was characterized by a gradual erosion of ideological orthodoxy, expressed through the emergence of radical extra-parliamentary groups, marking a clear shift from the extra-parliamentary stagnation of the 1960s. These groups presented a new wave of political ideas, ranging from feminism, ecology and Trotskyism to anarchism and social liberalism. In the first decade after 1974 we can also note the existence of small groups and publications that maintained a strong pro-*enosis* Greek Cypriot nationalist tendency. This current was initially associated

6 Caesar Mavratsas (1997) The ideological contest between Greek Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1995: Politics, social memory and identity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20 (4), page 721.

with the “Reconstitution of the Communist Party of Cyprus” (1975-77),⁷ a small Maoist political party that focused on the nationalist elements of Maoist ideology; rather than on the concept of cultural revolution. After failing to gain mass support, the party dissolved itself in 1977, with its ideas continuing in part through the magazines “Orimagdos” (Uproar), “Aftodiathesi” (Self-Determination) and “Enosis” (Union), which were associated with the “Aigaion” (Aegean) tavern in the old town of Nicosia. Although in the first years after 1974 this ideological tendency was considered part of the extra-parliamentary milieu, the positions it expressed, which were in line with those of the Greek Cypriot far right, led to an intense confrontation in the 1980s, resulting in the exclusion of this ideological current from the wider extra-parliamentary radical milieu.

In contrast to these marginal Greek Cypriot nationalist groups, new leftist tendencies began to emerge through the formation of political organizations and publications, influenced by radical ideas developing in France, Greece and the United Kingdom. These new ideas were often associated with the New Left and Trotskyism, ideological currents that offered an alternative to the monolithic ideological orthodoxy of the European Stalinist communist parties. Offering an alternative socialist vision to that expressed by the Soviet Union, these new ideological currents allowed for the opening of theoretical and ideological debates within the wider Greek Cypriot left. The emergence of Trotskyist political currents in the early years after 1974 seems to be linked to left-wing Greek Cypriot students studying abroad, who brought with them alternative political ideas upon their return to the island. Indicative of the emergence of new ideas was the publication in the late 1970s of the magazine “Deltio Sizitisis” (Discussion Bulletin), a Marxist political magazine that aimed to provide a space for the discussion of political, theoretical and ideological issues.

7 I have attempted to offer both the original names, as well as translations of the names of the various groups, initiatives, social spaces etc. presented in this section. At some points I chose to simply present translations, as some original names are merely descriptive (e.g. Anarchist Union), while at other points, I only present the original name, as I could identify no accurate translation (e.g. Syspirosi Atakton).

The first organized alternative political group can be considered the leftist tendency that developed within the socialist party EDEK in the 1970s. After the coup and the invasion, a new generation of young leftists gathered in the party, forming a radical tendency with mainly Trotskyist origins, which came to be known as “Aristeri Pteriga” (Left Wing), as well as “Sosialistiki Ekfrasi” (Socialist Expression), from the newspaper it published bearing that name. This particular tendency maintained a line of rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriot community, while promoting cooperation between EDEK and AKEL, for the election of a left-wing government in the Republic of Cyprus. Left Wing functioned as the most coherent alternative left-wing political organization in the 1980s, while remaining firm in its support for the rapprochement of the two communities. In 1981 its members were expelled from EDEK, leading it into the sphere of the extra-parliamentary left, in which it has remained ever since. In 1979 the organization “Ergatiki Dimokratia” (Workers’ Democracy), a Marxist-Leninist organization of a Trotskyist orientation linked to the British “Socialist Workers Party” (SWP) and the Greek “Sosialistiko Ergatiko Komma” (S.E.K.), also appeared. Workers’ Democracy circulated its own newspaper, maintained a strong class analysis of the Cyprus Problem, tried to influence leftist trade unions, was involved in the 1987 garment strike, and was also active in the anti-militarist movement of the 1980s.

In the early 1980s, the Trotskyist group “Kommounistikos Kiklos” (Communist Circle) appeared for a few years. It ran “Prolatis”, a hangout space in Nicosia in 1981-82. The project’s short life span is perhaps typical of the Cypriot extra-parliamentary milieu, where groups and initiatives often emerge and come to a close at short intervals. The publication of the magazine “Entos ton Teihon” (Within the Walls) (1985-1990) in Nicosia in the mid-1980s can be considered a pivotal moment in the production of an alternative left-wing political discourse. The magazine engaged systematically with cultural, political and theoretical issues of the period, accommodating alternative readings of Cypriot history, academic articles, critical texts on the Cyprus Problem and ecological analyses, while also hosting translated texts by Turkish Cypriot leftists and intel-

lectuals. Indicative of the importance of the magazine during this period is the presence of its members at the first official meeting of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens since 1974; in West Berlin in May 1989.⁸

Alongside the development of an alternative left milieu, anarchist and anti-authoritarian ideological currents appeared for the first time in Cyprus. In the summer of 1981, a group of young individuals rented two rooms in Limassol to hold meetings, in which anarchist political ideas were discussed. This meeting place, which came to be known as “Kilimi” (Kilim),⁹ seems to have been frequented by an increasing number of friends and acquaintances, forming the first circle of what came to be known as the anarchist/anti-authoritarian milieu. With the end of the summer, individuals from the Kilimi circle went abroad for university studies, leading a section of them to the city of Lyon, France. Little is known about this Lyon circle beyond the fact that it produced, printed and distributed the first Cypriot anarchist publication in 1982, called “Mavres Pinelies” (Black Brushstrokes), a magazine that ran for a mere single issue. While there were no publications in the years that followed, the group continued to engage with radical ideas, trying to critically analyze Cypriot society from an anti-authoritarian perspective. This is at least the conclusion one could come to by reading the 1984 pamphlet, “Cyprus, the National Issue and Nationalism: A Libertarian Analysis”, published anonymously in Athens, which informs us that the author’s arguments were developed in connection with discussions held with the Lyon circle on how to approach the Cyprus Problem from an anti-authoritarian perspective.

A year later, “Chrysallida” (Chrysalis) (1985-1990), the first Cypriot self-managed alternative social space, opened its doors in

8 Although we know very little about its activities, it is worth mentioning here the creation of “Omada Ginaikon Lefkosias” (Women’s Group of Nicosia) (1978-81), a feminist group that published four pamphlets on gender inequality and the woman question. In 1986, the “Friends of Akamas” was also founded, which to this day is a reference point for the local ecological movement, and whose activities played a decisive role in saving the Akamas peninsula from ecological destruction.

9 The space was also known as “Peftjin” (Pine).

Limassol. Its presence, which was to last for five years, allowed youth subcultures, alternative lifestyles, political initiatives and informal anarchist groups to coexist at a common meeting point. At least two political groups of the period seem to have been active in Chrysalis, the anarchist group “Anafentos” (Without a Master), which seems to have been the first anarchist group on the island, and the “Initiative Against Social Racism”, which was involved in anti-militarist political initiatives, particularly in relation to the recognition of the right to conscientious objection. In 1987 the magazine “Traino stin Poli” (Train in the City) (1987-1994) appeared in Limassol, the first Cypriot anarchist magazine. Train in the City was primarily an underground magazine, probably distributed through photocopying, with the exception of the last three issues, which were published officially. In its pages appeared texts dealing with sexual liberation, musical subcultures, anti-capitalism, postmodernism, Cypriot identity, critical readings of Cypriot history and nationalism, as well as international and local news.

Second Period (2000-2013)

Based on the available data, the 1990s can be seen as a transitional period. Nevertheless, we can mention here the publication of the magazine “Thkianema” (Wandering) (1996-2003), as well as the first appearance of the Cypriot punk scene, and thus the beginning of the formation of a DIY punk subculture which continues to this day. In an interview given by the punk band “Nuclear Mutants” in 1997, there is also a reference to an unofficial political group called “Anarchists of Nicosia”, the first reference to anarchists located in Nicosia instead of Limassol.¹⁰ The end of the decade also saw the appearance of the bilingual magazine “Hade” (1997-2001), probably the first bicomunal magazine in the history of Cyprus, which circulated on both sides of the Green Line, keeping open a channel of communi-

10 The interview was given in the French zine “Riot & Dance”, probably in 1996. It was republished in 1997 in the British zine “Ripping Thrash”. It can be found at the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org).

cation between the two communities during a period of almost total separation.

In the early 2000s we can identify a new cycle of politicization, which intensified after the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 and the failure to reunify the island on the basis of the Annan plan in 2004.¹¹ A first manifestation of this new cycle can be seen in the publication of the magazine “Eks Iparhis” (From the Beginning) (1999-2004) in Nicosia, which systematically published critical articles on Greek Cypriot nationalism, Cypriot history and the Cyprus Problem, as well as articles by Turkish Cypriot leftists, additionally publishing texts in favor of the Annan plan. The magazine further supported the opening of the checkpoints and generally encouraged theoretical and ideological debate within the Cypriot left. At the same time, “Anarchikos Pirinas Kiprou” (Cypriot Anarchist Kernel) (initially in Limassol and later in Nicosia) appeared in the anti-authoritarian milieu at the beginning of the 2000s. The Kernel maintained for some time a space in Anexartisias Street in Limassol, while its activities and political discourse reflect the appearance of new ideological currents within the anti-authoritarian milieu, influenced by the anarchism of Greece.

With the opening of the checkpoints in 2003, new possibilities for political action emerged. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organizations, as well as individuals who supported reunification, could coordinate, organize joint events and protests and push more directly for the reunification of the island. Significant activities of the period include the opening of the bicomunal Kardaş Cultural Centre in 2003,¹² the Demilitarized Nicosia initiative, which organized bicomunal demonstrations in favor of the demilitarization of the island and whose activities continued in the following period, and the activities of the “Occupy Buffer Zone” movement (2011-12), which squatted a building between the checkpoints on Ledra Street to protest the ongoing partition of Cyprus. We can further

11 In 2004, the “Initiative of Leftists for YES” was also created to support the plan, following AKEL’s decision to reject it.

12 In 2005 the management team of Kardaş changed, while in 2007-2008 the space changed management again and was renamed to “Steki Arsinois 5” (Arsinois 5 Hangout). In this last phase it was essentially functioning as an anarchist squat.

note that during this period the support for the reunification of the island includes a clear political demand, with most of the extra-parliamentary milieu supporting the bicomunal federal model of reunification. This position was systematically expressed in the public sphere through the magazine “To Kalemi” (Kalem) (2008-11), which was published by the Greek Cypriot section of the bicomunal Teachers’ Platform “United Cyprus”, as well as through the blog “Epanenosi 2011” (Reunification 2011) (2009-13).¹³

While Left Wing and Workers’ Democracy continued their political activity, new left-wing groups emerged. One of them was the “New Internationalist Left”, which was formed in the early 2000s, initially under the name “Committee for a Workers’ International (CWI) – Cyprus Section”. The New Internationalist Left is located ideologically within the Trotskyist current. It organized its own annual anti-fascist festival, and for some years had a student organization called “Youth Against Nationalism”, which published its own anti-nationalist publication called “The Wall”.¹⁴ Another small left-wing group that emerged during this period was “Anatropi” (Overturn), which published a political magazine with the same name. Although the group has remained active, its activity is limited to publishing articles on its website. Another political group that emerged in the same period was the “Independent Left Movement – Cypriot Students Initiative” (ANATROPI), a left-wing student group that was active mainly in Athens.

In parallel, an anti-consumerist youth subculture began to develop in the old town of Nicosia, centered around Faneromeni Square.¹⁵ This subculture was strongly influenced by the anti-authoritarian milieu in Greece, maintained an anti-nationalist and anti-fascist character and tended to organize itself through

13 Originally the blog was called “Epanenosi 2010” (Reunification 2010).

14 In 2018 the New Internationalist Left also opened the social space “Melt-emi” (Etesian) in the old town of Nicosia.

15 It is worth noting here the opening of two squats in the old town in the same period, “Malakasa”, which was originally established in 2005 by “Cyclown Circus”, a small Spanish travelling circus group, and the “Lantern of Diogenes” squat (2008-09). Cyclown Circus also introduced the idea of organizing Critical Mass cycling rallies, with the first march being held in 2006 in Nicosia.

direct democratic processes, usually through open assemblies.¹⁶ Characteristic examples of the expression of this subculture can be considered the organization of street parties in 2009-10 in Faneromeni Square, the subsequent organization of street parades in the old town of Nicosia, the “Critical Mass” cycle rallies, and the organization of alternative festivals in the old town, such as the “Festival of Theseos” in 2010, organized in coordination with local residents. The prevalence of this subculture in the old town of Nicosia, especially in the period 2008-2012, reinforced anti-authoritarian political activity, as young people came into contact with a number of political groups active both in the old town and in Faneromeni Square specifically.

Within the anarchist, anti-authoritarian milieu, the period is ideologically characterized by an emphasis on self-organization, anti-racism, anti-fascism, anti-capitalism, anti-militarism and the promotion of an anti-consumerist subculture. Some of the groups that were active in the old town were the “Anti-Authoritarian Autonomous Action” (2008-09), the “Anarchist Union” (2010-11),¹⁷ the pressure group “Citizen’s Movement Alert” (2009-10), created to oppose police violence, as well as “Awake Within the Walls” (2007-11), a group of residents opposing the commercialization of the old town and the racist treatment by the state of migrants living in the area. Another notable political group was “Falies”, which was an evolution of “Atypos” (Atypical), a group that was active within the Kardaş circles.¹⁸ Falies were very active between 2008 and 2011, maintaining their own social space/alternative library called “Agrammata” (Illiteracy) (2008-15). Another notable exam-

16 Faneromeni Square was also known as “Square of Manolis”. Manolis was the name given to the tree located in the square by the youth that used to hang out there at that time.

17 The group maintained a social space located on Sapphos Street in old Nicosia. After the group fell to inactivity, the space was maintained for a short period under the name “self-managed Hangout Space Sapphos”.

18 The group launched one of the first attempts to create an alternative online media site, releasing the “Falies Online Magazine” in 2005-06. It was from this project that Falies later took its name. For several years (2009-13) the Falies website was a reference point for alternative information, as well as for news and actions related to the extra-parliamentary milieu.

ple is the ecological group “Utopia” which also maintained a social space with the same name in the old town of Nicosia.¹⁹

Limassol also experienced a new wave of politicization during this period, as new political initiatives were formed, and a more coherent extra-parliamentary political network began to emerge. Some of the political groups of the period were the “Anti-Racist Initiative of Limassol” (2010-12), “Adespotoi” (Strays) (2011-12), which maintained a clear libertarian ideological approach, and the “Anti-Capitalist Leftist Class Revolutionary Rally – ANTART-ES” (REBELS), a left-wing political group active from 2011 to 2013.²⁰ During this period, the “Self-Managed Limassol Hangout Space”, known informally as “Steki”, as well as “Devicta” from the name of the political group that managed it, was also operating, a social space that seems to have remained open from January until June 2012. Political groups and social spaces in Limassol and Nicosia circulated their own leaflets and pamphlets, had a constant presence on the internet²¹ and systematically organized political protests, presentations, debates, alternative parties and documentary screenings.

Some of the most notable moments of this period were the anti-fascist mobilizations organized against the growing presence and activity of Greek Cypriot far-right groups. In December 2009, an anti-fascist march was organized in Nicosia in response to the first march of the “National Popular Front” (ELAM) in the city, the local branch of Golden Dawn. The march was organized by members and groups of the extra-parliamentary milieu, gathering around 1,000 people, a remarkable number for Cyprus, preventing members of ELAM from marching through Nicosia. A similar initiative was taken in Larnaca in 2010, in response to a march by the “Greek Resistance Movement” (KEA), another far-right political group that was very active at the time. The confrontation escalated

19 Around 2010-11 an abandoned field in the old town was also converted into a self-managed park, known as “Parkouin” (Little Park).

20 A student group called “Anti-capitalist, Anti-fascist Student Struggle – ANTAMA” (TOGETHER) was also active in 2013.

21 It is worth mentioning here the presence of islandanarchy (2009-13), an online forum of the Cypriot anti-authoritarian milieu.

violently, resulting in serious injuries to antifascist activists. The last major anti-fascist rally of the period with a significant turnout took place in January 2013 at Faneromeni Square, in response to ELAM, which organized a march to the square.

Finally, we can note that during these years the tendency of the student youth to organize themselves was increasingly prevalent, especially in the circles around Faneromeni Square. This tendency was initially expressed through the formation of a student self-education group in 2009, but also through the creation of the student group “Planadio Steki Dromou” (Wandering Street Hangout) (2010-11). The culmination of this process, however, was the formation of the student group “Skapoula” in 2011, which continued to operate in Nicosia until 2014. Skapoula published its own political magazine, organized its own political festivals, promoted alternative music (especially punk and hip hop), organized anti-fascist marches and systematically distributed political material of an anti-capitalist, anti-nationalist and anti-authoritarian nature.

Third Period (2013-2021)

We can observe a shift in politicization that coincides with the Cypriot financial crisis of 2012-2013, a crisis which concluded with the imposition of a memorandum on the Cypriot economy and the haircut of deposits in the two largest Cypriot banks. The financial crisis shifted the Cyprus Problem for the first time from the dominance it enjoyed in public political discourse, while it crystallized the end of the so-called economic miracle that was supposedly taking place within Greek Cypriot society since the late 1980s. The economic crisis coincided with the presidency of Demetris Christofias (2008-13), a leading figure of AKEL and the only left-wing politician elected to the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus. The failure of the Christofias government to offer an alternative to austerity measures, the implementation of such measures by the government itself, as well as the failure to resolve the Cyprus Problem, led to a widespread disillusionment with AKEL within the leftist extra-parliamentary milieu, which was expressed both through the criticism of the institutional left as well as through the attempt to create an

alternative left-wing political organization, which took the form of the “Committee for a Radical Left Rally” (ERAS).

ERAS was created in 2011 with the aim of bringing together the extra-parliamentary left under a single organizational structure. It drew support from members of political groups of the extra-parliamentary left, such as Workers’ Democracy and the Left Wing, from personalities of the extra-parliamentary left, but also from a new generation of leftists interested in forming an alternative leftist initiative independent of AKEL. Although it had established local sub-groups in various cities and drafted a comprehensive manifesto, ERAS was divided after its members decided not to officially support the AKEL candidate in the 2013 presidential elections. Internal tensions continued after the elections, resulting in a split, with the creation of the group “Left Intervention” (2013-14) in Nicosia and “Granazi” (Cogwheel) (2013-19) in Limassol. Left Intervention did not survive politically while Cogwheel remained active, but with limited influence. The minority pro-AKEL tendency retained control of ERAS, which became inactive after the split, finally ceasing its activities in 2014.

Two other leftist initiatives are worth mentioning. The first is the “Bicommunal Radical Left Cooperation – United Cyprus” (Drasy-Eylem), a bicommunal left-wing electoral formation that took part in the 2014 European elections. It was the only bicommunal electoral formation in the history of the Republic of Cyprus up to that point. In addition to members of the Turkish Cypriot left, the formation included members of Workers’ Democracy, of the Left Wing and of the New Internationalist Left, as well as Kostis Achniotis, an important figure of the reunification movement. Drasy-Eylem received 0.86% of the vote (2220 votes). Following the European elections, the formation faced internal conflicts and was effectively inactive, stopping its activity completely in 2016. The second initiative is the “Leftist Movement – We Want Federation” (AKTHO), created in 2016 to support the federal reunification of the island. AKTHO took part in several pro-federation events, promoting its positions and raising awareness about the prospect of reunification.²²

22 In 2018, the “Platypus Nicosia” group was also formed, a small Marxist

During the period of the economic crisis we can also trace the emergence of Stalinism as a coherent ideological current within the extra-parliamentary milieu, expressed by the group “Agkarra” (Quarrel) (2013), the group “stasis” (2016-17) and the “Nea Skepsi” (New Thought) website (2018). Both Agkarra and stasis seem to have had limited activity, with Agkarra maintaining a strong online presence in 2013-17. The emergence of Stalinist groups did not also mark the convergence of their political positions, with Agkarra expressing a particular skepticism towards a bicomunal bizonal federation, in contrast to the stasis group, which supported the federal model for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. In the same period, we also observe a rise in the public activity of “KKE Cyprus”, the local branch of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), through the publication of announcements and the organization of events and demonstrations.

In the anarchist, anti-authoritarian milieu, there was a parallel effort of coalescence, which was expressed with the creation of the group “Syspirosi Atakton” in 2012 in Nicosia. The group aimed at bringing together anarchists and anti-authoritarians under a common political organization. New people joined Syspirosi Atakton, with the group slowly focusing on issues that were either marginalized or completely absent from the anti-authoritarian milieu that had developed after 2000, such as gender relations, sexuality, the Cyprus Problem and feminism. The group started publishing the magazine “Entropia” (Entropy) in 2013 (2013-20), and in 2015 opened social space “Kaymakkin” in Nicosia, which later became autonomous, operating under the control of its own assembly, with Kaymakkin remaining a focal point for the extra-parliamentary milieu to this day.²³ Besides the writing and circulation of political texts, the activities of Syspirosi Atakton have included the organization of the feminist/queer festival “Gender and Power”, its involvement in the bicomunal

organization linked to the “Platypus Affiliated Society”. The group is mainly organizing political debates.

23 It is worth mentioning that in 2014 there was also a small self-organized social space in the old town of Nicosia called “Hangout Space Areos 11”, which was run by students.

reunification movement of the city, the organization of speeches and presentations at Kaymakkin, as well as its participation in the pan-European anti-capitalist anti-authoritarian network “Beyond Europe”. The activities of Syspirosi Atakton appear to have been pivotal for the incorporation of sexuality, gender relations, feminism and reunification as central themes within the anti-authoritarian milieu.

In 2014, the political group “antifa lefkosha”²⁴ was formed, following the hunger strike of Iranian detainees at the Menogeia immigration detention center. The group has systematically focused on the living conditions of migrants, institutional racism in Cypriot society, the Republic of Cyprus’ immigration policy and the Cyprus Problem, organizing presentations, debates, political interventions, solidarity actions and demonstrations. It has published a significant number of leaflets, announcements and pamphlets, as well as its own political magazine, “Antifa Tropikal” (2019-20). In 2017, the “Ramona” collective was also formed, following a visit by people from the extra-parliamentary milieu to the Zapatista communities of Chiapas, Mexico. Ramona works mainly as a solidarity group for the Zapatistas and played a central role in the initiative of hosting a Zapatista delegation in Cyprus as part of the world tour they started in 2021. The hosting of the delegation was accompanied by a series of closed and open events in various cities, villages and regions of Cyprus, in cooperation with other extra-parliamentary groups.

In Limassol, new political initiatives also emerged, such as the “Limassol Anti-Fascist Network” (2014-16), which appears to have taken part mainly in anti-fascist and anti-racist actions. During the same period, the social space “Zerminal” was also operating in the city, while various self-organized antifascist football matches known as “Antifa League” were organized. In the same period, the organization of an anti-fascist, anti-racist festival started at Molos, Limassol, which continues to take place. In 2017, “Spirithkia” (Spark) was formed, an anti-authoritarian group which has mainly focused on the

24 The original name of the group was “antifa nicosia”, but it was soon renamed “antifa λευκοσα”, combining the Greek (Λευκωσία) and Turkish (Lefkoşa) names of the city.

housing problem in Limassol, but also on the racist treatment of the migrant population by the Cypriot state. In the same year “Bandiera” began its activities, having members both in Nicosia and Limassol. The group aimed to create a common political organization of anarchists and communists. The project does not seem to have been able to overcome its internal contradictions, with the group permanently disbanding in 2020. Characteristic of this period is also the expansion of the extra-parliamentary milieu beyond Nicosia and Limassol, with groups being formed in other cities and regions. We see, for example, the formation of political organizations in the Larnaca district, such as the “Anti-fascist Collective Dromos” (Street) (2019-21) and the group “ASYLA Re Alexis” (2020),²⁵ as well as the creation of the libertarian group “Aeriko in the mountains of Troodos” in 2017, which maintains a social space in Galata.

Alongside the creation of new groups and initiatives, a number of alternative media websites appeared, such as “Defteri Anagnosi” (Second Reading) (2012), the trilingual “3533” (2013-17), “Platforma News” (2014-16) and “Kontrasusta” (2017-18). Despite efforts to establish alternative media websites, the dominance of social media has been almost universal. Of the alternative media sites, only Second Reading has survived, now almost entirely active on Facebook. In the same period, the “Cyprus Movements Archive” was created (2016), an open access online archive of the Cypriot radical milieu.

It is important to at least record here the establishment of the “People’s Athletic Club Omonia 29 May” in 2018 by organized fans of “Gate 9”, who disagreed with the conversion of their team, “Athletic Club Omonia Nicosia”, into a company. The new club was initially called “Omonia 1948” but was forced to change its name for legal reasons, remaining, nonetheless, also known by this name. Cypriot football has remained a field of political contention since the 1940s, a period in which sports clubs were divided into left-wing and right-wing, with “Athletic Club Omonia Nicosia”

25 The group originally appeared under the name “Antifa Oroklini”. Another group that appeared during this period is “Antifa Aradippou” (2020), which was later renamed to “A.C. Errico Malatesta”.

later developing as the most important left-wing football club in Cyprus. The establishment and subsequent course of “Omonia 29 May” also marks the autonomy from the institutional left of a significant part of the left-wing political subculture that had been developing in Cypriot stadiums since the 1990s.

The most important political action of the period from the extra-parliamentary milieu can be considered the second “Os Dame” (That’s Enough) march that took place in Nicosia in February 2021 and in which about 10,000 people participated.²⁶ The march was organized in response to the police violence, unprecedented in the context of Cyprus, that protesters were subjected to a week before, in the first march organized by the “Os Dame Coordinating Group”, with the aim of holding a protest against, among other things, state authoritarianism, corruption, institutional racism, lack of social welfare and understaffing of public hospitals. Groups from almost the entire spectrum of the extra-parliamentary milieu took part in the march, while the organization of the mobilization was coordinated by an assembly in which various political groups participated. Following the protests, we seem to be entering a new cycle of politicization, as older groups fall into inactivity and new initiatives slowly begin to emerge, repeating a pattern observed at the end of previous periods. We cannot predict here what form and ideological content a new cycle of politicization will have, but we can note here the creation of two feminist groups in recent years, the “Feminist Collective Kores Xapolytes” (2021), which seems to be active mainly in Nicosia, and the “Feminist Group Eutopia” (2022), which is active in Limassol. A small Marxist group called “1917” also made its appearance in Nicosia in 2022. Another recent development was the strike of migrant workers on the Wolt platform in December 2022, which was widely supported by the extra-parliamentary milieu.²⁷ Whatever form the Cypriot extra-parliamentary radical milieu takes in the coming years, it

26 Two more “Os Dame” marches followed in the following months.

27 The strike was actively supported by “IWW-Cyprus”, a small political organization linked to the global workers’ trade union “Industrial Workers of the World”. The organisation first appeared in 2020.

is undeniable that it will continue to exist, expressing both the rejection and the necessity of overcoming the social, political and economic reality prevailing in Cyprus.

Antonis Pastellopoulos,
Coventry, February 2023.

Bibliography

Sources in Greek

- Ioannides A. & Pastellopoulos A. (2020) Κάτω απ' την Άσφαλτο του Έθνους, Πτώματα! Για την συγκρότηση του ελληνοκυπριακού έθνους-κράτους [Beneath the Nation, Corpses! On the constitution of the Greek Cypriot nation-state]. *Shades Magazine*, Issue 2, pp. 55-79.
- Ioannou G. (2019) *Ο Ντενκτάς στον Νότο: Η κανονικοποίηση της διχοτόμησης στην ελληνοκυπριακή πλευρά* [Denktas in the South: The normalization of partition on the Greek Cypriot side]. Thessaloniki: Psifides.
- Ioannou Y. (2013) *Η Ποιητική Γενιά του 1974 στην Κύπρο: Η γενεαλογία και η έκφραση της αμφισβήτησης* [The Poetic Generation of 1974 in Cyprus: Genealogy and the expression of questioning]. Nicosia: University of Cyprus.
- Karathanasis P. (2017) *Από τα Κάτω Δραστηριοποίηση και Έξοδος από την Οριακότητα: Δημόσιες Εκδηλώσεις και Δράσεις στην Εντός των Τειχών Λευκωσία* [Organizing from Below and Escaping Marginality: Public Events and Actions in the Walled City of Nicosia]. Thesis (PhD), Mytilene: University of the Aegean.
- Kizilyürek N. (2019) *Μια Ιστορία Βίας και Μνησικακίας: Η γένεση και η εξέλιξη της εθνοτικής διένεξης στην Κύπρο (Δίτομο)* [A History of Violence and Vindictiveness: The Genesis and Evolution of the Ethnic Dispute in Cyprus (In Two Volumes)]. Nicosia: Heterotopia Publications.
- Markides A. (2012) *Κ.Κ.Κ. Το Χρονικό της Ανασύστασης 1975-1977 [CPC. The Chronicle of the Reconstitution 1975-1977]*. Nicosia: Aegeon.
- Mavratsas C. (1998) *Όψεις του Ελληνικού Εθνικισμού στην Κύπρο: Ιδεολογικές αντιπαραθέσεις και η κοινωνική κατασκευή της ελληνοκυπριακής ταυτότητας 1974-1996* [Facets of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus: Ideological Contest and the Social Construction of Greek Cypriot Identity 1974-1996]. Athens: Catarti.
- Moudouros N. (2022) *Διεκδικώντας την Πατρίδα: Η τουρκοκυπριακή αντιπολίτευση την περίοδο 1964-2004* [Claiming the Country: The Turkish Cypriot Opposition during the Period 1964-2004]. Thessaloniki: Psifides.
- Panayiotou A. & Moudouros N. & Misiaouli A. (2022) *Ανθολογία Ιστορικών Κειμένων και Αναλύσεων για την εξελικτική πορεία των θέσεων για τον Κυπροκεντρισμό, την Κυπριακή Συνείδηση, την Κυπριακή ταυτότητα και τον Κυπριωτισμό* [Anthology of Historical and Analytical Texts on the evolution of the positions in relation to Cyprocentrism, Cypriot Consciousness, Cypriot Identity and Cypriotism]. Nicosia: New Cyprus Association.

Sources in English

Achniotis P. & Anastasiades A. (2019) *TONGUE*. Documentary. It can be located here: <https://vimeo.com/372107850>

Antonsich M. (2012) 'OccupylBufferZone': Practices of Borderline Resistance in a Space of Exception. *Area*, 45 (2), pp. 170-178.

Charalambous G. (2012) AKEL: A Sociopolitical Profile of Greek-Cypriot Communism. In: Umut Bozkurt & Nicos Trimikliniotis (eds.), *Beyond a Divided Cyprus: A State and Society in Transformation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 151-168.

Christou G. (2018) *Children out of Place with Childhood: Pupils' Assemblies, Direct Action, Serious Play and Public Space in Youth's Autonomous Horizontal Politics in Cyprus*. Thesis (PhD), Falmer: University of Sussex.

Dunphy R. & Bale T. (2007) Red Flag Still Flying? Explaining AKEL - Cyprus's Communist Anomaly. *Party Politics*, 13 (3), pp. 287-304.

Iliopoulou E. & Karathanasis P. (2014) Towards a Radical Politics: Grassroots Urban Activism in the Walled City of Nicosia. *The Cyprus Review*, 26 (1), pp. 169-192.

Ioannou G. (2019) Social Activism and the City: Cultural Sociology and Radical Politics in 21st Century Cyprus. *The Cyprus Review*, 31 (1), pp. 209-238.

Loizides N. G. (2007) Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus. *International Studies Perspectives*, 8 (2), pp. 172-189.

Mavratsas C. (1997) The ideological contest between Greek Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1995: Politics, social memory and identity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20 (4), pp. 717-737.

Panayiotou A. (2012) Border Dialectics: Cypriot Social and Historical Movements in a World Systemic Context. In: Umut Bozkurt & Nicos Trimikliniotis (eds.), *Beyond a Divided Cyprus: A State and Society in Transformation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 67-82.

Pastellopoulos A. (2022) 'Federation or Death': The Beginnings and Early Ideology of Cypriot Anarchism. *Anarchist Studies*, 30 (1), pp. 58-82.

Pastellopoulos A. (2022) Cypriotism as a Political Ideology: Critical Contributions and Conceptual Limitations. *Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*, GreeSE Paper Series (No. 178), London School of Economics and Political Science.

Pastellopoulos A. (2023) The Forgotten Trotskyists of Cyprus. *Afoa.cy*. It can be located here: <https://afoa.cy/en/forgotten-trotskyists-cyprus/>

Siammas P. (2013) Sensory Stories: A Building in Question. *The Cyprus Dossier*, Issue 5, pp. 51-55.

Zetter R. (1992) Refugees and Forced Migrants as Development Resources: The Greek Cypriot Refugees from 1974. *The Cyprus Review*, 4 (1), pp. 7-39.

Selected Primary Sources

Achniotis K. & Panayiotou A. (2017) *Ριζοσπαστικές Αφηγήσεις για το Κυπριακό που το 1970 τζιαι Μετά [Radical Narratives about the Cyprus Problem from 1970 and After]*. Audio recording of a presentation and discussion organized by the anti-authoritarian group Syspirosi Atakton. It can be located here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-VsGTFy7kGk>

Achniotis K. (1989) Η συνάντηση Ε/Κ και Τ/Κ του Βερολίνου: κοινή ανακοίνωση [The Berlin meeting of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots: joint statement]. *Εντός των Τειχών [Within the Walls]*, Issue 41, pp. 8-9. English translation can be located here: https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=en:magazines:entostonteixon:no_41:berlin

Agiomamitis N. (2021) *Η Ιστορία και η Παράδοση της Εργατικής Δημοκρατίας [The History and Tradition of Workers' Democracy]*. Online presentation and discussion organized by the leftist group Workers' Democracy. It can be located here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKzgeVk53DM>

Anonymous (2007) Που το Πολιτιστικό Κέντρο Καρτάς στο Στέκι Αρσινόης 5: μια Ιστορία ενός Χώρου 2003-2007 [From the Kardas Cultural Centre to Arsinois 5: A History of a Space 2003-2007]. *Nekatomata blog*. It can be located here: <https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:digital:nekatomata:history1>

Anonymous (2018) 2007-2018: Η Συνέχεια μιας Αφήγησης, η Κίνηση τζιαι οι Χώροι [2007-2018: The Continuation of a Narrative, the Movement and the Milieus]. *Nekatomata blog*. It can be located here: <https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:digital:nekatomata:history2>

Charalambous G. (2021) Interview with the Cyprus Movements Archive. *Inter-face*, 13 (1), pp. 375-387.

IWW-Cyprus (2022) *The Complete Chronicle of the Wolt Strike*. Text of IWW-Cyprus which circulated on 28/12/22 on Facebook. It can be located here: <https://cyfootnotes.blogspot.com/2022/12/the-complete-chronicle-of-wolt-strike.html>

Left Wing (1981) Διακήρυξη της Αριστερής Πτέρυγας του Σ.Κ. ΕΔΕΚ [Declaration of the Left Wing of S.P. EDEK]. *Σοσιαλιστική Έκφραση [Socialist Expression]*, Issue 100, pp. 1-3.

Movement's Reflection Association (2025) *Υφαίνοντας το Νήμα: Συγκυρία, Ταξική Σύνθεση και Ανταγωνιστικό Κίνημα στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία [Weaving the Thread: Context, Class Composition and the Antagonistic Movement in the Republic of Cyprus]*. Nicosia: Faura Books.

New Internationalist Left (2014) Ποιοι απέκλεισαν τη ΝΕΔΑ από την Δράσυ-Eylem; [Who excluded NEDA from Drasy-Eylem?] *Website of the New Internationalist Left*. It can be located here: <https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:digital:neda:drasy1>

P. A. (1987) Σκέψεις για τον Χώρο στην Κύπρο [Thoughts on the Milieu in Cyprus]. *Δοκιμή [Dokimi]*, Issue 11, pp. 6-7.

Panayiotou A. (1994) Γενιές Ανεξαρτησίας - Ο Μετά-Αποικιακός Άνθρωπος [The Independence Generations - the Postcolonial Human]. *Τραίνο στην Πόλη [Train in the City]*, Issue 11, pp. 38-45.

S. A. (2009) Το «Φανάρι του Διογένη»: Καταλήψεις και κοινωνικά κέντρα. Μπλογκ της κατάληψης «Φανάρι του Διογένη» [The “Lantern of Diogenes”: squats and social centres]. *Blog of the “Diogenes’ Lantern” squat*. It can be located here: https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:digital:fanari:fanari_istoriko

Syspirosi Atakton (2021) Ως Δαμέ – Η Κυπριακή Άνοιξη – Ανταπόκριση από την Κύπρο [Os Dame - The Cypriot Spring - Response from Cyprus]. Originally published on *babylonia.gr*. It can be located here: https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:digital:sispirosiatakton:osdame_babylonia

Theodorou F. (1978) Σ.Ν. ΕΔΕΝ: Κρίση - Μια Σύντομη Αναφορά [S.Y. EDEN: Crisis – A Short Mention]. *Δελτίο Συζήτησης [Discussion Bulletin]*, Issue 3, pp. 19-22.

Preliminary Note

The following text was first published anonymously as a pamphlet in Athens in 1984. It is the first lengthy text written by a Cypriot anarchist dealing with the Cyprus Problem from a purely anti-nationalist, anti-authoritarian perspective, strongly criticizing the Greek and Cypriot leftist approaches of the period. It was a reference point in the anti-authoritarian/alternative milieu of Limassol in the 1980s and 1990s. It was republished in 2018 in Thessaloniki by the “Open Assembly of Ano Polis Struggle”.

In every previous publication, the text was accompanied by the following clarification: PLEASE NOTE: You may republish part or all of this document, provided that the source is mentioned, which is: “FILLA PORIAS”, Issue No. 4, published by Leonidas Christakis, Athens 1984. It is published -issue by issue- without the obligation of a regular date. Responsible for their publication and circulation: Leonidas Christakis. P.O. Box: 21028, 114 10 ATHENS.

Anonymous

Cyprus, the National Issue and Nationalism: A Libertarian Analysis

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Most of the writings before 1974 on Cypriot history are classic nationalist texts with the main aim of convincing people of the Greek identity of Cyprus. It is a history where everyone adds and subtracts what they like, since the goal is well established in the social imaginary. Not that these histories are completely stupid or a bunch of lies. But it is precisely in these histories and texts that you have to look behind the words and between the silences. There is of course Hill's history (which as far as I know is not translated yet), which is quite interesting, but of course it has its own biases and the problem of interpreting foreign consulate documents that Hill uses a lot. From 1974 onwards (and in the context of the crisis of the Greek-Christian imaginary), several works with interesting elements start to come out. Several books are also being written abroad both on recent events and on the more modern history of the island. (I am using two or three extracts from one such book, "Cyprus: a case study", written by various scholars of contemporary Cyprus).

The bomb that is Graikos' "History"²⁸ explodes in 1980. Mr. Graikos, an AKEL supporter and one of the intellectual fathers of neo-Cypriot consciousness, by collecting various information and

28 Editor's note: Refers to Costas Graikos (literary pseudonym of Costas Karatsiolis), whose "Cypriot History", published in two volumes in 1980 and 1982, followed a Cyprocentric approach to the documentation of Cypriot history.

making a “Marxist” critical analysis of the classical nationalist texts, proposes a historical foundation-justification of neo-Cypriot consciousness and the Cypriot state. The positive thing about Graikos and those who followed him is that he brings together various elements and builds another pole vis-à-vis the Greek-Christian one, which can also lead to the birth of a discussion-study on Cypriot history. Apart from this, the history of Graikos needs its own critical interpretation, since here the goal (the ideological-historical support of the Cypriot state and of AKEL) determines the analysis and presentation of events.

This text is an attempt to intervene beyond the two poles (Greek-Christian – neo-Cypriot). The elements, which support my historical analysis, come partly from a critical analysis of what the above ideologists or historians cite. And I mention all this in case anyone is willing to look at the sources, but also so as not to create any illusion that the following analysis is based on a history that has been fully written. Cypriot history as facts, documents and evidence is only now being discovered and written. We note this, so that anyone reading this text or anything else on Cyprus may retain their doubts and reservations.

And one last note: various topics (e.g. education, state, etc.) appear in various analyses – this is not a repetition. Rather, it is an attempt to bring out the dimensions of a phenomenon in its totality and to look at the interactions of various structures.

NOT DEDICATED TO MAKARIOS OR THE HEROES OF EOKA

This text was written with the main aim (and hope) to provoke some dialogue through disagreements and exchanges of views. From this point of view, it is a personal attempt to form some kind of reflection and critique on Cypriot reality. Within the framework of a libertarian analysis, which places class structure, patriarchy and the state as the main social contradictions, an attempt is made to construct an alternative reflection on the historical and contemporary Cypriot reality. The centring on nationalism is done because this ideology has had and continues to have a decisive influence in Cyprus, and as I try to show in the first part, it has played and continues to play a decisive role in the development of various groups

and individuals in the non-institutional left. And to a certain extent, this is the milieu to which the text is addressed, which is why there are also several references to Trotskyists and Marxists. Not because they have played or are playing a decisive role in Cypriot reality, but because they are the only counter-positions that this “milieu” has offered and has been offered. Now, to tell the truth, I don’t expect any substantial response from the pure blooded Trotskyists or Marxists, since they don’t seem ready for anything other than pressuring you to agree with them.

The hope for a response goes more to people who are positioned in the libertarian milieu, or to those who are unaffiliated and wandering. Beyond the hope for some discussion, the text does not offer itself as the positions or final conclusions of any group or individual. This is an exploration, it is neither a history textbook nor static political positions. The only useful political function this text can serve is to be overcome.

Methodologically, one might get the impression from reading this text that I am proposing a critical analysis, based on the structural dynamics of power relations, with minimal influence from those in power either as groups or as individuals. And this is possible, by the very nature of the text-critique of the ideological hegemony of nationalism and the processes it promotes. In this context, the emphasis falls asymmetrically on structural changes. My understanding, which is evident in various parts of the text, is that structural changes are results of the dialectic between the autonomous dynamics of power structures and of those subordinated to them. In other words, the present evolution is the result of the prevalence of power, insofar as this evolution was determined by the need to eliminate or assimilate social conflict. The dynamics of structures are altered by the intervention of people, and an analysis of today’s reality as a whole (and not only of nationalism) must look at the hidden contradictions in structures as a result of previous social conflicts that were defeated. Another point to emphasize in this context is that the defeat or assimilation of social conflict in different historical periods is not inevitable. That is, the historical course could have been different if the subordinated won in the social conflict. That is why I call structural changes the “defeat of

social conflict” – unlike Marxists, I don’t think capitalist or state-socialist modernization is the inevitable path of social evolution.

A special note is also needed on the role of the individual in these processes – if nothing else, because the tendency to avoid the responsibility of the individual is predominant in Cyprus. The victimization and simultaneous exoneration of the Greek Cypriot community after 1974 is typical of this funny, as well as sappy tendency to avoid responsibility. Blame the imperialists, the Turks, EOKA B, the whole world except the “poor”, “proper” Cypriot normie. In fact, alongside all of them, a large part of the responsibility lies with the Greek Cypriots as individuals. For 14 years they sat on their eggs or ran like sheep to the rallies, and in the coup most of them went home even though they “knew what would happen next”. The responsibility is immediate and the only way to avoid it is to blame it on others or on “divine fate”.

And some preliminary clarifications on terminology and dealing with various issues:

By the nature of the subject, but also because of the alienating separation of knowledge, there was a constant problem from the beginning, that the text should not become an exercise in intellectual self-gratification. I have made an attempt to more extensively articulate various issues at a few points, to avoid cliché expressions that need a dictionary to be understood. On another level, I have tried to avoid substituting familiar terms (e.g. neo-colonialism, national issue, etc.) even though my understanding of a topic may be slightly different or even often contrary to common usage. The term “national issue” is an example. Although I question the term “nation” itself, I use the expression “national issue” to express general dangers facing a group of people. Further, the wording of expressions such as Cypriots, Greeks, Turks, etc. is used in the everyday sense of the term, people who reside in an easily distinguishable geographical area (e.g. Cypriots) or who reside on the borders policed by the homonymous state. Although one could (and to a certain extent I think rightly) accuse me of reproducing alienation through the language in this way, I think, however, that at this stage there are more important things to discuss rather than getting bogged down with terminology.

And a final note on the choice of topics:

1. Although there are sporadic references to Turkish Cypriots and Turks, when the text deals with nationalism, it basically refers to the Greek Cypriot variant. Apart from the outward hysterics of Turko-centric nationalism, very little is known about the processes it has promoted within the Turkish Cypriot community, in Turkey; and the power groups that have promoted and are promoting it.

2. There are certain topics, which, although extremely important (e.g. the divide and rule policy of the English in the 1950s, the American interference and the financing of the CIA, etc.), are seldom mentioned. And the reason is simple. These topics have been so much analysed (every year there is a book or a bunch of articles on them) that it would be pointless to repeat them. I repeat, however, that these are presupposed in this analysis.

3. Various topics (e.g. education, state, etc.) appear in various analyses, this is not a repetition. Rather, it is an attempt to bring out the dimensions of a phenomenon in their entirety and to look at the interactions of various structures.

Although the responsibility for the final opinions is of course mine, however, in shaping the ideas and writing, I had a lot of help from 4-5 people who for various reasons might not want their names here.

And one last note for Cypriot pro-Enosis Marxists: the fact that our views differ diametrically and that there is a (strong or not) criticism of their views in the text, it would be a complete mistake to misinterpret this criticism of political positions as a criticism of the morality and consistency of these people.

Useful terms

AKEL - Progressive Party of Working People, the Communist Party.

EDEK - Socialist Party of Vassos Lyssarides.

DISY - Democratic Rally led by Clerides and a party covering the space of the old Enosists [supporters of Enosis].

DIKO - Democratic Party, led by President Kyprianou and for now the “Party of the State”.

TMT - Terrorist Turkish Cypriot Nationalist Organization.

EOKA - “National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters”, struggle of 1955-59.

The terms “neo-Cypriots” and “neo-Greek-Cypriots” are used in the same sense, since the mass expression of identification with the Cypriot state is expressed at the level of the Greek Cypriot state and consciousness.

short historical outline

The reference to the events is made in relation to the following analysis

1571 The Turks occupy Cyprus from the Latins. In the early years, trying to gain access to the island, they treat the Orthodox favourably. Their administration thereafter depends on the rulers of the day and the various phases the Ottoman Empire goes through. There are various pro-Latin revolts at the beginning, which diminish with the passage of time.

1660 The church becomes co-administrator, if not actual governor of Cyprus, with the granting of special privileges by the Sultan. There are local rebellions by members of both communities.

1765 Joint mass uprising of Orthodox Christians and Muslims under the leadership of Khalil agha (governor of Kyrenia) against the economic misery and the new taxes imposed. The rebellion is crushed by troops sent from outside. It should be noted that during this period Muslims show more pronounced tendencies to revolt, perhaps because there is strong downward class mobility in their community.

1804 A new uprising, which starts as a common uprising among the popular strata. The intervention of the church, which mediates the arrival of troops to suppress it, creates intercommunal antagonisms and incidents.

1821 Greek revolution and settlement of accounts between the elites. Archbishop Kyprianos is hanged.

1833 Three uprisings (of Theseus, monk Ioannikios and Gavür Imam) that start from popular discontent with the economic situation. There are attempts at cooperation between the various “leaders”. Gavür Imam occupies Paphos for 4 months. This is followed by repression with troops coming from outside. Ioannikios and Gavür Imam are executed. Theseus escapes through foreign consulates.

1878 Cyprus is ceded to England. The English restructure the administration of the island on a political basis and slowly lay the foundations of the modern state. At the same time there is a rapid rise in education. In the meantime, the first calls for Enosis [union with Greece] begin to be made by bourgeois intellectuals and the church. The Turkish Cypriot elite calls for a return to Turkey.

1900-1910 Church crisis with multifaceted implications. Intransigent nationalists vs. moderates, bourgeoisie vs. clergy, metropolises vs. archbishopric, etc.

1912 Intercommunal incidents in various villages and towns at the time of the Balkan wars. Although the incidents were not massive, they nevertheless show that nationalism is becoming entrenched and divisive. The first (even small) movements of inhabitants out of their residences in 2-3 villages take place.

1914 England annexes Cyprus (until then Cyprus had theoretically belonged to Turkey and England administered it by special agreement) and proposes to Greece Enosis so that the latter can enter the war. Greece, with a pro-German government, refuses.

1926 Crushing defeat of the intransigent nationalists in the elections. Formation of the CPC (Communist Party) by intellectuals and workers. Though fiercely persecuted, the party gains some influence in some areas.

1931 Oktovriana [October Events]. Popular uprising against the new taxes. The uprising quickly takes on an Enosis character. The English respond with repression.

1931-1940 The English impose a dictatorship and proceed with the effective establishment of the foundations of the Cypriot state. It is within the framework of the bureaucracy, which is created during this period, that the interests of various elites (bourgeoisie, gentry, etc.) converge. The oppression of Greek-Enosis nationalism makes it an anti-colonial symbol.

1941 The English relax the dictatorship. AKEL is founded by illegal cells of the CPC, liberal politicians and members of the popular strata. AKEL appears as an inter-communal party (although it too has Enosis as its goal). At first it looks like a broad popular movement against colonialism, the old bureaucracy (the “appointed ones”) and social inequality. The degeneration is gradual but rapid in the years to come.

1943-1947 Period of intense mobilisation of AKEL and of its spectacular rise. It crushes the right in the municipal elections and elects Leontios as archbishop, with a large majority.

1947 Leontios dies soon after his election. The new AKEL candidate loses the election in a climate of increasing polarisation and mass fraud. The English propose a constitution of self-government. AKEL tries to secure a boycott and calls on right-wing leaders to resign from government posts. The right of course refuses and AKEL takes part in the talks, which fail. Thus, AKEL already has a double defeat. It fails to gain access to both centres of power in Cyprus (the church and the state). Although AKEL followed a tactic of national “popular-front unity” even then, since 1947 it puts this line above all else and follows the choices of the power centres, looking for the right opportunity to establish itself in their eyes and gain access to them.

1948 Period of intense strikes. The English, the church and the right mobilize against the last mass movement of class conflict. Many strikes are intercommunal. Despite small material gains, the defeat is decisive. The defeat in the factory and on the street ensures the imposition of the AKEL leadership on large layers of the popular strata. The party’s political choices become the only hope for these strata who want to get out of misery and defeat. In the same year and under the influence of the civil war in Greece, a frightening polarisation of left and right is created in Cyprus, the effects of which are still evident. Different football clubs etc. are formed. While the Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot rift is barely discernible, the left-right rift erupts sharply and breaks the Greek Cypriot community in two. The hatred between left and right had for many years been much more intense than that between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

1949 New leadership in AKEL. The slogan is formalised: ENOSIS AND ONLY ENOSIS with any Greek government. The new

leadership of AKEL is the same one that exists today and which of course does not want to hear about Enosis.

1950 Referendum on Enosis. 97% of Greek Cypriots voted for Enosis. While the signatures were being made public, 15,000 Turkish Cypriots demonstrated against Enosis in Nicosia.

1955 The EOKA struggle begins. The struggle goes through several phases. Makarios is exiled to the town of Mahé in the Seychelles Islands, which were under English colonial rule. There are successive truces. Some of the most liberal members of EOKA are heroically killed (and under strange circumstances of betrayal). Afxentiou, Matsis etc.

1958 Grivas and the Terrorist Turkish Cypriot Nationalist Organization start assassinating leftists and afterwards there are widespread intercommunal riots with unprecedented, for the relations between the two communities, massacres. The English are fostering division in the usual divide and rule manner.

1959-1960 The Zurich-London agreements are signed and the Cypriot state is declared. During the signing, the English, in order to put pressure on Makarios, revealed to him that they knew where Grivas was hiding in Cyprus.

1963-1964 The Constitution does not function smoothly, while nationalists from both communities form militia groups. Makarios tries to amend the Constitution. The Turkish Cypriots refuse. In late 1963, clashes break out in Nicosia. There are widespread massacres of civilians. Sampson, the post-coup president, leads the massacres of Turkish Cypriots in Omorfita. Turkish intervention is threatened and clashes break out from time to time. (August 1964, clashes in Tillyria). The end of 1964 finds the Turkish Cypriots confined to ghettos, while their elite leave the government.

1967 New clashes instigated by Grivas in Kofinou and Agios Theodoros. There are again accusations by Turkish Cypriots of violence against civilians. Meanwhile, Makarios begins to promote theories of “feasibility”. Enosis is the goal, but the practical aim at the moment is independence.

1968 The first moves against Makarios by right-wing extremists begin.

1971 EOKA B is formed by Grivas and a guerrilla war begins with bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and brutal reprisals by the state

against members or followers of EOKA B. The junta's support of EOKA B is well known and the factionalism of Athens was also at work in Cyprus. It appears from published CIA documents that there was also an American funding of anti-Cypriot activities.

1974 Coup d'état-Invasion. Occupation of Northern Cyprus by the Turkish army. The war lasts very briefly. Mass exodus of Greek Cypriots to the south.

1977 Death of Makarios.

The crisis continues.

The text is divided into 4 parts:

- a)** The first is an attempt at a first approach and clarification, analysing the function of the national issue, and of nationalism on the general development and constitution of the Greek Cypriot far left. It is to some extent also the personal journey that leads to this text.
- b)** The second part is an introduction to the real dimensions of this phenomenon that could be called the national issue.
- c)** The third, which is perhaps the largest, is a critical analysis of Greek Christianity (and by this I mean all the ideological fanfare of Greekness, whether it is called that, or is described in more sophisticated terms) as an ideology of the historical approach to the Cypriot context and as an ideological cover for various processes of reconstruction of power structures (class structure-patriarchal politics-state centralization). This text is at the same time an attempt to analyse the historical developments of the last decades.
- d)** The last part is a critical analysis of Greek Cypriot consciousness.

1. THE “NATIONAL ISSUE”, THE FAR LEFT AND THE “MILIEU”

The “national issue” (which in this case refers the occupation of Northern Cyprus by the army of the Turkish state and the “plots of the imperialists” against us) has been a key pole of reference of the

Cypriot far left, which has timidly emerged after 1974 and which for some parts of it is still of course the PROBLEM.

In a first phase, immediately after 1974 and in a situation that smelled of general upheaval, the slogan of “conscripting” society for a “popular defence” etc. was raised. Talking about a far left movement at this time is a bit of a stretch, of course. But the first processes had begun among various individuals and groups, both within EDEK, which strongly expressed these currents at that time, and among AKEL members and enosisists. It is also the period of efforts to reconstitute the CPC.

EDEK, which also had the tradition of “resistance” to the coup, expressed for a time this willingness to reject any compromise with timid proposals for state socialist measures, in the face of the policy of social peace and appeasement adopted by AKEL and the state.

The contradictions of the ideology of conscription as a panacea for all problems (external and internal) did not take long to appear. The bourgeoisie, Makarios, the state and AKEL used the same logic, but for exactly opposite goals. The workers accepted not only the freeze, but also the reduction of wages, the refugees were appeased, the whole society started to take the path of conformity again within the framework of “national unity” for the long-term struggle.

In the end, the argument of those promoting the spectacle and social peace was identical to that adopted by the “subversives”. Yes, we need “conscription”, but conscription without “national unity” is not possible, and of course “national unity” and “social conflict” are mutually exclusive.

The contradictions of EDEK,²⁹ as soon as it was forced to take a “responsible” position, were indicative of the situation. In this context frustration (alongside the simultaneous partial decline of the “militant” mood that existed among the youth), and the realization that much of that whole ideology of “conscription” was

29 In 1976-77, when Makarios and AKEL begin to accept bi-zonal bi-communal federation. EDEK, despite theoretically crying out against this course of action, practically went along with it as it ran on a joint ticket with AKEL and all it did against the Makarios-Denktaş agreements (which bound the Greek Cypriot state to the bi-zonal federation) was to “express reservations”.

determined by the ruling ideology, led several individuals to reject this whole spectacle. In particular, the realization of our personal misery (sexual, psychological, etc.) led to a rejection that carried with it a demand for a life that seemed completely unrelated to the political schizophrenia of the politicians. Of course, this development was not general. Within EDEN³⁰ a “rearguard battle” continued for a time, until the party left all pretext behind and threw out the Trotskyists, “entryists” and other leftists en masse. “Aristeri Pteriga [The Left Wing]” followed its own disintegrating course afterwards, to finally leave the “pure-blooded” to publish “Sosialistiki Ekfrasi [Socialist Expression]”. “Conscription” still plays a key role in this group, only now charged with a more explicit “class” and at the same time “internationalist” component. The issue for them is to unite with the Turkish Cypriot workers and to take on the bourgeoisie and the occupiers all together in unity.

In the spectacular “left-right” polarisation, the Trotskyist spokesmen have aligned themselves with the so-called left (AKEL-EDEK) and have tried to “re-revolutionise” it with their entryism and internal party factions.³¹

From another point of view, various individuals passing from the effort for the reconstitution of the CPC³², or other Marxist-Leninist groups, or carrying an Enosis tradition, or discovering the light of truth in Psyroukis,³³ jumped to the other extreme, and started looking for the revolutionary subject among the far right enosists.³⁴ This milieu presented at one stage an interesting intervention, as it brought

30 Editor’s note: Refers to the youth wing of the socialist party EDEK.

31 The official line of “Socialist Expression” was the need for a left-wing government (AKEL-EDEK).

32 Editor’s note: The Reconstitution of the CPC (Communist Party of Cyprus) was a Maoist political party that operated from 1975 to 1977. It maintained the position of self-determination-enosis.

33 Editor’s note: Refers to the Greek Marxist historian Nikos Psyroukis, who dealt systematically with the Cyprus Problem and whose analyses had some resonance in the Greek Cypriot extra-parliamentary left in the 1980s.

34 There was a perception that this stratum (enosists), which opposed the Cypriot state (on the basis that its existence excluded Enosis), was revolutionary – somewhere some people were calling these strata unconscious anti-statists!!! (see Pentadakylos No.4 “The State in Cypriot society”).

together people from the left (but not from AKEL) and from the former far right, thus presenting itself as an attempt to break the whole spectacular left-right polarisation. However, it was a game played on the ideological sophistry of the AKEL-Enosis polarisation. AKEL once supported Enosis, e.g. which means that Enosis is a demand of the popular movement (hence revolutionary) and that the popular movement was revolutionary at the time. In these contexts the national issue held the key status, but at the same time it had new dimensions. These Marxists placed the problem of Enosis as the national issue and made various attempts to link it with the occupation and to the “imperialists”. In a first phase they argued, for example, that the coup and the invasion would not have taken place if Enosis had taken place. In a newer phase, they threw out the view that “what’s done is done”, but because the “Turkish bourgeoisie” is aggressive, the only way to save ourselves is Enosis (even if it is a double one).

What is amazing about this situation is the impression that something terribly new has been discovered. In fact, apart from the Marxist sauce that decorates the arguments, the substance is essentially the same as what we have all heard thousands of times in the schools of Greek-Christian education. As for double Enosis, which is going to become a revolutionary solution for some, it was proposed by the Turkish state since the 1950s and by the Americans since 1963.

The phenomenon has its funny side, especially when Trotskyists or pro-Enosis Marxists complain that the “Cypriot people” have lost their historical memory. There is, however, a serious -and sad-side. The far left, born and still trying to survive with the national issue as the PROBLEM, has made itself comfortable under the sun of Cypriot ideology and the imaginary left-right polarization. Arteriosclerosis, scaremongering and national, social, class, etc. unity created two more shops for this ideology.

The group that publishes the magazine,³⁵ which anyway belongs to the libertarian space – not the leftist one, having taken a

35 This is the group that published the magazine “Mavres Pinelies” (Black Brushstrokes) and for which this text was originally written and with which it was first discussed.

clear, negative position on the reduction of the national issue as the most basic problem of our existence, found itself in a dead end when it started an attempt to analyse Cypriot reality two years ago. Given the lack of many in-depth libertarian analyses of such situations and the complete lack of any evidence in Cyprus to draw upon, the search often turned into “sailing”.

This text -which may well be another “sailing”- emerged from last year’s discussions as a first attempt at some kind of analysis. At the same time, it also expresses a personal opinion of mine on the disagreement, expressed within the group, as to whether it is worth dealing with nationalism and the national issue.

First of all, some clarification of terms is needed. “National issue” expresses a problem facing a totality of humans (a people, a nation, etc.) regardless of the internal divisions (communal, class) and the power relations of this totality (class, patriarchal, state). The problem usually stems from external intervention, dependence, exploitation, etc. Thus, e.g. the invasion of the Turkish state in 1974 affected refugees as a whole, regardless of the power relations that had previously defined them (the recreation of these same relations is another story).

Nationalism in any form projects this problem as the main and defining problem of all social life. Nationalism answers the national problem at the level at which the problem is posed. Ignoring internal divisions and power relations, it tries to put forward a resistance to an unknown, threatening Other. In this sense, nationalism reproduces, promotes and institutionalizes in new contexts already existing power relations.

Nationalism functions as a status quo ideology within society. To some extent, this is also due to the frequent discovery and projection of an Other within the country,³⁶ e.g. traitors, conspirators, etc. It is a practical method for the state to get rid of any nuisance, while at the same time intensifying the pressure on society for unification-homogenization, suspending social conflicts and levelling out differences.

36 For more analysis of this issue and its function within the patriarchal family see the piece on patriarchal reconstruction.

However, the equation “nationalism” equals bullshit, oversimplifies the situation and avoids the problem. Because apart from the fact that nationalism is presented as at least an alienated response to a nonetheless real problem, there is also the fact that people take the issue seriously and believe it. The appeal of nationalism as an ideology reflects to some extent the importance of the problems it tends to address. But at the same time, this resonance is tied to the power relations that permeate society and are reproduced by nationalism.

In this context, the distinction between the “national issue” and nationalism is important. The national issue must be seen in its real dimensions as a real problem, while nationalism as an ideology needs to be analysed and criticised in order to be able to articulate an alternative discourse.

But not to confuse things, what I’m essentially saying is that the “national issue” is a problem imposed on us by various power structures (internal and external). Nationalism is the ideology that institutionalizes the problem internally, projecting it distorted through the power structures that exist. If there is an immediate need, it is to revalorise the national issue and critique nationalism, so that we can see the true dimensions of the problem and how much it concerns us.

Nationalism is an ideology that legitimizes the status quo, but to understand it, you have to try to analyse it, not exorcise it. Criticism of ideology, no matter how exhaustive it needs to be, must at some point encounter reality and will need to propose alternatives. This, of course, does not mean that we will immediately run around with magic recipes, getting into the rhythm of power, “if it were us we would do this” or “this is what must be done”. Instead, a reconstructive critique may be needed (and in Cyprus this is what is needed after all). A critique and activity on specific issues that will allow the creation of an autonomous space and discourse. But a critique that will know that as long as its discourse and its counter-power cannot confront those of institutionalized power at all levels, will be more or less captive to the power of the state and other mechanisms in times of crisis. In a war, the solution will be to flee or fight under the state, for the state. And for a refugee the

dilemma will be played between who will return and how strong the central state will be.

2. DIMENSIONS OF A PROBLEM THAT CAN BE CALLED NATIONAL

Speaking today about the Cyprus problem – or the national issue, there is often a sense, in the discussion, of things being “self-evident”. And yet, this “self-evident” aspect is not at all obvious if one looks at what the “national issue” has meant for various groups of people in this area over the last decades.

For the Greek Cypriot far right, for example, it was not only the demand for Enosis, but also a strong anti-communism and anti-Turkism, for AKEL’s supporters it used to express an anti-colonial struggle with an extension of Enosis, while after independence the problem moved to the need to protect the Cypriot state. On the other hand, for the Turkish Cypriot far right, the problem was expressed more as a struggle against the “Greeks and the communists” and of course between these extremes there was a whole range of other confrontations (the danger of the Greek or Turkish state; depending on the community or faction to which each belonged, imperialism, etc.).

This mosaic of approaches to the national issue is characteristic both of the complexity of the issue and of the ideological charge of nationalism, which, by fragmenting reality and its problems and projecting its separated fragments on the imaginary level, has laid and continues to lay the foundations of Cypriot ideological hegemony.

We will deal below with the ideological (and structural) function of nationalism. For now, we will attempt a brief analysis of the “national issue” in this geographical area, trying to see its real dimensions. In this context, the analysis is not limited to “communal or national” boundaries – a term I find quite questionable anyway, as seen elsewhere in this text, when its interpretation identifies large groups of people with the nations and states that police them.

The national issue (or the Cyprus problem) expresses (for the purposes of the following analysis) the dangers that the communi-

ties of the people living on the island of Cyprus face from “external forces”. Ostensibly, some “external dangers” appear to favour some communities or political factions (e.g. Enosis or the Turkish invasion) or even the island in total (e.g. tourism). However, with the international institutionalization of nation-states as local mechanisms for the structuring of social power and of imperialism-neocolonialism as an international structuring mechanism, the relatively short-term benefits of a community from state or imperialist intervention gradually take on a negative flavour in the face of the levelling and exploitation by the “former protectors”. Short-term gains gradually become long-term wounds. The experience of Greek Cypriots before the coup and of Turkish Cypriots after the invasion is typical in this respect. In this context we will look at the “national issue” on 3 different levels.

- I)* The problem of the strategic-geographical space of the Middle East.
- II)* The neo-colonial dependence.
- III)* The imperialism of the Greek-Turkish states in the Cypriot area and the competition between them.

I. THE STRATEGIC SPACE (MIDDLE EAST), THE INTERVENTIONS AND PEACE

This seems an issue solved and overanalysed before we even start. Cyprus in the Middle East, oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, American machinations and so on. Although this analysis has enough truths, it nevertheless has a deliberately limited field of vision (which is basically reinforced by our tearful solidarity with the Arab states and their chauvinism and in the absolution of Russian imperialism for what is going on in the region). The aim of course for the Russians and the Americans is oil and political control of the region. In this context, the role of Cyprus remains what it has been since the English took over the island, an extreme “gendarmierie station”, helping whoever owns it to police its dependencies and prevent opponents from entering the region. The crucial role that this geographical location has played in the modern history of the island (in terms of foreign interventions, direct or indirect) is quite obvious. The English bases and the American radars are typical of these developments. Cyprus for the moment is a gendarmierie station of Western imperialism.

However, this is where we need to start to clarify things, because this is where the similarity of analysis with that of the problematic (so dear to our leftist “anti-imperialists”) ends, which, seeing the above, draws its line of confrontation with “American and Zionist imperialism” and places us on the side of “Arab anti-imperialism” etc.

Seeing the fate of the Palestinians (slaughtered for 30 years by Israel and the Arab states), the fascist structure and ideology of the Arab states, the growing expansionism of Israel (and of course not only Israel) and the intensity of the competition between the superpowers, there is a sense that the problem does not fit into the comfortable and beloved clichés of “good and evil” that have suited and suit the left.

The problem is not simply “Western imperialist intervention”, but the whole game of superpower competition. Furthermore, the states of the region themselves have started to develop a relatively autonomous imperialism (within the framework of their growing economic power), which makes the situation in the region even more explosive and at the same time, of course, leads to an increasing internal oppression, showing in this process the real face of nationalism in this region.

In a first consideration of the issue there is a need to take responsibility. Because when 30-40 miles from your house there are bombs that can blow up the whole region, or radars that guide one faction in these massacres called wars in the Middle East, you have a responsibility for your tolerance. Still, when you sell hypocritical support (as the Cypriot state does), expressed in practice by heroizing every dictator of the Arab states and Soviet imperialism, you are in fact avoiding the problem and your responsibility.

This view (tolerating practically the use of your space by one opponent and tearing your ass apart in favour of the other) so characteristic of Cypriot ideology, makes guilt comfortable to a certain extent, while at the same time sees the world in black and white, avoiding any reflection.³⁷

37 It would be nice if pro-Enosis Marxists would take a look at socialist Zionism. Perhaps they might see some correlations with their own case and the

However, beyond the moral responsibility and the ideological needs served by avoiding reflection on what is happening in the Middle East, there is another dimension to the issue. For the strategic interests of the superpowers, we belong to the Middle East and, consequently, developments in this area directly shape us. It has already been mentioned that the West's interest in Cyprus stems to a large extent from its geographical position. In this context, Cyprus will continue to be the target of direct or indirect intervention by the superpowers, depending on the developments in the Middle East. For the time being, AKEL and DISY express a balance on indirect interventions. The suppression of even a basic "political dialogue" (even within the framework of a bourgeois democracy), or even the determination of their position on the Cyprus problem according to the interests of their patrons, is a typical aspect of the results of these interventions.

These interventions, however, express only one aspect of the problem, beyond which there is a basic issue of physical survival. The over-armament of the states in the region, the vital interests of the superpowers and the volatile situation that prevails, create serious risks of generalised war. Any dictator can declare even more stupid wars than the one between Iraq and Iran. And in a generalised war, Cyprus, as an enclave of one coalition, could become a battlefield for the missiles of the superpowers and their minions. And in this context, it is chilling to think that 65%³⁸ -at least- of Cypriots vote for affiliate parties that, if they were in power alone, would fill this place with the missiles of their patrons.

In this context, there is an immediate need for an autonomous peace movement, opposing both the two imperialisms and the nationalism-imperialism of the states of the region. The danger of war has become so real and its technology so dangerous that the problem of peace has become a basic problem of "natural survival" for the peoples of the region – and in this respect I can place it in this category of problems which I call "national".

implications of such "marriages" – where socialism is sacrificed to the need of the "national interest", or how many people with such views were used to make the state of Israel what it is today.

38 DISY and AKEL got roughly that share of the vote in the 1981 elections.

II. FORMS OF “NEO-COLONIAL” DEPENDENCE

The increasing bureaucratisation of professions, the foreign financial aid as a permanent support for the economy (in exchange for our wandering whining)³⁹ and the touristification of everything; interconnectedly create another form of dependency – neo-colonial dependency.

Before we go any further, however, we need to make one thing clear, because there is a critique (quite popular on the far left), which in its anti-consumerist fury gives you sometimes the impression that it would prefer people to be hungry, rather than mindless consumers.

For me at least, the fact that the standard of living has gone up dramatically, the fact that people are not freezing their asses off, is both pleasant and positive.

However, this rise in living standards and the resulting consumerism became not only an end in itself and a mechanism for the reproduction of the spectacle, but also eliminated any trace of economic self-sufficiency and autonomy.

With the war in Lebanon we are slowly becoming a centre for “offshore businesses” (already the government announced last summer that this is one of its objectives after granting a licence to 4 international banks in two months). Our already over-stretched bureaucracy is getting a new boost as offices of European firms are popping up everywhere. The aftermath of this development has already begun to be seen at home, an arteriosclerosis of all thinking, an intensification of conformity in the context of being “settled”.

In the international arena, the evolution is more subtle and long term. Losing all productive capacity, this island is totally dependent on international capital for its economic well-being. It is a form of dependence that does not need “cannonball politics” to convince of its wants. Economic blackmail will work just as effectively.

And if the economic competition between European and American capital becomes intense in the region, we will be one of the

39 The last thing I heard in the various tragic-comedic “whining” moments is that the government maintains 1-2 camps with shacks (and pays refugees to stay there) for official visitors.

possible centres of a conflict. And to the extent that these international interests serve not only the bureaucracies of their party-dependencies, but also economic elites, they create external pressures and blackmails, but also internal tensions (DIKO and DISY seem to a certain extent to be predetermined schemas of these conflicts). And of course, no one should underestimate the Soviet economic interests, expressed in a network of private and state-owned enterprises and transactions, and of course the central role of AKEL as an intermediary. The economic aid⁴⁰ which largely set us on our feet after 1974 has an ambiguous character. It was useful in the short term, but the fact that this economy has learned to live with these injections of stimulus in the long run creates such problems of dependency; that our choices as a society are limited to the level of how many steps we take on the tightrope of our various (and often rival) benefactors. Tourism is a third factor of this problem, which, while helping us economically, has also created a network of dependency and attachment to the various metropolitan centres.

With tourism, of course, various internal problems are already starting to be seen, with the destruction of the natural environment, fenced beaches etc.

The peculiarity of tourism is perhaps the fact that the sell-off of this area is taking place in broad daylight before our eyes. (Of course, tourism also has an enormous social impact as a lever for modernization. However, the analysis of this aspect and of tourism in general and its ideological function would require a separate analysis-discussion). In this complex set of problems, which increase dependency and at the same time rape the internal social and physical space, there is no alternative – except a stupid anti-tourism, as if tourists are to blame for our bullshit. Not to mention the fantasies of the pro-Enosis Marxists who see the root of evil -where else- in the non-realisation of Enosis. You see, the Greek

40 The Cypriot economy has been “on its feet” since 1974, largely due to foreign aid. In this context, we should also mention the huge financial aid from Greece, which was among the highest. The continuation of this aid is funny and to some extent scandalous. The standard of living in Cyprus is higher than in Greece - the money that people in Greece are deprived of in a time of economic crisis is largely given to sustain nationalist illusions.

state would have reservations about making us a resort island (as the Cypriot state is doing now).

III. GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS

The Greek state (like the others created in the region with the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire) for most of its modern history was characterised by a strong tendency towards geographical expansionism. Of course, this expansionism always had the cover of the “liberation of ancestral lands” and Cyprus was of course no exception. State expansionism (which is both an expansion and a process of centralisation of the structure of the state) goes hand in hand in these contexts with an attempt at cultural levelling that crushes the autonomous cultures of various communities, integrating them into the homogenised “national culture” of the intellectuals of the state. Below is an analysis of the negative effects of these processes within the community and their role in the formation of ideological hegemony. For now it will express a “cultural imperialism” of the Greek state towards the Cypriot communities.

Beyond the ideological and structural function of expansionism, there was also an economic dimension to the interest in Cyprus. The island (almost on the coast of the Middle East) began to become increasingly important, as Greek shipping capital gained an increasingly decisive position in the economic life of the country. Cyprus could have been a unique centre of traffic and trade for the ships and businesses of the shipowners. At the same time, the reconstituted ideological hegemony in Cyprus managed for a time (1930-57) to mobilise large masses through the nationalist imaginary. The Greek state, however, bound by its dependencies and internal pressures, was unable to take advantage of the opportunities (1914, 1945) and when it was finally half-dragged by those in Cyprus it had intoxicated with fairy tales, all it could do was to patch it up as it did in Zurich. Turkey’s entry into the Cyprus conflict in the 1950s began to complicate the problem, gradually creating tension between the two states, tension that took on new dimensions after 1974 and extended beyond the Cyprus problem, into the Aegean, etc. In the context of the evolution of the structures and ideology of the two states, the Cyprus problem acquired at times a particular function (either as a space of

expansion or as a space of ideological discharge and cultivation of hatred towards the objectified Other, the enemy of the race).

In this context, the national issue is expressed at four (at least) levels:

- a) On the one hand, it exists as a problem of expansionism and state annexation. By this problem, however, I do not mean the risk of annexation of one state (Cypriot) by the other (Greek). The prospect of creating a nation-state is an inherent feature of nationalism, and as such, it creates the problem of negating any potentially liberating dimension of nationalism. The prospect of the state denies the self-determination of communities and as such is (for me at least) a negative phenomenon in any form. However, annexation by an already large and constituted state increases the levelling, exploitation and dependency on the metropolitan centre. 1974 was largely the result of that period when Cyprus resembled a colony of the “national centre” of Athens and Ankara, depending on the community.⁴¹
- b) On another level, the cultural levelling promoted by the metropolitan centre not only destroys regional cultures, but also sets the basis of the ideology that undermines all cultural development. The “province” exists as a relic of the past or as a tourist resort.
- c) Furthermore, the possibility of state annexation or intervention has always been a central problem for the community that would be the loser of this development. Greek Cypriots have never been concerned with what Enosis meant for Turkish Cypriots. When they did get an answer (at least from a portion of that community) it struck a sour note. 1974 turned things around, so that Greek Cypriots are now the ones in danger.

41 Despite Makarios’ manoeuvres and theories of feasibility, the ideological charge was so great that no one dared to openly take on the “national centre”. Makarios was a typical case, he tolerated for years conspiracies in the army and propaganda against him in schools, in the hope of avoiding conflict with the “national centre” (even when it was the Junta). When he decided that he was going no further it was already too late.

d) Another aspect -perhaps the most immediately dangerous- of the problem is the aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations (both for real differences and for internal consumption). However, in the way the problem is now positioned, a conflict between the two states for any (external or internal) reason will certainly make us their battleground.

And in such a conflict, apart from the fate of the defeated community, there will again be a problem of the survival of all. Ultimately, those who survive after the napalms, will hang around in the ruins. A rather interesting aspect of the Cyprus problem is the autonomous dynamic that the problem has acquired (as an ideology) among many people in Greece. And of course, the Cyprus problem and its “national” dimension are but parts of the ideology of “national integration”, which the Greek state has been nurturing since its birth. But the important thing is that, among Greeks, the self-powered prospect of this ideology has always been an easy way of political abuse and exploitation. Thus, the Greek left has played on these feelings in order to emerge from its defeat and present itself as more royal than the king in its proclamations. The “refusal to accept the Zurich agreements” etc. is indicative of the political level at which the matter was played out.

The interference of the Cyprus Problem in the Greek political scene was both harmful and disorienting. It was the issue that politicians have always used, either to criticize and gain support without touching other “taboo” issues, or to draw people’s attention “beyond the Aegean”, towards the danger from the “barbarians”.

The junta had played this card heavily and for a while after 1974 the issue seemed to have been abandoned by politicians. But the election of Papandreou quickly changed the scene. The new prime minister came to Cyprus and started selling “co-partisanship”, “struggle” etc. There was nothing new in the story – he just went to play along like others before, anticipating what was in store for him during his years of administration. The Cyprus Problem could be a relief valve to unemployment,

policing, crisis etc. In the end, he did not succeed, at least for now. He was outflanked by the Cypriot statisticians when he got in their way. Papandreou's move, however, shows that although Turkey has the initiative on the island, the return of the Greek state to the conflict is not at all unlikely. (The joke of the affair was the incomprehensible hymns that were being sung at the time by pro-Enosis Marxists about Papandreou and Chrysostomos,⁴² a bit prematurely of course, but you never know what might happen.)

If there is an immediate need in this context, it is the development of a dialogue for understanding and peace, a language between people that is different from that of the three states (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey).

3. THE GREEK-CHRISTIAN-ENOSIS NATIONALISM AND ITS FUNCTION

I. IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENTS – HELLENISM AS A PHENOMENON

The “Greek-Christian History”, which has been served to us for years by the intellectuals of the state and of “social peace”, has been based on two main axes.

- a) The existence and uniqueness of this phenomenon called “hellenism”.
- b) In a conception of history as a straight line, extending from antiquity to the present, and whose unchanging essence was the phenomenon of “hellenism”. In this context, the relationship between the people who were supposed to embody this phenomenon (hellenism) and other peoples and cultural groups was a surprisingly asymmetrical one. The Greeks were “civilizing” or “liberating”, while the rest of the world was corrupting or “barbarically conquering” this now metaphysical phenomenon.

42 Editor's note: Refers to Chrysostomos I, then archbishop of Cyprus.

The racism of these views is more than obvious to those who want to see it. Those who organized the massacres of the Turkish Cypriots in 1963 and 1967 were also sucking on such “candies”. And of course, this bullshit is neither a discovery nor unique to our Greek Christians.

What is, however, particularly interesting, having a key ideological function, is the linear relationship that is suggested to exist between antiquity and the present. This is because it expresses one of the main components of nationalism -the tendency to level cultural and other differences both temporally and socially- and the simultaneous denial of the opposing interests and perceptions that divide different groups of people within the power structures that govern their relations. Thus, for Greek Christians, various conflicts (local, cultural, etc.), even apparently mutually exclusive concepts, ways of life and philosophical tendencies, express parts of a whole, of hellenism.

With various intellectualist stunts, everything is put in the same bag, – along with the aphorisms, of course, for those who still don’t suit us today, as “corrupt” etc. The natural and obvious question in the face of this construct is simply: why so? That is, why this whole? Why this area, which the modern geography of states calls “Greece” (which after all includes areas that the “Greeks” of antiquity considered barbarian) and not the Balkans, the Middle East, etc.?

Of course, it is no coincidence that the basic defining element of this whole is its state.

The rise of nationalism on the European and then on the international scene is intertwined with the rise of the modern state and the modernisation of other power structures (class relations, patriarchy, etc.)

II. THE PRO-ENOSIS MARXISTS

Before proceeding to the specific case of Cyprus, it is useful to mention the pro-Enosis Marxist perspective (at least at its theoretical level), which seems to propose a more sophisticated view of the issue.

“The ethnogenesis of peoples begins when the social life of humans begins. But nations begin to crystallize as a complete historical category in the period of decline of the feudal middle ages.”

Ignoring the fact that his views are based on Stalinist definitions (of the nation, for example), and this fact alone (the Stalinist basis of the analysis) should raise concerns for the analysis itself, which smells of a stale Marxism, Psyroukis basically proposes that in the course of ethnogenesis the bourgeoisie gradually loses the leadership of the struggle and it is taken over by the proletariat (who else?).⁴³

As far as the Greek area and the Cyprus issue are concerned, Psyroukis finds that this issue becomes a crucial issue for the national liberation struggle of hellenism. As summed up by another pro-Enosis Marxist:

“...the Cyprus problem is the condensation of all the contradictions of Greek society and the regime of subordination and decadence...”⁴⁴

According to this position, the struggle of the Cypriots against colonialism and imperialism (embodied by England) becomes the struggle of the Greek people for independence. The bourgeoisie, which is selling out Greece to foreigners, is betraying the struggle of the Greek Cypriots. (Typical cases for Psyroukis are the refusal of the English offer in 1914, the condemnation of the October Events by Venizelos and the non-inclusion of Cyprus in the “national processes” in 1945.)

Thus, the bourgeoisie loses the leadership in the struggle for ethnogenesis and it must be taken over by the working class. In this context, Enosis could not be achieved simply by ceding the island to Greece.⁴⁵ On the contrary, the demand of Enosis

43 The pro-Enosis Marxist perspective, which dates back to the 1960s and the first appearance of Greek Maoism, has found its spiritual father in the historian Nikos Psyroukis. The emphasis in the analysis, which follows Psyroukis and RIXI (rather than the Cypriot pro-Enosis Marxists), is because they seem to have largely determined the ideology of the Cypriot comrades. Also, it should be stressed that pro-Enosis Marxists do not necessarily have a single view on all issues or even a uniform ideology. I use the term “pro-Enosis Marxist” as a term generally accepted by them (see also RIXI No.14). As for the analysis, I rely on their theoretical framework and on views expressed without encountering a contradiction among them (e.g. dual Enosis).

44 R. Olympios, *Tetradia* no.1. “The influence of the Cyprus problem on the thought of the left-wing militants.”

45 Here, Psyroukis is taking things too far, completely disregarding historical reality. For the mentioned refusals of Greece were made at times of particular

(a demand that expresses the dynamic of Greek ethnogenesis and the anti-imperialist struggle of the nation) has an explosive dynamic that overturns the balance and challenges imperialist-capitalist dependence.

And Psyroukis observes that in the 1950s the Cyprus problem was the issue that challenged the nationalist right and gave a new impetus to the movement of the Greek left. And in Cyprus, in the 1940s, AKEL was at the forefront of the struggle for Enosis. Here then, always according to Psyroukis, is the working class slowly taking the lead in the struggle for ethnogenesis.

From a first point of view, it seems that here we have some distinctions (albeit class distinctions) within the flattening unity of the nation. It is, however, disappointing to see that this is only on the surface. Psyroukis is doing his own levelling. Following the Bolshevik analytical formula, Psyroukis sees a worker-peasant alliance led, of course, by the proletariat (through its party). The problem with all of this is that essentially, apart from the evil bourgeoisie, everyone else belongs to this imaginary unity, called the Greek nation, which has common interests and goals and, basically, the historical necessity of national integration.

And the results are that Psyroukis does not ultimately escape from the framework of the classical ideology of hellenism. He ignores or does not take into account the differentiations of various social and cultural groups. There is also here the metaphysical concept of hellenism as a timeless entity (but evolving historically) and that the stumbling block in the Cyprus issue must be overcome in order to complete the national necessity. Of course, in this hypothesis the idiosyncrasies and dispositions of people are relatively indifferent to the interpreter and ideologist of historical necessity. Regardless of what Cypriots think they want, their duty and destiny are historically determined. Psyroukis and various

historical circumstances and in no case was Enosis erased. It is simply that the politicians in Athens postponed the issue for a better opportunity. Let us not forget, it was the "communist-eater" Papagos who began to somewhat move the diplomatic nets for Enosis. And in Cyprus, the Enosis struggle in the 1950s was clearly led by the ruling classes. It is a stretch to interpret diplomatic circumstances and political contradictions as social or historical contradictions.

pro-Enosis Marxists, for example, insist to this day on the 1950s slogan “Self-determination-Enosis”.

The slogan is funny and contradictory, because if Cypriots had self-determination today they would not of course choose Enosis. And yet the slogan is kept within the ideology of historical necessity and “national destinies”. The only way to recognize the decision of the Cypriots as correct (and as self-determination) is when they choose Enosis. Otherwise, Cypriots don’t know what’s going on. A younger pro-Enosis Marxist tells us this very clearly:

“...but the Cyprus problem is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of lawyers, just as it is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of the Cypriots”.⁴⁶

Of course, when we talk about hellenism and its historical necessities, are we going to be concerned with what the Cypriots have to say?

To a certain extent, Psyroukis grasps a contradiction, but it is overdrawn and belated. The Cyprus problem acted as a catalyst for developments in Greece in the 1950s. What it essentially did was to contrast the nationalism of the right with its dependency and ridicule it. And this of course gave the left the opportunity to come out of the margins.

But by re-emerging, the left, through the humiliation of the nationalist right, did not manage to overcome the ideology of the latter. The left emerged posing as more royal than the king in its patriotism (patriotism = refined leftist term for nationalism). The result of this story was finally to shift the “national enemy”, instead of being the Bulgarians and Greece “crying” for Northern Epirus,⁴⁷ the terms were transferred to England first and then (until today) to “NATO Turkey” and “martyred Cyprus” respectively. This not only shifted nationalism, it actually created a nationalism for all Greeks again.

46 P. Prodromou “Our reaction to Turkey’s expansionist plans”, Apopsi no. 8-9. page 4.

47 It should be noted in this context, that the theory of “national integration” and ethnogenesis goes out of the window with regard to Northern Epirus. But this is a matter of “right-wing nationalism”. And then Albania is “socialist” and for years it was Maoist.

And of course, since then, Cyprus played a big role in Greek developments (especially until 1974). Left, right and centre, politicians and colonels; quickly understood that the heart of Greek nationalism was beating in Cyprus. And this nationalism became a characteristic “ideological mechanism” of the state, which slowly re-established the state as the pole of reference for “all Greeks”, the prelude to the social state of PASOK (to use the phraseology of RIXI). The results of nationalism for the left in particular are very obvious for anyone who wants to see them. The Greek-centric chauvinism about culture (from the exorcisms by the Communist Youth of Greece of the youth subculture as an “American way of life”, to the quackery of the Greek musical purity of Savvopoulos, Theodorakis, Markopoulos, etc.), the calls to “sink Hora” and the extreme nationalism of PASOK towards Turkey, the emergence among intellectuals of the Marxist-Orthodox or Neo-Orthodox current, etc. From one point of view, the pro-Enosis Marxist conception of this history, at the level of theory.

Apart from Psyroukis, the group around the magazine RIXI (which has its ideological roots in Psyroukis’ group of 1953) came to dig up the issue recently. Although they regurgitate the same old stuff about “national integration”, their proposal has its innovations. It essentially abandons the demand for “self-determination-Enosis” for all of Cyprus and settles for “Enosis of the remaining part” with Greece. A double Enosis. And the reason is that this is the only way to “save Cypriot hellenism” from annihilation (because the Turkish state is expansionist) and to ensure peace in the region.

Now, why the Turkish state is inherently “expansionist, barbaric, militaristic” (Psyroukis’ expressions etc.), while the Greek one is simply the noble conclusion of the ethnogenetic process of hellenism, has never been explained to us. Just as they never explained to us how these “anti-imperialists” and revolutionaries against the “state-capital” have now decided to fight for the same solution that the imperialists have been proposing for years now (double Enosis) and to be interested in the “completion” of the state they otherwise want to “overthrow”. If RIXI is really interested in peace, it would be more practical to fight Andreas Papandreou’s nationalism. Instead, they prefer to return again

to Psyroukis, get into the logic of hellenism and of course propose responsible and national positions (and not groupthink and fringe positions as they say). And of course, when you propose responsible and national positions, you cannot ignore the need to support and complete your state.

III. CYPRIOT HISTORY FROM ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Returning to the Cypriot context, it is necessary to look at history without nationalist lenses, in order to see the extent of the Greek-Christian imaginary (including its pro-Enosis Marxist variant).

Because, ultimately, there is another history, which is not written because it does not suit the ideological hegemony and for which you have to look behind the words and contradictions of our “historians” to see it.

Cyprus was inhabited for most of its history by various communities divided religiously, culturally and in some cases by class. In the most recent period we have communities of Maronites, Latins, Armenians, Jews, Muslims (Turks), Orthodox Christians (Greeks), Linobambaki (a religious group that believed in both Christianity and Mohammedanism). The rise and fall of these communities depended largely on the treatment they received from the rulers of the day.

In the first centuries AD the Jewish community was strong enough to revolt (115 AD). The rise of Christianity and oppression led to the marginalization of this community. The rise of Christianity was then accompanied by intense communal strife, as the Orthodox priesthood, in conjunction with the state, waged an intense war on “pagans” and heretics (this for those wondering which wanker beheaded or mutilated most ancient statues). During this period the word “Greek” (much to the dismay of our Greek Christians) was something of a dirty word for orthodoxy since it was charged with this “pagan” past.

The Latin community appeared and developed during the Frankish rule⁴⁸ with the help of the state and almost disappeared

48 During this period (as well as others) it is debatable whether the Orthodox (the ancestors of the Greek Cypriots) were the majority. Mr. Graikos notes that in

during the Turkish rule, as this community became the target of attacks by the new rulers, who went so far as to subordinate the Latin community to the Orthodox Church.

This other History of Cyprus is of course something that has been exorcised from the official or unofficial histories of our Greek-Christians. Insofar as they were historical facts and could not be completely ignored, the solution was easy. They expressed, at worst, a “moral decline”, or more commonly they were the results of the “oppression of the conquerors” (see the History of Zannetos). God forbid for an orthodox Christian (and a Greek one at that) to change his faith or become a heretic on his own. If I dwell on the racism expressed by Greek Christianity (alongside its ideological function), it is because it has so heavily infused our thinking that we take the abstraction of history it presents as true. We need to get behind the ideology to read the History of the lie as such.

Relations between the various communities were for long periods of time apparently quite antagonistic, and this was certainly due to their strong religious character, but also due to the various power structures that determined their relations (class differences, who was favoured by the state apparatus, etc.).

The Ottoman period begins under similar circumstances, with the Muslim community developing under the support of state power.

At the same time, however, the Orthodox community also benefits from the change of rulers. The religious (and basically political) fury of the Ottomans is turned against the Latins, while the Orthodox church regains its rights and even assumes a regulatory role in the administration as the leader of the Orthodox “millet”.

The power of the church also gradually increases after the reforms of 1660 and its power rises sharply. Thus Turner, a former diplomat who visited Cyprus in 1815 observes: “Cyprus, though theoretically subject to the authority of a Bey appointed

a population of about 180,000, there were 70-80,000 Armenians and Maronites – alongside them must be added the Latins and Syrians. Also in the 17th century, in an official census, the Mohammedans were the majority. Although this majority included the Linobambaki who were an independent community, it nevertheless highlights the point that the Orthodox, even if they were the largest religious community, were not the majority.

by the Sultan, is in fact governed by the Greek archbishop and his clergy.”

This created a variety of reactions. On the one hand, there was intense competition at the top of the power structure between the church and Ottoman political power. At the bottom of the hierarchy there were various reactions. On the other hand, there was a convergence of Christians and Muslims – in class terms, there was the impoverishment of Muslims, culturally and religiously. An interesting element in this regard is the Linobambaki community. The tendency of Christians and Muslims of the time (which continued, however, to a lesser extent until the mid-20th century) to make joint pilgrimages to each other’s historic temples is well known. The interference of this Christian-Muslim community (which, of course, for the Greek-Christian historians were merely Christians forced to change religion superficially) is typical of the tendency for symbiosis and political interaction in the context of each community’s autonomy.

In this context, the growing corruption of the church and the Ottoman hierarchy began to lay the foundations for common revolts based on class demands (1765, 1804, 1833) from the middle of the 18th century.

Muslims and Orthodox Christians ate the same food, wore the same clothes, built houses and churches and mosques in closely related architecture. Islam’s acceptance of polygamy and the prohibition on drinking alcohol did little to separate the two communities. Although the two communities were separated in religious worship, channels of political representation and family law, the division (and contradictions) between urban elites and peasants was socially more significant and the source of violent uprisings. Muslim and Orthodox peasants revolted together on several occasions. The bishops and rulers cooperated in the administration of the island despite their internal conflicts over power. “Case study: Cyprus”.

In this context, the execution of the archbishop and other bishops in 1821 was more of an expression of the internal strife of the power elite (since Kyprianos had opposed and condemned any activity on the island), than of national strife etc. However, this picture of coexistence and class confrontation, although typical of the 19th and

early 20th century, is not as unique as the neo-Cypriot historians and apologists want to present it.⁴⁹ The internal structure of the two communities, with the basic structure of social consensus being communal patriarchy (which underpins and entrenches power relations both in interpersonal relations and in the social whole), the complex political structuring of power (the theoretical power of the Muslim administration and the practical power of the church) and the gradual change in economic relations between the two communities (with the impoverishment of the Muslims and the gradual rise of the Orthodox) always left open the possibility of new communal antagonisms.

A typical case of this possibility is the 1804 rebellion, about which K. Kyrris observes:

“Although the revolt had to a large extent the character of a class conflict between the exploited masses of both communities against the exploiting classes of both, the relatively large number of Turks killed by the Turkish troops serving the interests of the latter (ruling classes) created resentment against the Greek authorities, who had actually had the upper hand in the settlement of the matter and had paid the salaries of the troops. Thus, the conflict soon acquired a national character” (K. Kyrris: *Symbiotic elements in the history of two communities in Cyprus* p. 262 CK).

Communal strife is of course the card that both ruling classes are trying to play to stop the common uprisings. It is in these contexts that the rise of Greek nationalism begins, the function of which we will discuss below.

It is a fact, however, that the communal strife and the real mass appeal of nationalism as a prospect of liberation come much later. The roots of the conflict, however -the power relations within and between the two communities- existed before.

The arrival of the English, the institutionalization of the economic and political rise of the Orthodox community, the development of the Megali Idea⁵⁰ in Greece and its introduction into

49 Neo-Cypriots like an idyllic picture of cohabitation until the evil nationalists came along and lured the “uneducated people” etc.

50 Editor’s note: The “Megali Idea” (Great Idea) was a Greek nationalist vision aiming to unite all territories perceived as historically or ethnically Greek under the modern Greek state.

Cypriot society through the schools and the reconstruction of various power structures, gradually lead to the 30 years of nationalism (1930-60).

IV. PROCESSES OF POWER RECONSTRUCTION AND NATIONALISM

Nationalism is a very complex phenomenon. On the one hand, it expresses an attempt at liberation, of which the Greek state is both the culmination and the safeguard. At the same time, in the ideological landscape, nationalism goes hand in hand with, and very often expresses, processes of social reconstruction. We will try below to see the interaction and the degree of expression of three processes through nationalism:

- i)** The rise of the bourgeoisie and the attempt to avoid class intercommunal conflicts by the ruling classes.
- ii)** The process of the reconstruction of patriarchy from a private-family phenomenon to a communal one and the decisive relation of patriarchal ideology to nationalist ideology.
- iii)** The process of centralization of power, rationalization of administration, the development of bureaucracy, the levelling cultural influence of metropolitan nationalism and the rise of the new ideological hegemony with the state intellectuals as the main interpreters (counterfeiters).

i. class reconstruction and the exorcism of social conflict

The emergence of intense class conflict in the second half of the 18th and early 19th century (which would continue on a smaller scale throughout the 19th century and into the first half of the 20th) reflects to some extent a process of autonomy of the most oppressed class strata from the ideological hegemony of the communal hierarchies. In particular, the uprisings of 1833 are typical of a certain intensity and quality of these revolts.

In contrast to the Halil uprising of the 18th century, in which the insurgents looked for leadership among the ruling class, 1833 had a strongly popular character with implications of social upheaval. The uprisings erupted after massive inter-communal mobilizations

over the economic situation and even its leaders⁵¹ emerged from the best clergy of the two communities (Imam, monk Ioannikios) and are declared opponents of the elite. But while the spontaneous class uprising⁵² is an extension and a broadening of the class inter-communal uprisings, the new leaders that emerge (especially the Christian Theseus – and to a lesser extent Ioannikios, who also collaborated with the Imam in Paphos) collaborated to an extent with the consulates of the great powers; and it is in this context that the possibility of Enosis as “liberation”⁵³ appears (the neo-hellenic state had already been formed). This projection of annexation to other states as a prospect of liberation is a case which, although not decisive in 1833, nevertheless gradually rises in the 17th century and especially in the 20th, as the population itself is “taught”, through the spread of nationalism, that this is the only solution for liberation.

51 These “leaders” appeared after the popular mobilisations to “lead” the military struggle. And it is no coincidence that the neo-Cypriot and Greek-Christian historians, each trying to justify their state, argue over the intentions of the 3 leaders instead of the popular tendencies that were admittedly common (Christian-Muslim) and with obvious implications of a final conflict (and the elites of course responded in unison. Archbishop Panaretos blessed and justified the massacres of Christians and Muslims in Paphos after the suppression of the movement). Anyway, whoever wants to justify modern institutions of power will look no further than the embryonic power mechanisms (leaderships) that were created in the movements.

52 The uprisings, beyond their class dimension, also carried a prospect of closer relations between the two communities, based on political equality regardless of religious affiliation. Hill, for example, observes that Gavür Imam was perhaps named so because he promised Christian-Muslim equality.

53 The claims of the Greek-Christians that the movements were of an Enosis nature are far-fetched to say the least. The rebellion of the more “Enosisist” leader (Nicholas Theseus) was quickly dispersed and it is unlikely that the insurgents (including many Turks) had any idea of the ideas of the self-proclaimed “military leader”. The same applies to Ioannikios, who even collaborated with Gavür Imam, and whose (Ioannikios’) last comrades were 40 Albanians. As for the other “self-proclaimed” leader, Gavür Imam, his intentions are not yet clear. The neo-Cypriots want him to be the most genuine popular leader, while L. Piggouras, in a study-distracted for the neo-Cypriots, suggests that he had links with Egypt and that he was a “Cypriot Ali Pasha”. Although from a historical point of view all this is interesting, we hope that in the future our historians will solve the problem of “good” and “bad” leaders (theirs and others) and also deal a little with the class movement (as many of them claim to be Marxists anyway).

The historical silencing and the current distortion of events (by neo-Cypriot and Greek-Christian historians) is to some extent indicative of the history of lies that tries to justify the current structure of power through a mythology of the past.

In the context of that period there was a need to split the unity at the grassroots and reconstruct imaginary divisions and unities in order to exorcise the growing social conflict. The Muslim administration tried to revive communal antagonism and conflict in times of crises (1341, 1853, 1862, 1871, etc.), however the success of this method was minimal and common local uprisings were still observed.

The Orthodox hierarchy follows a different path. An attempt to reconstruct the ideology of hegemony in order to shift the contradictions to the religious-communal level. In this it has two allies. The newly established Greek state, with its expansionist tendencies, and the bourgeoisie, which, formed in the cities, is experiencing a gradual rise in the 19th century. Of course, the bourgeoisie and the church (together with the *ciflik* owners) have to some extent competing economic and political interests. However, the desire of the bourgeoisie to get rid of rotten Ottoman feudalism (and later colonialism) and their fear of popular uprisings push them into a not-so-comfortable alliance with the church and the clerics against the Muslim elite and the danger of growing social conflict. The main contribution of the Greek state and the bourgeoisie lies in the gradual construction of the new ideology of nationalism. Particularly after the arrival of the English and the partial distancing of the administration from the religious hierarchy, along with the development of schools, the bourgeoisie began to play an increasingly central role in the Greek Cypriot community. Rivalries with the other elites, of course, continued until 1930, when the development of the bureaucracy by the English laid the foundation for a new kind of relationship.

School education (strongly promoted by the bourgeoisie and, to a certain extent, by the church) played a decisive role in the constitution of the imaginary unity of the Greek nation and the repulsion of the prospect of social conflict. Communal

schools (which experienced a tremendous rise in the English administration), taking their curriculum and teachers from the metropolis of Greek-centric intellectualism and chauvinism, encouraged intercommunal antagonism and the creation of national stereotypes (see Geest and Murvin's studies).⁵⁴ Education was perhaps the key element in the creation of ethnic division. In essence, the Cypriot population had to be taught new identities as Greeks and Turks, new forms of language and changed customs.⁵⁵ Apart from splitting the class unity in the two communities, school education institutionalized on a new level both class and ideological contradictions. The teacher and the priest, the bourgeoisie and the *ciflik* owners, got a new level of hierarchical justification. To the extent that the Greek Cypriot community set Enosis and nationalism as the ideological background, the ruling classes immediately joined the imaginatively structured community that excluded the Turkish Cypriot neighbour and saw a "national" relationship with every orthodox Greek-speaking moneylender. This in the context of a new separation: those who had the power now also possessed the "knowledge". The Cypriot language was banished as "barbaric" in the face of the culture of the constructions of the metropolis (Athens), *demotic* and *katharevousa* Greek.

The separated spectacle is structured hierarchically. The alienation of the commoner in the face of this hierarchical separation (which was justified in the liberatory perspective of Enosis) had already begun the process of conformity that characterizes contemporary Cypriot life. The last massive class conflict manifested itself in 1948, as the Stalinist bureaucracy of AKEL was caught between its internal conflicts and the spectacular polarisation caused by the extreme right-wing, the church and the colonialists. The defeat of the class confrontation had

54 Studies by two American psychologists among Cypriot youth in the 1960s. Among other things, they found a more pronounced nationalism among high school youth than among older people or private school students. Also, in a thematic analysis of school textbooks, nationalism and anti-Turkism were among the most projected values.

55 Cyprus: A case study.

similar results to the gradual defeat of the class alliance in the 19th century.

A new division is permeating Cypriot society, this time between left and right. The acceptance by the Stalinist bureaucracy of AKEL of the ideological hegemony of nationalism consolidates the division. For twenty years AKEL has been looking for its entry into the state power structure – the issue was that the party lost the certificates of “patriotism” that allow it to enter the social power of the state. Apart from a few sporadic strikes, the class conflict in Cyprus has been and is being suppressed in the name of “national unity” and of nationalism (Greek or neo-Greek-Cypriot). What is most visible in the political arena are the conflicts of different groups of elites and of the bourgeoisie tied to different economic interests (European or American capital, Russian state socialism, etc.).

There is, however, another dimension of the class structure of Cypriot society, which is often overlooked, the growing economic dependence of Turkish Cypriots on Greek Cypriot capital. Of course, Greek Christians will complain, saying “well, why on earth are we to blame for their incompetence”. Of course, the comic-tragic in the whole affair is to hear Marxists saying the same thing (for capitalism’s apologists it’s a bit obvious, since they say the same thing about workers, but for Marxists...).

The main aspect of this development is, of course, the prospect of the rise of a class-based national movement among the Turkish Cypriots, even if the anti-colonial struggle had aimed for independence, as dreamt by the neo-Greek-Cypriots.

ii. nationalism and patriarchy – from communal to social patriarchy

At first sight, the ideological-imaginary framework of nationalism is quite loaded with patriarchal images. Nationalism is the theory of “racial purity” and national dignity, which passes through the possession of the woman-object.

The “motherland” in the hands of the “barbarian conqueror”, her sons who will liberate her and of course will have her as their own. Even the practice of nationalist movements is quite explicit. Apart from the anti-colonial struggle there is usually

a parallel attempt to extract and “purify” the race – the usual victims of this story (apart from political opponents) are the lowlifes of the “lumpen”, especially the prostitutes (which of course is not so coincidental).⁵⁶

Furthermore, at the level of the images and models projected by the nationalist imaginary, the determination of the whole edifice by patriarchal values and idealizations is evident. The model of the hero is that of the disciplined hard man or the leader who seems to refrain from any contact with women beyond giving orders or praising them when hiding, when giving birth and when supporting the men-heroes.

EOKA⁵⁷ was of course the culmination of this model. A small elite of men-heroes⁵⁸ under the guidance of “strategists” and “ethnarchs” undertook the “liberation” of the island.

56 Not to imply that this is only the practice of right-wing nationalist movements, anyone who is interested should look at Stina’s book “EAM, ELAS, OPLA” to see the practices of a left-wing nationalist movement against ideological opponents, marginalised people, prostitutes, etc.

57 The reference to EOKA and the criticism of this organisation is not made at the level of the A or B fighter. It is a criticism of the ideological climate that gave birth to and tolerated EOKA, and on an individual level to its initiators and organizers – Makarios and, more importantly, Grivas. Beyond that, there is no doubt that beyond the interest-seekers who sought a position in the Cypriot state (Yiorkadjis) or the ideological fascists (Grivas), there were also people who believed and fought for freedom and for the anti-colonial struggle. If more people thought like the quote from Matsis below, things might have been different: “That’s why I don’t care if this land is lived on by Turks or Greeks. What has value is that it is lived by those who water it with their sweat, standing on it free...”

58 The description of EOKA as an “elite of male heroes” does not mean that EOKA had no female followers or even members. Grivas in 1956 ordered the creation of women’s groups – which, despite their training, of course always remained as reserves. It is also worth reading the book by Eleni Seraphim Loizou (the only woman who was allowed to become “wanted, if needed” (i.e. a partisan) and one of the few (were there any others?) female section leaders of EOKA. The way she talks about the “leader”, phrases like “the earth opened up to swallow me” when she was congratulated by the “leader” in front of the male section commanders, the fact that in order to convince the men to take on a mission, she threatened them that if they didn’t, she would “send girls”, etc. say a lot about the mentality in EOKA, especially when said by a woman who had risen on its ranks somewhat. It is in these contexts that the critique of the elite men-heroes is made. Like the mentality, ideology and power structure of the organization -which were clearly male issues- women, like the general population, were at best the reserves.

Patriarchy of course pre-exists nationalism. But at least as we know it in the European region, patriarchy has changed significantly in recent centuries. Whereas before it was founded on the personal power of the man-patriarch-father in the family context (we will call this relationship communal patriarchy), it has now spread and diffused in “modern society” with the grafting of modern, mass institutions and power ties (e.g. state-patriarchy, pornography) with its own characteristics (social patriarchy).⁵⁹

This differentiation, between communal and social patriarchy, is not something static or divisive like capitalism-feudalism.⁶⁰ Although it has some things in common with the above distinction (based on class relations), it is nevertheless much more complex. Patriarchy in any society (whether modern or older) is the main lever of social consensus and perhaps the archetypal power relation. And the family is one of the key institutions of this power structure (a structure that extends from culture to economics and politics). In this sense, both the family and the social diffusion of patriarchy are historical phenomena. However, in modern society, with urbanization, the gathering of thousands of people in cities, the spread of mass media, the breaking of blood ties, the “extended family”, etc., are leading to a crisis of traditional patriarchy, the family, traditional morality, etc.⁶¹

Nationalism appears in Europe (and later on, globally) at about the same time that communal patriarchy seems to be disintegrating under multiple pressures (patriarchy itself seems to be in crisis in some cases).⁶² In this crisis of patriarchy, which is also a crisis of the ide-

59 Both communal and social patriarchy have their own differentiations.

60 For those who like sociological definitions, the classical distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (for all its drawbacks) is closer to the distinction of patriarchy proposed here.

61 For a first reflection on the issue of changing morals, crisis of the family, etc. in the period of change, see Edward Shorter’s classic study “History of the modern Family”. Shorter observes that the first sexual revolution that took place in this period was made by the lower classes (the proletarians).

62 It enters a crisis in the sense that the pressure and struggle of women goes beyond the interpersonal level, and is brought into the political problem. It is no coincidence in this context that modern feminism appears from the French Revolution onwards and goes hand in hand with other social movements (e.g.

ological imaginaries of society, nationalism does not appear as an irrelevant parallel phenomenon. It is essentially the ideology that helps to reconstruct and consolidate patriarchy at new levels. In any of its forms, whether as warlike masculinism or as a cultural turn to the roots of patriarchal culture, nationalism reestablishes social consensus on imaginaries directly identified with patriarchal configuration.

The relationship between nationalism and patriarchal structures became quite clear when nationalism reached its peak with fascism and Nazism. But analyses on these phenomena have, to some extent, dwelled on the extremes of nationalism and the relationship of these extremes to totalitarianism. Particularly after the emergence of the anti-colonial movements in the 1950s and 1960s, the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and patriarchy was sidelined and Lenin's thesis of good and bad nationalisms (the nationalism of the oppressed is "good" and the nationalism of the oppressors is "bad") came to the fore again.

However, in the late 1960s and during the 1970s the idyllic images began to fade as the supposed "good nationalisms" continued to produce abominations with astonishing similarity. A more critical reflection of these movements and of the new "national-liberation" nationalism thus began (particularly with the intervention of the feminist movement). Before we begin a more detailed analysis of Greek Cypriot nationalism, we must also mention a contradiction in the so-called "national-liberation movements".

The ideological differences-imaginaries of nationalism as an extension of patriarchal values and images were mentioned at the beginning of this section. This tendency of nationalism encounters a direct problem in the needs created by the anti-colonial "liberationist" edge of national liberation movements. Ultimately, nationalism as a "national" (in the sense that it is at least theoretically addressed to the whole population) movement must offer something to women, in order to gain not only their tolerance, but in necessity their participation (as helpers of men, of course). The

the workers' movement). As pointed out in the study "Fire in the minds of Men", between the two major revolutionary currents of the 19th century (socialist-nationalist), women revolutionaries had more fields of expression and a preference for the former.

tension between these two tendencies is expressed on another level as a contradiction between modernising-modernist tendencies (promoting a reconstruction of power in new domains) and more conservative-traditional ones. This contradiction is a variable that changes from movement to movement and although modernist tendencies prevail in most cases, there are nevertheless different phases and stages of development.

The interesting element in the Cypriot case is that this contradiction still survives and creates various comic tragedies (e.g. the “medieval” moralism and the position of women as second-class citizens in a seemingly reconstructed social patriarchy). It is in these contexts that the influence of more traditional patriarchal concepts is characteristic.

The tension between these two tendencies, however, has not taken on a particularly intense character up to now, and this is because of the relatively limited space for women to exert pressure within Greek-Christian nationalism, and the peculiar historical circumstances (which have so far led to an alliance between “modernists-traditionalists”) have led to a rapid assimilation of women’s efforts and to the formation of a social patriarchy with a traditional ideological background (a certain tendency and pressure for liberalization lately on a personal level is not unrelated to the crisis of nationalist imaginaries after the defeat of 1974). We will try below to analyse the reconstruction of patriarchy promoted by nationalism on the basis of 3 characteristics of this power relation:

- a)* The need for the existence of a patriarch.
- b)* The need for “racial purity” based on sexual repression and the objectification of a female other in the archetypal relationship.
- c)* The establishment of immortality as a core value of patriarchal culture.

a) The need for a patriarch -someone with authority to decide, command, punish, submit, etc.- is self-evident in the power structure we call patriarchy. In communal patriarchy the role is played by the male father and his authority. Passing through the interpersonal level, it is established at the communal level on the basis of his authority in the family. With the crisis of communal patri-

archy, the individual man-father is no longer enough. In modern society, the state slowly takes over many of the functions of the old individual-man (this of course does not mean that men cease to be the dominant sex, but the state takes away many of their traditional powers).

Nationalism promotes this process in two ways. On the one hand, it tries to re-establish the family as a stable molecule of power reproduction and as a “racial community”, while on the other hand, it promotes a supra-individual institution, which undertakes to re-establish social consensus.

In this context, the rise of nationalism (in the 19th and 20th centuries) intensified the “pseudomoral” sermons⁶³ of the church, the bourgeois intellectuals and the poets, who wanted to pose as moral cops. In the middle of the 19th century the first reform school was built for the “little tramps” who were on the streets, while at the beginning of the 20th century the “charitable activity” of the bourgeoisie for the “moral education” of the poor began. (It is ironic that this “philanthropy”, which appears at the European level and is a key lever for the manipulation and reconsolidation of the family, is carried out through bourgeois women, perhaps looking for a way out of their own misery, see “POLICING OF THE FAMILIES”.) Thus, at the same time as the need to exorcise social conflict, the need to strengthen the family, to reassert the authority of the church, and to build social institutions that limit deviation from morality, enter the picture.

63 It is not clear whether the intensification of the “pseudomoral” campaign coincided with an intensification of the crisis of communal patriarchy and the dimensions of this crisis. The lack of a lot of data and of a socio-historical analysis creates problems of identifying the historical phases of the reconstruction. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming is the near absence of studies and analysis of the position of Cypriot women in various historical phases. The little evidence that does exist, such as the large number of categorisations in the archbishopric codes (see Kirris), the existence of “children of the street”, etc., points to a model with many similarities to the European ones that have been analysed in depth. Certainly, however, much more is needed in this area. One of the few studies of women in the 18th and 19th centuries presented at the “popular university” is a collection of extracts (mostly from foreign observers) without a theoretical-analytical framework.

Nationalism appears in this context not just as a reinforcement, but as an ideological direction, and the arguments are formulated: “We must create Greek Orthodox Christians -a racially pure race- and get rid of ignorance, corruption, alienation from the church, from those who live with or marry Turks or Turkish women, from street tramps, etc.”. The nationalists put a lot of emphasis on education and schools. The modern state is beginning to be embryonically built. The church and the English are slowly building the institutions of a structure that re-educates Cypriots. A state on which they will learn to depend upon, to expect orders from, to love. (The modern statism of the Cypriots has deep roots). The results of this process began to be clearly visible from the 1950s onwards.

In 1955 the preparations for the beginning of the “dynamic struggle” culminated, a struggle that aspired to liberate Cyprus (and there is no doubt that many Cypriot people believed seriously in the cause of liberation and gave their lives for it).

I quote below some extracts, which speak for themselves, from a now historical document of EMAK (the name of the “revolutionary organisation” before it was renamed to EOKA).

“What attitude should the people take? The people should not be carried away by their patriotism and enthusiasm aroused by the struggle and successes of EMAK and rise up in open revolutionary struggle against the conqueror... Only the organized fighters of EMAK will act; and always at the command of EMAK. The people should only observe the struggles of EMAK with lively interest and help in every way if necessary, have full confidence, have full faith in the liberation that is soon to come...”

So much for the roots of modern statism and conformity. But there are other interesting things in the document, beyond the generalities about the people – it specifically calls on “Turks and communists” not to take part in the struggle. And for those who wonder what role the people will play anyway, apart from “observing”, “not taking part” and having “full faith”, it has something for them:

“Those who are not organised and want to cooperate in the struggle, let them write the word EMAK on the streets and walls. This is also a serious contribution”.

In this context EOKA constitutes a point of reference. It is the ideological apogee of the nationalist imaginary based on the roots of the patriarchal culture and at the same time the prelude to a state that you have to “love”, “obey” and “have absolute trust in”, like in EOKA (and it is no coincidence, from another point of view, that the Cypriot state that was created in the 1960s was a pawn of EOKA and of right-wing militants). The collective father was created and the Cypriots were ready to accept it. The replacement of Grivas by Makarios in the patriarchal stratum was quite natural. The former probably never understood the modernizing potential of nationalism. Makarios understood it and played on the contradiction between modernization and the traditional ideological charge to create the patriarchal state and at the same time represent it personally.

He managed to a certain extent to offer Cypriots both: a personal father and an organised bureaucratic complex – the state.

The fact is that Cyprus was orphaned by the death of Makarios, it lost its personal patriarch. But there remained his state, which, despite the efforts of Kyprianou, no longer seems to need its personal patriarch so much. Perhaps, finally, the death of Makarios will unleash the dynamics of the contradiction.

b) The ideology of racial purity, the perception that there is a pure race-nation (the Greek one in this case) that is in danger of degeneration, corruption and pollution, is a basic characteristic of nationalism, not only of the far right but also of leftist nationalism (the latter of course being more sophisticated). As various scholars of the Nazi phenomenon have observed, this tendency to “purity” has deep roots, reaching back to repressed sexuality in the context of the patriarchal family. At the same time, the ideology of racial purity is based on an archetypal relationship within the patriarchy.

On the tendency to objectify an Other as something hostile and subversive that must be subjugated. The woman, as Simone de Beauvoir observes, is the typical case of the Other in patriarchal culture. John Chrysostom, from our own Greek-Christian culture, says it quite clearly: “Woman is a necessary evil, a natural temptation, the danger in the home, a deadly charm.”

This objectification of woman as Other at the interpersonal level acquires with the socialization-reconstruction of patriarchy, corresponding macrosocial foundations founded on the internalized archetypal relationship with woman. While in communal patriarchy the “purity” of the village family etc. is guarded, in social patriarchy “racial purity” appears as a collective concept in the context of the nation. The race-nation somehow becomes a closed circuit, an imaginary extended family. Its chastity, its purity, must be guarded against contamination.

This theory of racial purity promoted by nationalism in the context of the reconstruction of patriarchy not only promotes a new conservatism, but also has direct political implications based on psychological submission.

The pressure on the Linobambaki to conform to the Greek-Christian nation (discussed below) is a typical case in point. With the emergence of the communists, the infection is threatened from elsewhere:

“Communists, artisans and workers should not be employed by individuals and associations. Parents should denounce communist teachers...young people from the villages who come to the cities to learn their art should be prevented from coming into contact with people infected with the communist germ.” Announcement of a meeting in the archbishopric in 1930.

This need to invent threatening “Others” continues and intensifies as the nationalist fever rises. In 1958 the “fighters” of EOKA started killing poor workers, because they were leftists. The first victim, Menikos from Lefkoniko, was tied to a tree and after the nationalists came by and spat on him, he was subsequently stoned to death. And the hatred for the “objectified Other” is slowly turning towards the Other community as well. This projection of threatening “others” has favoured nationalism, decisively breaking the coexistence of the two communities. The Turkish Cypriot may have been the friend, neighbour or co-villager of the Greek Cypriot, for example, but the fact that he was a Turk created the conditions for tolerating that his fate would be left at the hands of nationalists (the same logic worked in reverse for Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots, of course).

It is in the context of the extension of patriarchal objectification to macrosocial levels that it can be inferred that, even while at the beginning of the 1960s the fanatical nationalists were a very small minority, they nevertheless managed to create a reality of intercommunal conflict.

Even today, many people wonder how things got this far. The average Cypriot's tolerance of things he disagreed with was instrumental in getting to 1974. Many Cypriots (Greeks and Turks, left and right), though they disagreed with the chauvinist extremities, tolerated them, because disagreement would have cost them the stigma of anti-Greekness or anti-Turkishness (depending on the community).

Entering the imaginary unity of the nation, they tolerated hatred towards the "objectified Other", the "barbarians" of the Other community.

Alongside tolerance, the need for "objectified others" -enemies ready to devour Cypriot society- took on new dimensions after 1974 and the rise of neo-Cypriot consciousness. For a time, it turned against the former EOKAB members, constantly uncovering conspiracies. Slowly, however, it got over that and new targets began to be located: "corruption" and drugs have been a hit lately and from time to time, the "anarchists". (The label includes anything that doesn't fit in the mind of the Cypriot normie). We have here an extension of the archetypal relationship. The woman-object is the foundation of man's power and the collectivity of the nation. She is an Other, who, if given or taken (willingly or unwillingly) by others, undermines patriarchal authority.

And in order to "defend" itself the patriarchal imaginary creates a series of objectified Others who "may" undermine it by taking the woman-object.

In this context, rape becomes the symbol of male-national domination, as well as of defeat-disgrace. Although the true extent of the phenomenon of rape during the inter-communal clashes and the invasion has not yet been ascertained (both sides accuse each other of widespread rape), it is nevertheless a theme that constantly hovers (overtly or implicitly) in discussions of the "national struggle". Comments along the lines of "they'll fuck your mother or sister" serve as the extreme form of intimidation

if you say you don't care about the national issue, or the open tantrums of some nationalists who confuse "national military victory" with the rape of Turkish women (and Greek women on the other side of the green line, of course). The sense of defeat of the Greek Cypriots after 1974 is expressed in the context of this wound. If you look at the posters and literature surrounding the "tragedy", the classic themes are the raped woman, the woman who was left alone (lost her husband), the woman-Cyprus raped by Attila. Taking these phenomena as a whole, we observe a gradual reconstruction of patriarchy. The woman becomes the property of the nation, the woman as identical with the body of the homeland – the one that men struggle to keep as their own and "pure", the one the foreigners want to possess and rape.

c) Another basic characteristic of patriarchal culture is the tendency towards immortality.⁶⁴ This tendency is expressed in various ways, for the purposes of this text it is useful to mention History, the appropriation of the body of women and (especially) children. Male immortality in communal patriarchy is founded on the appropriation of the body of the woman (as a reproductive machine, while denying sexual pleasure) and children, and the creation of a family history that goes from patriarch to patriarch. The female body in these contexts is the colony where the patriarch builds his immortality and establishes his central authority.

With the gradual "socialisation" of patriarchy through nationalism, a new situation is created. The tendency of men-individuals to immortality is transformed, with the social reconstruction of patriarchy into a tendency to immortality of the collectivity of the male sex -patriarchs, heroes, etc.- within the framework of the imaginary unity of the nation. History commemorates the "immortal" men-heroes, who not only kept possession of the female body that belongs to them, but also preserved the body of the homeland as

64 This trend has been observed by several scholars. Al Habri, for example, attributes it to man's attempt to make up for the fact that he cannot give life like the woman in childbirth. When this effort is placed in the context of a power relation (such as patriarchy), it turns into perpetuation and immortality on the basis of domination.

their own. Nationalism dreams of wars of “immortality” in which women doubly lose. They lose their children for the patriarchal imaginary, while at the same time everyone knows that the female body is the most precious spoil (even if it is repressed in the modern language of nationalism) of the victor-rapist. With nationalism and social patriarchy, women are transformed, in moments of feverish nationalist imaginary, into the common property of the nation of men, which requires the production and breeding of national heroes, who look to the old patriarchs for inspiration, not to be “sissies”. At the same time, the female body and its imagined extension into the concept of the homeland is the affirmation of power and the mechanism of immortality for the collectivity of the male gender. At the end of the EOKA struggle, for example, a list of the names of the “heroes” was published: there are 66 dead men, 9 hanged (men, of course) and a footnote for 9 accidentally killed by the English and 64 killed by the Turks. It is not difficult to realise under which category the already few women who died for EOKA fall (“accidentally killed”). The “men” are the “heroes” who write history. The creation of the patriarchal history of the men-heroes of EOKA is one phase in a long process of reconstruction that begins in schools.

It is the school that erases the family patriarchal history of the grandfather and great-grandfather (of the “generation”) and educates the “children” of the nation in the collectivities of the fathers of the nation. Children, and especially sons, become carriers of the transmission of immortality as a core value of patriarchal culture. In social patriarchy, the upbringing of children passes from the family and the community to centralized institutions (schools-state-bureaucracy), which mark the prelude to the rise of the state as the direct agent and arbiter of patriarchal relations.

As Aries (*Centuries of Childhood*) points out, the recognition of childhood in a first phase has the characteristics of the perception that the child is more or less a pure empty existence, which, if only filled with the right material, will bring forth a law-abiding class of citizens. This tactic, despite its developments, is a direct objectification of the child (the result of both patriarchal tendencies – objectification/externalization and the appropriation of women’s capacity

to give birth). The school will largely replace the family in shaping ideology. New patriarchal relations, new models of mutilation will slowly pass under the pressure of both power and structural changes for modernization. Immortality as a movement of collectivity (the nation) finds in the state the expressor of the new social need. The child-object is the battlefield chosen by nationalism (and those who promote it) to crush social conflict and reconstruct the ideological hegemony of power. The children are the nation's children -its living expression and future hope of immortality- and they must be educated in the new ideology like empty boxes waiting to be filled. The rise of education in the period of English rule reflects a similar tendency on the part of the colonisers, namely to form a law-abiding population. It is in these contexts that the controversy between the English and the Church over education is expressed. This conflict, expressed around the slogan "whoever controls education, controls the minds of the people", was an ideological conflict in which the English lost the ideological hegemony of Cypriot society (despite their administrative victory in 1930). The school would promote the ideological hegemony of nationalism, promoting new mechanisms of immortality -history, status quo, etc.- and power within the framework of a reconstructed patriarchy.

III. CENTRALISATION AND CULTURAL LEVELLING

The rise of nationalism as an ideology is historically accompanied by the parallel rise of the concept and structure of the modern nation-state. This characteristic of nationalism and the movements that adopted it created quite early on a strong mistrust among the libertarian world towards such movements. Bakunin's embrace of Garibaldi and his support of self-determination for the Slavic peoples had no continuity in libertarian thought.⁶⁵ For, to the extent that

65 Libertarian anarchist movements developed in the 20th century in intense competition with nationalist movements. Suffice it is to mention two classic anarchist movements, the Makhnovist movement in Ukraine in 1918-21 and the revolution in Catalonia (and other Spanish regions of course) in 1936. The Makhno movement and the CNT both had to confront the nationalists, who ultimately played a role in the defeat of the revolution. It is necessary to stress that in both regions there was a "national" problem (of autonomy from the Russian

various nationalist movements had a liberatory edge of self-determination, etc., supporting them was self-evident. At the same time, however, the ideological function of nationalism, and especially its extension into the nation-state, not only created scepticism, but, with the institutionalisation of the new state power, actually denied its own liberating edge, the demand for self-determination. This course of nationalism is not accidental. As mentioned above, the liberatory edge was undermined in advance, through the power relations that constituted the ideological basis of nationalism. But the parallel course of nationalism and the nation-state deserves to be seen more closely, because it reveals some of the main features of this ideology – and in particular its central role in the process of centralising social power in the state, the bureaucracy and the intellectuals. There is a double aspect to this process: cultural levelling and the centralization of power structures. The levelling that operates at the cultural level tends to deny the specificities of different social groups and communities. There is a process of creating a “national culture” (which usually functions as the new ideological hegemony) that in the process crushes the autonomous regional or local cultures of various communities, presenting them as degenerate or “lacking culture”. In this context, it expresses the rise of metropolitan intellectuals (usually of the capital city or of the big urban centres), who often define, in a piecemeal way, the “national culture”, choosing what suits them from folk culture and rejecting the rest. This rise of intellectuals expresses on another level the principle of the modern homogenization of the population and the defining of its culture or subculture through hierarchical channels. Conformity and consumerism have a direct relationship with these developments. In the face of a culture cooked up within corporations and circles, the position of the passive spectator and consumer is a position reserved for the layperson within the context of this production.

or Spanish state). The anarchists and the nationalists offered completely different solutions to the problem (the former decentralized-separate federation of regions, the latter the creation of a nation-state). Without responding to the national issue, at the level it was presented, the anarchists formed an autonomous “discourse and sphere”, insofar as their counter-power could be counterposed against the state and the nationalists, and opened up new solutions.

Returning to Greek-Christian nationalism, it is necessary to look at the experience of the Greek state to understand its impact in the Cypriot region. Because ultimately, if there was one dimension where we have had more or less a common experience with people living on the geographical borders of the Greek state over the last 100-150 years, it is the experience of cultural levelling. And this is largely because we have been subjected to it by the same centre of power, Athens and its nationalist intelligentsia. The Greek state and the intelligentsia that formed its ideology always seem to have suffered from a double problem. A passionate need to prove that the modern Greek state was a descendant of ancient “Greek” civilization and at the same time a strong antipathy to the Eastern influence that characterized folk cultures. These two constituted to some extent a problem of identity. On the one hand, the Greek state wanted to “belong” to Europe (and antiquity was the ideological proof of its status). But at the same time, the people who stuck with the label “Greeks” on them had very little to do with the ancients. After so many centuries they had created their own autonomous cultures, expressing their own needs and desires – and at the same time were heavily influenced by contact with Eastern civilization. The opposition to the eastern element and the levelling of regional autonomous cultures are the two elements that strongly characterize the process of building and centralizing social power in the Greek region.⁶⁶

With the expansion of the Greek state, various communities (Turks, Macedonians, etc.) “disappeared”, while others, under the pressure of the Athenian state, “adapted”. Even the Orthodox Christian communities (which seem to have formed the basis of the new state) were gradually forced to abandon their autonomous regional development and become appendages of the metropolitan centre of Athens.

If there seems to be something positive achieved by greater communication between communities, this is completely lost, as the “new national culture” slowly ceases to be created by the com-

66 See the persecution of Rebetiko when it was a living singing practise, or the modern persecution of “Turkish gypsy” music, “gypsy” music etc.

munity. The Cypriot experience had several parallels with other regional-autonomous cultures in the Greek region. Not because there was a Cypriot culture in Cyprus – as some neo-Cypriots say. Rather, the Cypriot population was made up of various communities, as I mentioned above. The main effect of this levelling was to destroy the possibility of the autonomous development of each community within a framework of reciprocal interactions. And this prospect seems to have existed in the 19th century.

This can be seen not only in the common uprisings, but also in the possibility of overcoming religious fanaticism within the framework of popular religion. And this is evident both in inter-communal marriages (which according to some observers were once a common phenomenon) and in the tendency to make joint pilgrimages to mosques and churches.

Of course, the most striking example of these reciprocal interactions is the community of the Linobambaki. And the fate of this community is typical of the crushing of the prospect of autonomous community development in the context of reciprocal interaction. With the rise of Greek-Christian nationalism, the church decided to stop sacraments to the Linobambaki, hoping to force them to choose Orthodoxy. Despite all the pressure, however, eventually the community gradually joined the Muslim community. The segregation worked perfectly (albeit against the church's hopes), destroying a space of interaction. Polarisation through spectacular segregation was a major element of cultural levelling. (The same polarization reappeared after the civil war in Greece, this time within the Greek Cypriot community). At the same time, levelling, by steadily moving the centre of culture creation to Athens, gradually began to promote the cultural decline of this land -culture was coming from Athens- and to lay the foundations of modern consumerism. The divergence in the period 1878-1930 between intellectual and popular poetry (intellectuals-traditional poets) is an expression of a growing gap, but not of mutual reinforcement. (And of course it is no coincidence that the great majority of nationalist poems come from intellectuals). Traditional poetry will become more and more underground and repressed (now it seems that the experts have decided that it is dead for good so they have started to build "museums" for it).

The strengthening of the intellectual “culture” will seal the death of “folk” culture and will promote the separation of art/layperson. Alongside the process of cultural levelling and ideological centralization, there is a parallel centralization in structures. The rise of nationalist consciousness among the bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the church hierarchs at the beginning takes, alongside everything else, the form of an attempt to rationalise and centralise the church structure. (The church functioned as a political organization for the elite of the Orthodox community during Turkish rule). The conflicts that erupted because of this role, but also the gradual autonomy of the poor strata together with the corruption that had always characterized the Cypriot church, had essentially formed various centres of power within the hierarchy and at the same time a tendency of the parishes towards more autonomy. The centralisation of both the administrative structure and the ideological influence of the church was necessary to promote both communal divisions and for the reconstruction of ideological hegemony. However, the efforts did not seem to have had significant results until the arrival of the English. The British colonial power set out from the beginning to build a more rationalized centralized political structure.⁶⁷ Within the framework gradually built by the English, the internal processes in the church intensified. On the one hand, the church seems for a moment to be in danger of losing community leadership, as the English build political structures of representation. At the same time, pressures on the church structure to take a leading role in the formation of an ideological hegemony centred on nationalism, are intensifying. This naturally sharpens and gives new dimensions to the internal crises between the various centres of power (bishopsrics-archbishopric).

67 The impression is often cultivated that the English did everything to dehel-lenise the Greek Cypriots. This is a far-fetched fairy tale from the nationalist period. Without caring much for the Cypriots, the English nevertheless increased the power of the Greeks and for various reasons encouraged the Greek-Christian movement in its early days (see Churchill’s statements in 1912, Governor Storrs’ writings, etc.). In the first period (until 1914, when the annexation took place, and sometimes until 1930) several Englishmen, through a Eurocentric racism (against the eastern Turks), or for reasons of political expediency (since until 1914 England was just a placeholder in a Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Empire) emphasized quite clearly the Greekness of Cyprus.

These conflicts were expressed at a first open level in the attempt to break down the administrative control of schools by local authorities and the relative autonomy of church parishes (this was of course also a blow to the tendency of various ordinary priests to identify with the community in various disputes with the power of the elite).

The ecclesiastical crisis of 1900-10, apart from its class edge (the bourgeoisie, the conservative wing of the church, the church's ciftlik owners), was also at another level a conflict through which the church structure began to rationalise and centralise.

The English are promoting this process, as they are laying the foundations for a centralised society through the gradual building of the infrastructure of a Cypriot state. The conflicts of the elite naturally intensify in this context, because alongside their old antagonisms, a central contradiction is beginning to emerge and take on increasingly explosive dimensions: The English administration, with the "modernism" it promotes -the development of political structures, a centralised school system, the institutionalisation of inter-communal divisions through administrative structures, etc.- is the decisive factor in the gradual reconstruction of the ideological hegemony of the elite; and at the same time paves the way for the social and economic rise of the bourgeoisie. From this point of view, the English administration not only helps the elites in exorcising social conflict, but also paves the way for a painless reconstruction of power structures (and after all, the colonial army was a more reliable guarantee of security than that the Ottoman one). On the other hand, however, ideological hegemony, built on the Greek-Christian nonsense and the nationalism of Enosis, was inherently opposed to English rule.

Ultimately, ideological hegemony, the reconstruction of power and the exorcism of social conflict were institutionalised and developed intensely within the framework of colonial modernisation, but at the same time the turning of reality into a spectacle within the nationalist imaginary required opposition (however mild) to the English; and insistence on Enosis in order to maintain its coherence. The segregated spectacle and its imagined unity in the out-of-life image began to set the stage for

the political absurdity that would follow in our modern history (from EOKA to 1974).

The above contradiction had another important effect. It creates the opportunity for the church and the conservative wing of the elite to remain in the limelight and even to slowly emerge as a leading mechanism in Cypriot society. Of course, the conflicts between different groups of the elite continue to rage below the surface. The important result of all this, however, is that English modernization is left somewhere in the middle, especially as far as social life is concerned (as we shall see below, the neo-Cypriot consciousness is precisely the attempt to complete this modernization). The history of Cyprus after 1930 is particularly charged by these contradictions, as the spectacle takes on an autonomous dynamic. The Palmerocracy (1930-40) is the decisive step of the English to push the process of modernization to its realization – the birth of the bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy appears as a meeting place of the conflicting elites and, at the same time, as the emergence of a new group of elites that sets the basis of the Cypriot state. As this bureaucracy grows stronger and feels its dynamics (whose logical prospect was the Cypriot state), the contradiction between ideology (Enosis) and reality (the bureaucracy as the basis of the future Cypriot state) is only maintained in the self-contained perspective of the spectacle. For some strata of the bureaucracy this will continue until 1974. The rise of AKEL in 1941-46 is the first (and last so far) popular reaction to the growing power of the bureaucracy. Significantly, in 1943 AKEL ran for the first time in the municipal elections with the main slogan “down with the appointed”, while its later propaganda (e.g. for the Constitutional Assembly in 1947) centred on the hypocrisy of the right in manning the state apparatus while presenting itself as intransigent towards the English. In its early years, AKEL looks like a continuation of the popular movements of the 19th century, as it tries to overcome divisions and to express an anti-colonial, class and social discourse (its rise at the time was astonishing, 4 years after its creation it won the 4 largest of the 6 municipalities of the island and several Turkish Cypriot municipalities). Degeneration however comes very quickly. The growth of an internal bureaucracy (to some

extent an inevitable result of the Marxism-Leninism of the leadership group that prevailed), as well as the attempt to co-opt the parallel bureaucratic apparatus of the church (with the election of Leontios), quickly lead it into the ideological framework of hegemony and the spectacle. Nationalism is the rope with which AKEL is slowly tying itself, to then crawl at the feet of its opponents, demanding certificates of patriotism. AKEL's stance from 1947 to 1960 is one of those unique moments of political schizophrenia (at least for the people who follow AKEL) and political hypocrisy (for the leaders) that characterise the Cypriot political scene. While in Greece thousands pass through Makronisos suspected of being leftists, and while thousands are slaughtered, tortured, etc., AKEL crawls through the spectacle and its contradictions. On the one hand, it bashes the government of Athens as monarcho-fascist, as sell outs and so on; and on the other hand it strives to compete with the extreme right in nationalism-fanaticism with the slogan: "Enosis and only Enosis with any Greek government". (It is worth noting that 5-6 months before the "popular mobilizations" for this line, the party had held similar celebrations with the slogan "Self-Government-Enosis"). The bureaucracy as a social force (inside and outside AKEL), not only wins the game by integrating its opponents, but also makes its first impressive entry into politics, reproducing imaginary divisions, and effectively abolishing politics. The foundations of the Cypriot state were ready. If there is anything significant in the fifteen years of 1945-60, it is the gradual rise of the church and the seduction of the state bureaucracy by it. The election and unchallenged authority of Makarios is the linking of the 2 centralizing mechanisms (church-state) and their temporary alliance under the patriarchal gaze of Makarios.

4. THE NEO-CYPRIOT CONSCIOUSNESS AND MODERNISATION

In recent years there has been an effort, which (at least superficially) seems to come into conflict with Greek Christianity (not just the term but the ideology), what the far right, the church and, among the far left, the pro-Enosis Marxists so passionately call "neo-Cypriot

consciousness". Apart from the fantasies projected by the above, the "neo-Cypriots" (theoretical or not) are essentially pre-oriented to the notion that we must also overcome ideologically the insecurity of hellenism as a dependency on the national centre and begin to identify with the Cypriot state. Thus, a bastardization of history begins (however, for the moment it has not reached the frenzy that Greek Christianity has reached), to prove that we are and are not Greeks, that the struggle for Enosis was good and was not good, etc.

Eventually, of course, it is not difficult to see the extension of this reasoning: somewhere, a Cypriot nation will slowly emerge, of which the Cypriot state will constitute its main axis.⁶⁸ However, although the centre of gravity is different (the Cypriot rather than the Greek state), the roots of this phenomenon go back a long way and come directly from the Greek-Christian imaginary and the reconstruction of power that was promoted by Greek-Enosist nationalism. As we have seen above, the processes and structures of power and ideology promoted by Greek-Christian nationalism essentially built the foundations of the modern Cypriot state. And if the "intra-Cypriot" problematic has something certain where its problematic begins, it is this state. neo-Cyprianism is a nationalism that takes its ideological hegemony and practices from Greek-Christian nationalism. Levelling through national unity, exorcism of social conflict, need for an Other to project the scarecrow of danger, reproduction of power within the family and institutionalization of the objectification of the Other, rise of the state as the regulator of social patriarchy, etc. The segregated spectacle, the sheepification of people, a fitting modernization. It is for this reason that in the previous pieces and from now on I will use the term neo-(Greek)-Cypriot consciousness -precisely as the view that this is a new face of the old fairy tale- of Greek-Christian nationalism and its functioning in this region. In this context, the relevance of what was mentioned in the previous part is, I think, obvious

68 Although the Greek Christians live with this nightmare, the neo-Cypriots have not yet proposed it. Their two demands, which aroused the holy wrath of our Greeks (and the pro-Enosis Marxists, of course), were the proposal to officially establish only the Cypriot flag as the state flag (i.e. to do away with the Greek flag) and to create a Cypriot national anthem. The yearnings that these people have.

and of no need for repetition. Beyond the ideological continuity, however, the neo-(Greek)-Cypriot consciousness also represents a significant development, perhaps even a turning point, in Cypriot history over the past 50 years. In an initial phase, it comes to seal a period and openly say what for years Greek Christianity had been sugarcoating for us, that ultimately, the extension of nationalism is this state, with which the social imaginary must finally come to terms. On another, less obvious level, the neo-Greek-Cypriot consciousness perhaps signals two important processes: the completion of modernization (and at the same time the settling of old scores among the elites) and the creation of an ideological hegemony (and the reorganization of the segregated spectacle), so as to put an end to its reactions. Modernism, whose completion was blocked by nationalism (whose development framework it had built), seems to be the central theme again. With the death of Makarios, the antagonisms between the state (with its bureaucracy and its politicians) and the church began to express themselves transiently (for the time being), but quite strongly. The antagonism is, to a certain extent, a settling of scores between two centres of ideological, political and economic power. At the same time, however, it expresses (and will express more strongly in the future) a conflict between modernists and conservatives.

The state, and to a certain extent the power mechanisms that anchor it, seems determined (as shown by the education reform and labour legislation) to rationalise society completely and to take over the central role of social power. Pressured both by the needs of economic dependency (whether in the form of tourism or as an “offshore business station”) for a modern, modernised society, but also by the internal needs of a suffocating society, the promoters of modernism hope for a painless reconstruction of power structures (as their peers succeeded in doing in the days of Greek-Enosist nationalism). The conflict is expressed between 2 trends, the modernists and the conservatives. The terms are to some extent misleading, because apart from the church and a part of DISY, the others are both – their position is determined more by who holds state power than by their “ideology”. To some extent, it can be said that the most consistent moderniser is the very state structure that

needs this process; and which to some extent imposes it on those who govern it. At another level, the neo-Cypriot consciousness is an ideological attempt to settle the internal reactions of ideological hegemony that led to the absurdities of the last 30 years. We have already mentioned the political masochism of AKEL with Enosis and only Enosis. A few years later, the EOKA struggle brings out the contradictions in a more explosive way and leads to the Zurich patchwork of a state. However, the decisive time of developments was in 1958, when the segregated spectacle had its first violent contact with reality.

Intercommunal clashes begin with mass massacres, while Grivas and his counterparts in the Turkish Cypriot community push the logic of separation and objectification of the Other to the extreme with a series of murders of leftists. The state of Zurich under the patriarchal rule of Makarios is an attempt to reconstruct the spectacle after its overwhelming contact with reality. And what comes out of Zurich is striking, not only for the funny belief (?) of its makers that it would last, but also because it is perhaps a global phenomenon, where after a “national-liberation” struggle, a people gets a constitution worse than what the colonialists proposed before. It is time this fairy tale of the EOKA struggle to be put back where it belongs, in the autonomous dynamic of an ideology that has lost all contact with reality. 1963 is a repetition of 1958, the roots of Greek Cyprianism begin from then, in Makarios’ attempt to disengage from the ideological extension (Enosis) and accept the practical result of the ideology of nationalism (the Cypriot state). Thus, the theory of the possible appears. The intervention of the population (the “people”) in these situations hovered between submitting to and supporting the modernist efforts of Makarios and in confronting ghosts of the past. The emergence of EOKA B simply pushed the contradictions to extremes again, but this time within the Greek Cypriot community. The marching towards the coup and the invasion was at one point as predictable as the absurdity of the whole affair. The clash between spectacle and reality and the explosion of the contradictions of ideology in 1974 was catastrophic. The emergence of the neo-(Greek)-Cypriot consciousness in this context was an extension of the “possible”, but an extension

determined to reorganize ideological hegemony with cohesion, based on a nationalism that sees more clearly where it is, where it is going, and what it is building. Now, whether it succeeds or not is their problem. What do we do?

Preliminary Note

The following text was written in 1988 in Limassol by the anarchist group “Anafentos”. It was found in a photocopy of the fourth issue of the Cypriot anarchist magazine “Train in the City”. Due to the poor condition of the photocopy, small parts of the text could not be typed. These deficiencies have been noted in the reproduction of the text below through the use of brackets, and words have been added in places where the meaning of the sentence is not changed. The title of the text refers to the ‘Davos Process’, the 1988 diplomatic meeting aimed at launching a process of reconciliation between Greece and Turkey.

anarchist group “Anafentos”

Neither Davos nor non-Davos

or Why we are indifferent to the schemes of all kinds of clowns
of power: An Anti-authoritarian Proposal

THE NATION-STATE, NATIONALISM, AND THE COMPETING RULING CLASSES

1. If there is a problem today that can be defined as the “Cyprus Problem”, it certainly cannot be confined within the territorial framework of Cyprus, nor within the time frame of the period after 1974, 1960 or even 1950. The problem has its roots much deeper in history and stems from the competition between the two imperialist -and therefore expansionist- states of Greece and Turkey for economic, political and military dominance in the region.

2. The antagonism between the various ruling classes is one of the most intense contradictions of capitalism and which often leads to military conflicts between them, dragging into them the exploited classes on both sides - who are the “raw material” in these conflicts, “the cannon fodder”. The existence of an ideology that justifies in the eyes of the exploited such massacres and everything related to their preparation and conduct (taxes for armaments, militarization of society, uncontrolled centers of power, etc.) is necessary.

3. The Nation-State is the ideological extension of capitalism-statism (Western and Eastern) in society and nationalism is the point where it touches people’s consciences. We will not deal here with the nature of nationalism, its extensions in the patriarchal society and how it is planted in the consciences of the oppressed (religion, education, etc.). It will suffice only to say that the basic function of nationalism in the social imaginary is the identification of the state with the ‘great and powerful’ father and of the homeland

with the ‘sweet and loving’ mother: an extension of the model of the patriarchal family -upon which every class-industrial society is based- to the whole of society.

4. It goes without saying that the big winners of these intra-imperialist conflicts, which since the Second World War have usually taken place on the periphery of capitalism and rarely in the metropolis, are the arms manufacturers. The ruling classes of the militarily victorious state are also benefitting, while the ruling classes of the defeated state will not take long to get back on their feet. The big losers, however, are the exploited classes on both sides who have borne the main, if not the entire burden of the war (the dead, the disabled, hunger, the refugees, hardship, etc.) and who are in no better position than before.

5. By simultaneously projecting the threat of the evil other, to the external imaginary (or sometimes ‘real’) ‘enemy nation’, nationalist ideology manages to unite people who have nothing in common with each other except their common allegiance to this ideology and to divide people who have every common interest in turning against this ideology as well as against those whose interests are in one way or another served by it.

6. The consolidation of nationalist ideology, which sometimes appears as far-right racism, invoking the “roots” of the “race” and sometimes appears as “left-wing patriotism”, invoking various Stalinist-Maoist theories and neo-Orthodox nonsense, results in class cooperation (see national unity) and the defusing of social conflicts. And all this in the name of the “national economy”, the “non-shrinking of the nation” and a bunch of other crap. This of course does not serve the cause of people’s liberation at all.

7. [Possibly missing part of the text] The only beneficiary of this collaboration is the exploitative society (and the classes whose interests it serves) that perpetuates the domination of the economy over itself on the one hand and the domination of its ideology over the people on the other. Thus in times of peace the exploited are called upon to throw themselves into production, while in times of war they find themselves, whether they like it or not, on the front line.

THE COMPETITION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

8. Greece and Turkey, even small “South” Cyprus, have long ceased to be colonies or third world feudal states and have entered the camp of imperialism, without this meaning that they too are not dependent on the metropolis (here a West Germany has not managed to escape the imperialist dependence of the USA, even though it is a first class imperialist power in its own right). It is on the basis of this position that we shall then examine what can be defined as the “Problem” or the “National Issue” trying to avoid whining as much as possible.

9. Apart from the “Great” spheres of influence which are competing for political, military and economic control with the two main poles of capital accumulation and ideology, there are also the “smaller” spheres of influence which are competing for their sub-control with other smaller, but nonetheless imperialist states.

10. One such sphere of influence is the Eastern Mediterranean. Since Israel, the most developed capitalist state in the region, cannot exercise effective control (though it will never cease to pursue it) mainly because of its poor neighborliness with the Arab states, this role is left to Greece and Turkey (and secondly or thirdly to “Southern” Cyprus) which are engaged in a competitive race at all levels.

11. This is of course nothing new. It is the Greek “Megali Idea” on the one hand and the dreams of the former Ottoman Empire on the other -expressed today in the modern neo-Turkish expansionism- that have led the two countries sometimes to successive massacres and wars and sometimes to agreements akin to “Davos”, depending on the political circumstances.

[MISSING SUBTITLE TEXT]

12. During the years of the Ottoman period, and especially after the Greek bourgeois-democratic revolution, nationalism was naturally transplanted to Cyprus within the Christian and Muslim communities from the metropolises of nationalism: Greece and Turkey, which suited the various ruling classes of Cyprus. On the Greek side, the Orthodox Church played a key role in this, as it was practically co-opted by the Turks and with the privileges granted

to it by them (for their own political reasons, of course) managed to convince the majority of Christians of the Greekness of their origin. It is worth noting that the Orthodox community at that time was indeed the largest community but it was far from being the absolute majority.

The Greek language invaded all of the popular strata, intervening precisely at the stage where a common Cypriot language was being formed. A typical example is that of the Linobambaki, a minority who believed in both Mohammedanism and Christianity and who spoke a language-mixture of Greek and Turkish. The minority was eventually absorbed into the Muslim community as the “counter” result of the Orthodox Church’s insistence on Hellenizing them. The reaction of the Muslim popular strata was to further adhere to their own religion as their only refuge.

13. The polarization and the separation of the exploited classes into Greeks and Turks, into “good” and “bad”, into perennial “enemies” of one or the other nation, was slowly but surely taking place. And all this at a time when there was a significant “common” revolutionary tradition and the common uprisings of Christians and Muslims against the centers of power were not few (although theoretically Muslims were in a somewhat better situation since they did not pay tribute. But this differentiation, whose purpose was precisely to separate the oppressed, was of little importance, since impoverishment was a general phenomenon).

14. Of course, during all these years there have been settling of scores both internally and between the various elites (Greek and Turkish). For example, during the period of the Greek bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Ottomans purged the leadership of the church in order to prevent the spread of the Greek revolution to Cyprus, although it was later proved that the Church had no such intention, not wanting to lose its privileges. This was the first great nationalist uprising.

15. There followed a period (in the last years of the Ottoman period and during the period of English rule) when the common struggles between Greeks and Turks (and no longer between Christians and Muslims) became less and less frequent and the distrust between the two communities continued to grow. The first population movements

took place and separate education was slowly imposed. The other communities, especially the Latin community, virtually disappeared. From the early years of English rule, the Greek community already constituted the largest section of the population.

During and after the First Imperialist World War the Greek nationalist upsurge reached a new peak, which the English colonialists exploited, and by applying the well-known “divide and rule” they managed to perpetuate the separation of the communities. Since the 1950s (Enosis referendum) and afterwards Turkish far-right nationalism appears as a response to the Greek one.

16. The Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), founded in 1941 by illegal cells of the CPC⁶⁹ was the only popular organization that, even in the early years of its existence, had access to both communities. Subsequently, however, and as the Stalinist party that it was, the role it played in the issue of the Turks of Cyprus was hypocritical to say the least. The culmination of this hypocrisy was the adoption of the slogan ENOSIS WITH GREECE, UNDER ANY GOVERNMENT in the 1950s, thus becoming the tail of Greek nationalist ideology, which of course led to the strong reaction of the Turks of Cyprus (who from now on will be called Turkish Cypriots TC while the Greeks of Cyprus: Greek Cypriots GC). Of course, on an individual or even party membership level, there were many members of AKEL who fought for Greek-Turkish solidarity and many of them were victims of assassinations by nationalists on both sides.

AKEL subsequently remains neutral in the face of the national-“liberation” struggle of the extreme right-wing GC nationalists who, under the leadership of the fascist former leader of the battalion “X”,⁷⁰ make it clear from the outset that the aim of their struggle is ENOSIS. For some strange reason, however, they simultaneously declare that this struggle is directed first against the communists, then against the Turks and thirdly against the English! (There is no doubt that within the ranks of this organization (EOKA) there

69 Editor’s note: Refers to the “Communist Party of Cyprus” (CPC).

70 Editor’s note: Refers to Georgios Grivas, leader of the pro-royalist anti-communist organization “X” in the 1940s and later leader of “EOKA” and “EOKA B”.

were also people who were romantic, liberal and noteworthy, but this is not enough to prevent the organization from being described as fascist-nationalist).

SINCE INDEPENDENCE

17. The proclamation of the Cypriot state in the 1960s finds GCs on the one hand in an intense polarization between left and right (which was to intensify further thereafter) and on the other hand having the upper hand in the economy of the country (although there is evidence for all this, a stroll in the Turkish neighborhoods of Limassol will convince you). The situation is as schizophrenic as the Cypriot state itself which had nothing to rely on, as it had to bridge the gap between two communities that had neither a common language, nor a common religion, nor a common economy, nor anything else that could unite them under the flag of a state (e.g. a kingdom, a race, etc.). The same schizophrenia is prevalent among the GCs who, while fighting for Enosis, found themselves with an Independent State.

18. Then in 1967, a change of guard in Greece (military junta) is confronted by the then President Makarios and his supporters (including AKEL) who in the meantime had adopted the more realistic line of INDEPENDENCE, although the ultimate goal always remained ENOSIS (“Enosis is desirable but not possible”). This leads to the effective rupture within the ranks of the GCs -even within the ranks of the GC right- dividing them into pro-Enosis and pro-independence factions (then called Grivikoi and Makariakoi). It is precisely then that the new nationalist ideology emerges dynamically (although its roots are older): NEO-GREEK-CYPRIOT-INDEPENDENCE which is strongly opposed to the traditional GREEK-ENOSIS and constitutes the two main principles and opposing trends of the same nationalist ideology, since both are Greek. There was no NEO-CYPRIOT nationalist ideology since Cyprus has never been a Nation-State. What really existed was the struggle over which nationality would dominate by stepping on the other and imposing its own nationalist ideology and from Independence onwards it was the GCs who managed to identify the state with their own nation while

the TCs, located in a defensive position, began to look forward to the creation of their own state.

The ridiculous thing about this story is that Independence was much more to the liking of the GCs and it is precisely here that ideology is differentiated from economics. However, this emasculating sentiment was to determine the attitude of the GCs towards the TCs. The latter, with the declaration of independence, are effectively second-class citizens while important articles of the constitution (so much invoked later by GC politicians) concerning the rights of the TCs as a minority were not implemented, [missing part of text - the next 4 words are not from the text:] [something that was used by the] Turkish ruling classes and the TC elite to promote their own economic interests and expansionist plans. The sequence of events is well known: the events of 1963-64, racist massacres between GCs and TCs, the threat of Turkish intervention, the action of the TC far-right nationalist armed organization TMT and finally the forced -and not voluntary as they had no choice- confinement of most TCs in real ghettos. The TCs as a whole faced an immediate and real danger of a genocide (not to speak only of 1922 but also of our own ‘Turk eaters’ like Sampson, Yiorkadjis, Lyssarides etc.).⁷¹ They finally escaped thanks to the intervention of the English -who of course had their own reasons and interests, otherwise they wouldn’t have cared- who intervened between the opponents and created the famous green line.

19. The two tendencies of Greek nationalist ideology in Cyprus quickly lead to armed conflict. The extreme right-wing pro-Enosis organization EOKA B is again founded by Grivas and they accuse Makarios of being a traitor to Enosis. They then proceed to attack

71 Editor’s note: Polykarpos Yiorkadjis was a member of EOKA. After independence he served as Minister of Interior, Defense and Labor during the 1960s. He was also the leader of the “Akritas Organization”, the most important Greek Cypriot paramilitary organization that took part in the 1963-64 inter-communal conflict, aimed at the violent abolition of the bi-communal state. He was assassinated in 1970. Nikos Sampson was also a member of EOKA. He later led his own paramilitary organization from independence until the Turkish invasion, and in 1974 he was declared president of the coup d’état Cypriot government. Vassos Lyssarides was the founder and leader of the socialist party EDEK. He commanded his own paramilitary organization in the 1960s and 1970s.

and murder pro-independence individuals and leftists, while the response of the state and the pro-independence faction is similar.

Except for the massacres of the TCs in 1967, this issue is put on the shelf for a while as most of them have now isolated themselves in their wretched ghettos.

20. So things are leading to the new big explosion of all these contradictions of the hegemonic ideology in 1974. The facts are again known: first the coup against Makarios planned by the Greek junta and executed by the GC National Guard. This is a rare case of political schizophrenia where the army representing the Nation is confronted with the State apparatus par excellence: the police. This then prompted the intervention of the Turkish army, which invaded the island under the pretext of protecting the TCs. It is known to all that this military operation (a large-scale landing operation that is completely impossible to plan and execute in a week) was planned much earlier and that behind all this there were other bigger political games being played. But what no one in South Cyprus today admits is the fact that the TCs then really were exposed to a huge danger despite all the radio statements of the coup plotters that the whole thing was concerning only the GCs (and if that was the case the TCs had every reason not to believe it since the Junta president was none other than the ‘Turk eater’ of Omorfita, Sampson).

The result of the invasion of the Turkish army was the definitive separation of the two communities and the creation of a gap between them that grows as time goes by. The truth is that the TCs in the South since long before 1974 started to move North after suggestions or even blackmail from their leadership (and this was to break down the myth that GCs and TCs before the war lived as brothers. The truth is that nationalism had worked its miracle again). Anyway, it is in 1974 that the GCs in the north were displaced to the south and the TCs who still lived in the south moved north either because they wanted to, or because they had no choice, or because they were exchanged for GC prisoners. Then, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established and at this moment in Cyprus there are two States with similar ethnic identification, no matter how “false” Southern Cyprus characterizes the North. What to do? This seems to be the way

all states exist: they are built on violence, survive using violence and die using violence.

The victims of course of this new intra-imperialist conflict were again the exploited classes of both communities, who were not entirely innocent. Infected to the core by nationalist ideology, they played the game of the bosses and of course lost.

21. [Missing point 21. and the text of the subtitle of the next point. Possibly there is no point 21. due to a mistake in numbering, or part of point 20. is point 21., with the numbering missing in the printed text, due to bad photocopying]

After the crisis of 1974, “Southern” Cyprus experienced a rapid economic growth, what has been called an “economic miracle”. The first thing the authorities cared to do was to patch the holes in the economy opened by the war. This was of course done at the expense of the exploited classes who were asked to throw themselves into production and make sacrifices to restore the economy. It is precisely here that the maturity of the local capitalist class was demonstrated. It managed to avoid any explosive situation that might have arisen in the first two years after the invasion due to refugees, deprivation and unemployment. And this was done with the close collaboration of all the parties and trade unions that have sold out any workers’ struggle in the name of the National problem. The left-wing parties have been content to repeat their accusations against the right which has been in power ever since (don’t be fooled by the results of the last elections) for its inability to lead a national-“liberation” struggle, repeating again and again the rhetoric about the US-NATO imperialist conspiracy that was behind the events (who remembers the slogan GREECE-RUS-SIA-ALLIANCE!!!!?). At the same time, and since Greek nationalist ideology was identified in the minds of most people with the betrayal of the Greek junta, it is sidelined, with the GC nationalist ideology expressed mainly by the Makarios line being promoted. The phenomenon ‘from fustanella to vraka’ was also convenient for the GCs in the international political arena as they always sought to prove that the Cypriot state is one and that its only representatives are the GCs. On the other hand, they could not help but always display the Greek flag next to the Cypriot

flag and maintain closer relations with the Greek state. Anyway, the fact is that in recent years there has been an upsurge of “pure Greek” nationalism which envisages the single or double enosis of Cyprus with Greece as the only way out. But all this again is a big chapter in which many other factors have to be taken into account, such as, for example, the competition between the Greek and GC ruling classes etc.

Then, with the various aids from abroad (mainly from Greece and the USA) and with the various “refugee” taxes, the problem of housing the refugees was slowly solved. Finally, with the decisive shift of the economy to tourism, the issue of unemployment was settled to reach today’s GC society of 1988.

TODAY’S CYPRIOT FANTASY

23. “Southern” Cyprus today is a petty bourgeois society that has gone from poverty to over-consumption in a very short period of time. A country that is becoming an important economic and diplomatic center. We are talking about a modern cosmopolitan façade, but behind it lies a culturally miserable, spiritually castrated society where the most extreme egoism and reactionary patriarchal concepts coexist with thousands of offshore businesses and luxury hotel complexes. A small state on the tourist periphery of the metropolis of capitalism.

The working class -the vast majority of it infected by all kinds of nationalist ideologies- has been made the property of the state and its trade union leaders with the only reward being the apartment with the VIDEO and the two cars. [unreadable part of the text - the beginning of the sentence does not come from the text:] [It has convinced itself that the national problem is] the only problem that exists in Cyprus today and that all it can do about it is to blindly obey the laws of the state, work like donkeys to continue to have its petty bourgeois comforts, pay taxes for defense and trust its leaders to handle it.

THE AUTONOMY OF SOCIETY FROM THE STATE, OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM THE WHOLE, OF THE MINORITY FROM THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, OF THE DISTRICT FROM THE CENTER, OF THE MARGINAL CULTURE

FROM THE HEGEMONIC etc., ARE FACTS INCONCEIVABLE IN THE CYPRIOT CONTEXT.

24. As a natural result of this situation, the racism of the GCs is also extended to the social level, targeting anyone who consciously or unconsciously refuses to submit to this daily misery. And we have the recent example of the open attack of the police and the state against marginalized youth and the creation of the special police units. The state of “Southern Cyprus” and the identification with it [creates a] society [that] cannot tolerate anyone who questions the centrality of the national issue as THE problem (here leftists go so far as to call for a Greek brigade on the island and support not only the army but also its discipline).

IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT ANY POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE THAT PROMOTES NATIONAL UNITY ACTUALLY SERVES THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY BY MASKING THE REAL CONTRADICTIONS OF SOCIETY AND EXORCISING SOCIAL WAR IN THE NAME OF THE NATIONAL PROBLEM.

Perhaps the final points that we could characterize as positions of the group, without these being magic recipes, are:

WAR ON THE WAR OF THE BOSSES. Against a new Greek-Turkish conflict that will definitely involve Cyprus. Against militarism in all its forms and exposing the role of all kinds of armies starting with our own.

EXPOSING NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY WHEREVER IT COMES FROM: left or right, Greek, Turkish, Enosis, Double Enosis, etc.

RESTATING THE PROBLEM ON ITS CLASS BASIS. Denial of the centrality of the national issue. The only problem of liberation that the exploited classes of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, as well as the whole world, have, is that of liberation from the shackles of forced labor and daily boredom. Everything else is implied or is included. But to do this requires [sentence missing]

SOCIAL CRITIQUE, practical and theoretical. Alternative-anti-authoritarian discourse and practice.

RAPPROCHEMENT ON A FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL (and not on a leadership level) both for the two communities in Cyprus,

and of the Turkish and Greek oppressed in the context of an Internationalist solidarity, exposing of course the fiasco of agreements, such as Davos, between the Social-Fascist Papandreou and the Ankara Militarists.

Since there are many questions that arise from what we have said above, we will try to answer some of them:

1. But isn't the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus an illegal state built on violence?

All states are illegal and all are built on violence. We do not divide states into "good" and "bad". The issue is brought to us on the basis that all TWO Cypriot states are built on violence and this was the result of so many years of mistrust and suspicion between the two communities. We do not of course support the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus any more than we support the presence of the Greek, Turkish, English or any other army on this land. We know very well what the role of each army is and how many crimes they are responsible for against humanity.

2. Are you against an armed national-liberation struggle?

These are all options that have been tried in the past and have only led to massacres. From a radical point of view, what needs to be done is to avoid a new war. After all, what did the national liberation movements of the 1960s -which also had an anti-imperialist character- leave behind them other than dictatorships and misery, and to what extent did they succeed in providing a revolutionary perspective? The national liberation struggle as a primary struggle always results in the strengthening of the state (center of power) and the militarization of society in exchange for the replacement of foreign oppressors with the local ones. This is precisely the very delicate point that anti-authoritarians must be both anti-imperialists and anti-militarists and it is certainly a subject that bears much discussion.

3. So you are against a war that would settle things?

Absolutely. No war has ever settled anything but the conditions for the next one.

4. Are you against violence?

Violence is the worst part of our everyday life and we will never stop fighting against it. But we accept violence as the means of last

resort of social self-defense and of waging the only war in which we will participate: the social war (and when we say violence we do not mean exclusively the extreme case of armed violence).

5. But in what you say you seem to place almost all the blame on the Greek and GC side?

We have tried to put the issue on its class-social basis. If this is being done it is because we hear what the Turks have done every day. No one dares to stick their nose into Greek shit.

6. [question missing from the photocopy]

We are not trying to justify any expansionism, especially Turkish expansionism. But try to justify Greek expansionism and you will see what game you are involved in (some people insist that the Greek state reaches as far as the Indies!). The point is not to argue one nationalism against another, one state against another, one army against another. The point is to expose the role they play in the oppression of humanity and to fight them, starting with what is most directly related to us: 'our' state, 'our' army, Greek nationalism, always in the hope that something similar will happen on the other side. As unrealistic as this may seem at the moment, it is the only truth for us. And after all, how much have we really tried in the direction of Internationalist solidarity?

7. But what about the refugees and missing persons?

No one can question the human (not the national) right to freedom of settlement and residence (some of us are refugees and some sentimentality about the place we grew up is inevitable). However, it would be naive to think that a solution to this particular problem could be found through clowning like the one observed at Davos, whining at the UN or a war. The refugees have simply been the new victims of this eternal game and as long as the oppressed GCs and TCs do not take their fate into their own hands this will be their role in history. And in a new such phase it will be all of us who will be feeding with our bodies the cannons of the militarists of Athens, Ankara and Nicosia. As for the missing persons, let them look a little in the mass graves of the coup. Those who can't beat the donkey, beat the saddle.

8. And if the Turkish army tries to occupy the whole of Cyprus, what will you do?

However serious the threat of a new war may be, let us not suffer more from the fear of it than from the war itself. Regardless of which side attacks, we categorically refuse to fight. But for this to be effective, an anti-war discourse in general and an anti-authoritarian discourse and practice in particular, both in “North” and “South” Cyprus, as well as in Greece and Turkey, must be articulated from now on, so that there can be an organized response to the difficult moment of the declaration of war. And it is in this internationalist direction that we should move, perhaps to prevent a new round of racist massacres (in the past there have been many cases of soldiers who organized themselves and effectively refused to fight, showing an unprecedented maturity). We need to finally get rid of the shit our fathers put on our backs and look for new ways of coexistence and understanding between individuals, social groups (not classes of course) and nationalities.

If any of this does not happen, we deserve our fate:

LET EVERY PERSON HASTEN TO SAVE THEMSELVES

ANARCHIST GROUP ANAFENTOS
LIMASSOL

Preliminary Note

The following text of the Trotskyist group “Workers’ Democracy” was found in issue 34 of the Cypriot magazine “Within the Walls”, published in 1988 in Nicosia. It is an intervention in a debate and confrontation that started to develop in the magazine concerning the Cyprus Problem. The debate began with an intervention text written by Ch. Eliades (issue 30, 1988) on the article “Intervention in Two Monologues” by Nicos Peristianis and Marios Lysiotis, which appeared in 1989 in issue 26 of the magazine, commenting on the dialogue between Aris Politis and Özker Özgür that was developing in the newspapers “Epikairi” and “Yenidüzen”. In response to the article by Ch. Eliades, Workers’ Democracy published in issue 31 the critical article “Another Greek Cypriot Social Patriot”, starting an exchange of articles that continued until the end of the publication of “Within the Walls”. Workers’ Democracy approached the Cyprus Problem through the prism of revolutionary defeatism, while Ch. Eliades followed a line closer to the dominant Greek Cypriot position of the period. This text, as well as the following text of Workers’ Democracy hosted in this collection, present in a concise manner the positions and analyses developed by the group within its book “The Cyprus Problem and the Internationalist Tasks of Greek Cypriot Revolutionaries”, published in 1988. The reproduction of the entire discussion was not possible in this collection, but it has been transcribed and can be found in the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org).

Workers' Democracy

The Main Enemy is “Our” Bourgeoisie Again on Social Patriotism

In the previous and in this issue of “Within the Walls”, the magazine hosted in two parts, an article by Ch. Eliades, with the subtitle “a response to the editorial group of Workers’ Democracy”. The reply concerns our article that was in a previous issue, which he considered a response to his own article in the March issue. He even notes that with that article we “entered” the dialogue around the “national issue” ourselves.

But apart from the fact that we have not now entered the “dialogue”, neither our previous article in “Within the Walls” nor this one are answers to Ch. Eliades and others who have similar political views. And they could not be, because to do so requires much more space than it would be possible for “Within the Walls” to allocate to us. We have been doing this for some time with a series of our articles in the newspaper “Workers’ Democracy” that we published in 79-80, and in recent years with our articles in the Greek magazine “Mami” and in the “Ergatiki Alilegkii” newspaper of the Greek revolutionary organization OSE. In February of 1988 our book “THE CYPRUS PROBLEM and the Internationalist Tasks of Greek Cypriot Revolutionaries” was published.⁷²

72 Editor’s note: The book “The Cyprus Problem and the Internationalist Tasks of Greek Cypriot Revolutionaries” was published in February 1988 by Workers’ Democracy. It is the most coherent attempt to analyze the Cyprus Problem through the Marxist-Leninist tradition that had been written in Cyprus in the 1980s and 1990s. It has been digitized and can be found on the website of the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org).

That is why in our first article we referred to this book for a critique of all Greek Cypriot social patriots. We even explained that we would limit ourselves, as the subtitle said, only to “a few remarks on the case of Ch. Eliades” to show some contradictions of social patriotism. Contradictions like those of Ch. Eliades, who claims that “never has one barbarism ever undone or overthrown another previous barbarism”, while at the same time calling for the removal of the settlers, without seeing that only with a comparable barbarism to that of 1974 can this be done.

So Ch. Eliades’ claim that we have wronged him because we did not present his politics in full is not valid. We did not say that we would do so. And there would have been no reason to revisit his writings if in his last article he had not directly inverted a very important position of ours.

Ch. Eliades devotes a part of his article to showing our “contradiction” when we denounce those who call for the expulsion of settlers as nationalists while on the other hand we accept that “as a matter of principle we agree with the removal of settlers” but we are concerned that “we will encounter difficult problems even on the issue of the departure of all of them”. He even tries to “encourage” us by writing that: “No one claimed that this [the expulsion of all settlers] would be easy, nor is the road to democracy and socialism paved with rose petals.”

But Ch. Eliades did not want to notice that the one who “in principle agrees with the removal of the settlers” is DISY,⁷³ and that the whole of that reference was taken from the newspaper “Alitheia”⁷⁴ to which we referred. Nor did he notice that right next to the statement “for reasons of principle we consider the above position to be correct”, i.e. “the departure of all of them”, there was in brackets our own ironic comment saying [“well, of course”].

If Ch. Eliades had read our article more carefully, or had bothered to take a look at the contents of the book to which we referred, he would have seen that not only are we not “in principle” in favor

73 Editor’s note: The Democratic Rally (DISY) is the largest right-wing party in the Republic of Cyprus.

74 Editor’s note: Refers to the right-wing newspaper “Alitheia”, which historically expressed the positions of the Democratic Rally (DISY).

of the expulsion of the settlers, but that our position is completely opposite to the one he attributes to us. Here is what we say about the settlers in the relevant chapter:

“They are here and the workers should welcome them, and not only them, but also everyone else, from wherever else they happen to come from. It is a matter of principle for the internationalists. The right in Europe is emboldened by racism against foreign workers. Cypriots in Thatcher’s England face the same thing, and the trade union movement there has supported them.”

AGAINST “OUR OWN” BOURGEOISIE

We also explain in the book why we consider the struggle for domination between the bourgeois classes in Cyprus as reactionary on both sides. As unjust, reactionary and expansionist the aims of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie are, the Greek and Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie have equally unjust and reactionary aims. Whether one bourgeoisie dominates Cyprus or the other, the result will be the national oppression of the other ethnic group. That is why the task of the left is not to support the privileges of any nation and to not subordinate themselves to reactionary aspirations, especially of “their” bourgeoisie.

This is the basis on which we base our policy. Anyone who does not also see “our” bourgeoisie as aggressively expansionist and imperialist, does so because he sees “their” nation as better than the others.

This is exactly what social patriots can neither see nor want to see. Instead, when they are uncomfortable in the face of references to Lenin’s policies they prefer to state, as Ch. Eliades does, that “we are giving Lenin a hard time”, like “father Stalin” used to do. Of course, it would have been good if he had taken the trouble to prove this claim.

What characterizes the policy of all social patriots who invoke Lenin is that they completely ignore (want to ignore!) some of the most basic points of Lenin’s policy on national conflicts, i.e. they “forget” Lenin’s insistence that the specific tasks of socialists are **different according to the nation to which they belong**. And that the main task of revolutionaries is to fight against

their “own” bourgeoisie that has oppressed or oppresses or seeks to oppress again other nationalities, and against its attempt to impose its rule on others:

“Internationalism is recommended in the break with your own social chauvinists... and with your own imperialist government... in your decision to accept the greatest national sacrifices... if this is beneficial to the development of the international workers’ revolution.”⁷⁵

Because Ch. Eliades does not want to understand this attitude, he wonders with much frustration and even more naivety if we would also describe as social patriots the Turkish revolutionaries who are fighting against “their” bourgeoisie to support the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus and the right of the Cypriots to live in a state. But... of course not. These are real socialists and internationalists. Social patriots are only all those **Greek Cypriot or Greek** leftists who fight so fervently for the withdrawal of the Turkish army and against partition, matters that are tasks specifically for Turkish and Turkish Cypriot revolutionaries.

Social patriots also do not want to know that Lenin believed that the duty of supporting the **right** of self-determination of oppressed nationalities lies **specifically with the revolutionaries of the nation that oppressed or oppresses or seeks to oppress** such nationalities, and they do not want to know what this position means. This can be seen from the fury with which Ch. Eliades denounces that we consider that the very “secession-creation of the “TRNC” is politically correct, and even in accordance with the Leninist conception of things”.

We are not arguing that the creation of the TRNC is “politically correct” or “politically incorrect”, nor that it “had to be done that way”. That is not the issue for us. We are only arguing that we, as **Greek Cypriot** revolutionaries, precisely because we are Greek Cypriots and not Turkish Cypriots or Turks, should resist the attempt of “**our**” ruling class to prevent Turkish Cypriots from having their own state. **Only** this. And it is very different from what Ch. Eliades attributes to us, having fallen victim to a not at all original foolishness. Are we going to “abuse” Lenin again?

75 Collected Works of Lenin volume 37 p. 108.

“When you accuse the supporters of the freedom of self-determination, that is, the freedom of separation, of encouraging separatist tendencies, you are doing exactly the same nonsense and the same hypocrisy as if you accused the supporters of the freedom of divorce of encouraging the break-up of family ties.”⁷⁶

WHERE HAVE THE LEFTIST SOCIAL PATRIOTS COME FROM?

For decades AKEL has been talking (and not only talking) about an alliance of the labor movement with the patriotic bourgeoisie that would help the alleged “national liberation struggle” of the Greek Cypriots. A nice slogan under which the equally unjust and expansionist national desires, aspirations and wishes of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, as well as their nationalist phobias -the “horror” of the “Turkification of the whole of Cyprus”- are hidden, which does not, however, recognize the Turkish Cypriots’ right to feel a corresponding horror and phobia either for the “Grecification” or for the “Greek-Cypriotization” of Cyprus.

The defeat in 1974 of the Greek Cypriot (and Greek) ruling class disappointed many left-wing petty bourgeois patriots. With petty bourgeois impatience they “punished” it and continue to “punish” it in their minds by describing it as “incompetent”, and now look forward to the working class to do the “national liberation” work of “our” “incompetent” bourgeois class. If the twists and turns of history show that not only is the Greek Cypriot working class not willing to do this, but also that the Greek Cypriot and Greek bourgeoisie are regaining lost ground and their own expansionism has some chance of defeating Turkish expansionism, then we will see most “left-wing” social patriots shed their socialist facade and appear clearly for what they really are - pure patriots.

This little article, of course, cannot serve as an answer to Ch. Eliades’ aphorisms and “self-evident” truths, nor to the tradition of social patriotism. In the last decades the vast majority of the politicized people in southern Cyprus, if they are not right-wing nationalists, are left-wing patriots, either of AKEL or dissidents

76 Lenin “Questions of National Policy” p. 15.

“from the left” like Ch. Eliades. It is difficult for those who dare to challenge such deeply rooted beliefs. To criticize all of them, to begin (yes, to begin only!) to bring back to light an old but very effectively distorted, “forgotten” politics buried by all, requires a fairly long analysis, such as the one we have done and that is primarily published in our book. There we show both what Lenin’s attitude was and how the social patriotic “Leninists” distort it. Of course, it would be an abuse of the hospitality of “Within Walls” to ask that it be republished in serial form, but if it is all right, we are happy to make it available for the reading audience of “Within Walls”.

Editorial Group “Workers’ Democracy”

Preliminary Note

The following text was published in two parts in issues 39-40 and 41 of the Cypriot magazine “Within the Walls”, which appeared in 1989. It is a continuation of the debate-confrontation between the group “Workers’ Democracy” and Ch. Eliades which developed through the pages of the magazine. A brief historical note of the confrontation can be found at the beginning of the previous Workers’ Democracy text included in this collection.

Workers' Democracy

The “Self-evident Truths” of Social Patriotism

The Greek Cypriot Far Left

PART A

On the occasion of an article by Ch. Eliades in the March 1988 issue of “Within the Walls” we wrote an article entitled “Another Greek Cypriot Social Patriot”. That is, yet another one who speaks in the name of socialism, but in practice is just a patriot. Since then, a reply was written by Ch. Eliades in two issues of the magazine, and a final article by Ch. Eliades, again in two issues.

Our purpose was never to enter into a discussion specifically with Ch. Eliades, but to take the opportunity through his articles to show the contradictions and the real essence of politics, not of Ch. Eliades, but of social patriotism. A policy that is not his “privilege” alone, but that of the traditional left as well as the majority of the rest of the left in south Cyprus.

The last few months have shown that the confrontation between us and them in our first article in “Within the Walls” (as well as in the rest of our writings) is not theoretical at all. In the circumstances that have arisen in the last year, the relationship between the position of each person in this political dispute and the attitude he or she holds in practice towards political events that cannot be ignored, has become clear.

In recent months there has been a general rise of militant nationalism, which was the reaction of the most extreme rejectionists

to Davos,⁷⁷ to the victory of the “compromising” Vassiliou,⁷⁸ and to the resumption of intercommunal dialogue.

We saw this strengthening of nationalism take shape with the various “anti-occupation” marches, the “walk home” marches, with the “militancy” of the students on the anniversary of the declaration of the TRNC, and with the racist events on the occasion of the marriage of of Alexia Chronia with a Turkish settler.⁷⁹

On the other hand, however, during the same period, some movement of support appeared for Y. Parpas, the conscientious objector against conscription, who went to jail for two months⁸⁰ because he declared that he did not want to participate in the National Guard exercises to fight the Turkish Cypriots, but wanted to fight for a sincere rapprochement. In the same period, the mobilization against the vote for the “Emergency Contribution for Defence”⁸¹ appeared, with an open picketing event in Eleftheria Square, and with an organized campaign in workplaces, distributing leaflets and collecting signatures.

In short, polarisation within Greek Cypriot society began to strengthen. At one “pole”, at one end, are the militant rejectionists.

77 Editor’s note: Refers to the “Davos Process”, a 1988 diplomatic meeting aimed at initiating a process of ‘reconciliation’ between Greece and Turkey.

78 Editor’s note: Refers to George Vassiliou, President of the Republic of Cyprus from 1988 to 1993, who supported the then United Nations initiative for a solution to the Cyprus problem based on the Ghali Set of Ideas.

79 Editor’s note: After 1974 and until the opening of the checkpoints in 2003, crossing between the two sides was only allowed on humanitarian and diplomatic grounds. In this context, a teenage Greek Cypriot girl who was allowed to cross and stay temporarily on the occupied side to visit her grandmother; fell in love with a young Turkish man and decided to stay. The event was systematically presented by the Greek Cypriot media of the period as a kidnapping, creating a general moral panic and politicizing the issue. These allegations were eventually refuted after a visit by UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus). The only support expressed towards the teenager seems to have come from the Limassolian anarchist milieu and from a small part of the extra-parliamentary left.

80 Editor’s note: In 1988 the conscientious objector Y. Parpas was imprisoned for refusing to take part in the military exercises of the National Guard, citing his ideological beliefs. In the same year, the “Committee of Support for Conscientious Objector Y. Parpas” was established, in which both Workers’ Democracy and people from the anarchist-antiauthoritarian milieu of Limassol participated.

81 Editor’s note: A tax that was first imposed in the 1980s to increase funding for the National Guard.

Mostly petty bourgeois chauvinists who are reorganizing and trying to revive some sort of EOKA, perhaps to create an EOKAC, which would prevent an agreed solution that would likely “sell out” their nationalist aspirations.

The other “pole”, the other extreme, is a tiny minority mobilising openly for the first time in workplaces. A minority that can become the fertile ground for the creation of a mass internationalist workers’ movement.

This polarisation is the characteristic of this period that makes it not only more necessary, but also gives more possibilities for internationalist intervention. That is why it puts much greater tasks on those who speak in the name of socialism, the working class and internationalism.

But the attitude that most of those on the far left took in this period of increased possibilities and tasks, shows that we were right when we gave in our first article about Ch. Eliades the title “Another Greek Cypriot Social Patriot”. Indeed, if nationalism is the characteristic of the right, this time it became apparent that the common characteristic of both the traditional and the extra-parliamentary left in southern Cyprus is social patriotism.

The Central Committee of the supposedly “compromising” and “rapprochement-supporting” AKEL unashamedly issued a statement “demanding the immediate and unconditional release of Alexia Chronia”. All the others showed that, despite their willingness to appear as a revolutionary left, their attitude towards the Greek Cypriot bourgeois army is not revolutionary at all. At best, they could not take a clear position towards it, and they hardly dared to touch the concrete issues raised by its existence. While we appealed to all the organizations or groupings of the extreme left to cooperate, both in the case of Pappas and in the case of the “emergency contribution for defence”, the only ones who seemed willing to contribute to the creation of an anti-militarist internationalist front were, from those who see themselves as Marxists, only us. The others were the anarchists of the “Initiative against social racism”.⁸²

82 Editor’s note: Anarchist group active in Limassol in the 1980s.

The attitude of the left towards the most basic foundation of bourgeois rule, the bourgeois army, is not a detail. And the characteristic of all of them, from Ch. Eliades, and the leftists who are rallying around the magazine “Within the Walls”, to the “Left Wing of EDEK”, is the attempt to avoid the issue, to avoid taking a specific position. The “Left Wing of EDEK” decided, for reasons only they can know, to write some slogans only after the Parliament passed the “emergency contribution for defence”.

WE “DISTORT LENIN” WITHOUT “ANALYSING THE PARTICULAR”

The attitude of all these towards our critique, since February 1988, when we published our book “THE CYPRUS PROBLEM and the Internationalist Tasks of Greek Cypriot Revolutionaries”, has several similarities. Either they say it verbally, so that they don’t have to justify it, or they write, like Ch. Eliades, that:

“Workers’ Democracy prefers to falsify these concepts through a generalizing, eclectic and anti-dialectical view of things. Comfortable with throwing quotes from Lenin, they think they have secured their ‘internationalist’ identity by ‘economizing’ on the need for analysis of the particular and settling for an unhistorical and flattening generalization.”

But just because Eliades puts it in writing doesn’t mean he is more honest or more responsible than the others. He has his own “trick” too. Thinking that he is covering himself behind the fact that he is “responding” to articles we wrote in “Within the Walls”, he pretends that they show our overall position, by magically vanishing all our other political writings. In this way he can claim that we are “economizing on the need to analyse the particular” and “settling for an unhistorical and flattening generalization”.

He pretends to ignore the book and even the magazine, to which we refer in both of our articles for an “analysis of the particular”. “Analysis of the particular”? What do they all think we are doing in 300 or more pages of the book? Are we writing the story of our lives?

We went to the trouble of writing a long book not because we are professional writers or historians or masochists, but because we knew that the various Eliades that abound in southern Cyprus would

try to use such arguments to counter an internationalist politics and critique which would show that they are just that... social patriots.

The historical “analysis of the particular” in this book takes up the whole first part of the book, over 140 pages, i.e. without the “economising”, of which Ch. Eliades and others accuse us of. There we do nothing but try to prove “concretely”, i.e. through references from historical studies, newspapers etc., through the facts, what the “particular” situation in Cyprus was and is. To show that until 1974 the Greek Cypriots were clearly the dominant ethnic group that was ethnically oppressing, according to all the criteria of ethnic oppression, the Turkish Cypriots. To show that after 1974 it is still promoting a policy just as aggressive as the one it was promoting when it was clearly in charge. To show that the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus is reactionary on both (and all four) sides. And thus to be able to draw conclusions about the (different) attitude that the revolutionaries on each side should have, especially the attitude that we as Greek Cypriot revolutionaries should have.

We could not, of course, do the same in a few pages of a magazine, even if we could ask a hosting magazine to devote most of their space to us. That is why we mainly referred to our previous writings, and not to “quote our publishing history” as Ch. Eliades attempts to accuse us of.

And he thinks the trick he has found is so effective that he keeps repeating it in his article:

“Workers’ Democracy is comfortable with throwing quotes from Lenin...with short quotes, completely disconnected from the rest of the body of the argument of the text taken, disconnected from the specific political and historical context, or from the specific object of the reference.”

However, apart from the 140 pages of our book dealing specifically with the Cypriot reality, we devote more than 30 pages to a presentation of the Bolshevik and Leninist tradition on national issues and war. There we have put not “short” but instead tediously long “quotes”, and even with reference to the “rest of the body” of Lenin’s writings.

If Eliades or anyone else wants to criticize us for not doing an analysis of the particular, for “throwing” and distorting “short”

quotes, then he has the basic obligation to take into account the rest of our texts, which are not short at all. Disagreeing with our positions is one thing, but criticizing “short” and “decontextualised” quotes is simply an attempt to avoid giving a substantive response to the content of our politics by lying.

But, where and how did he prove, even just with the quotes we used in our articles in “Within the Walls”, that we have a “generalizing, eclectic and anti-dialectical view of things” and that we are distorting Lenin? Nowhere, he just repeats it using the “loudest” adjectives, (even likening us to “Father Stalin”), to “scare” anyone who, despite all the circulated “wisdom” and Greek Cypriot patriotic “self-evident truths”, wonders if we are right. This forces us this time to write a longer article than the previous ones.

Ch. Eliades himself is a very good example of what he accuses us of. Let’s look at his “dialectical historical analysis” and how “particular” and appropriate the examples he uses are. Examples that are worth looking at because most of them are used by others.

THE “ANALYSIS OF THE PARTICULAR” OF CH. ELIADES

“analysis of the particular” 1: are we in the era of national wars and progressive capitalism?

“As for Marx and Engels, better to leave them alone. The scoundrels once dared to write in favour of Germany’s territorial integrity.”

That’s what Ch. Eliades wrote in his article. “Once” they did indeed support it. But many years have passed since then, and many changes have taken place, not only in Germany, but all over the world, including in Greece and Cyprus. The territorial integrity of Germany was absolutely tied to the need to pass from feudal fragmentation to a centralised bourgeois state in which capitalism, and with it its “gravedigger”, the working class, could develop. Ch. Eliades, citing this example from Marx, speaks as if there were in Cyprus (and in Greece, which is a fraternal ally of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie) problems similar to those of Germany in the era of progressive capitalism, of the transition from feudalism to capitalism and bourgeois democracy. If we are not in a similar situation, then the reference to the specific position of Marx and

Engels and its application to today's Cyprus does not fit. We will "abuse" Lenin again:

"Comparing the "continuation of the politics" of combating feudalism and absolutism -the politics of the bourgeoisie in its struggle for liberty- with the "continuation of the politics" of a decrepit, i.e., imperialist, bourgeoisie...means comparing chalk and cheese". (English Collected Works, volume 21, pages 220-221, "The Collapse of the Second International")

"analysis of the particular" 2: Cyprus is a "(semi)colonial country"

In fact, in order to get out of this contradiction, Ch. Eliades (and all other social patriots) replace the struggle between capitalism and feudalism with the struggle between colonialism, imperialism and national-liberationist bourgeois-democratic movements. Eliades writes:

"The term 'historical incompetence' does not refer to the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie alone, but to the bourgeoisie of colonial and semi-colonial countries in general."

That is, Cyprus of 1960-88 is considered a semi-colonial country of the "third world", a victim of imperialism. In reality, however, it is not a victim of imperialism, but imperialistic itself, even an aggressor. Paraskevaides, one of the largest construction companies in the world, and the other smaller Greek Cypriot companies that undertake projects in Arab countries, alongside the skilled and well-paid Greek Cypriot technicians, administrative staff, supervisors, etc., use a number of Pakistani, Indian and other "underdeveloped" people, employing them under the worst conditions and wages. If this is not imperialist behaviour, then what is it? KEMA,⁸³ which we were informed by Haravgi⁸⁴ after the elections that it is the largest centre of its kind in the Mediterranean, is yet another proof of how "historic" the "semi-colonial" character of Cyprus is, and how "incompetent" in the "national" sense its bourgeoisie are.

83 Editor's note: Refers to the "Middle East Research Centre" (KEMA), founded in 1962 by George Vassiliou, later President of the Republic of Cyprus, which maintained an important role in the field of research and advisory services on the markets of the Middle East and of Eastern Europe.

84 Editor's note: Refers to the newspaper "Haravgi", official newspaper of the "Progressive Party of Working People" (AKEL).

And Eliades and the others do not want to see that today's imperialism is a global system, a chain of more or less capitalistically developed countries which all take part in the exploitation of the global working class and the peoples of a number of underdeveloped countries. A chain which, alongside its large links, has small but equally imperialistic links. Two such links, tied to each other, are Greece and southern Cyprus, which are in no way inferior to their counterparts in Turkey and northern Cyprus.

The old "poor" Greece now has branches of its National Bank in other countries, one of which is in the racist Union of South Africa, to which it sells arms. Thus it participates in the occupation and oppression of the black population. The Greek state-owned war industry (EBO) has recently become famous with the Greek Irangate, i.e. the sale of arms to both Iran and Iraq during the war.⁸⁵

Another attractive notion for some leftists is that "Cyprus" is a victim not only of global imperialism and its "proxy" of Turkey but even of Greek imperialism. This has nothing to do with reality. When the Greek and Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie agree that "Cyprus" is the "outpost" of Hellenism, they mean it. The Cyprus problem is also part of the imperialist Greek-Turkish conflict.

But this is not a conflict over the sharing of colonies between two imperialist powers unrelated to the local population. In this Greek-Turkish conflict, "Cyprus" (i.e. its ruling classes, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie) is not only not the victim, but is complicit. It is characteristic that the terms 'Greek Cypriots' and 'Turkish Cypriots' are post-war, they appeared after 1974, (and have their own propaganda purpose for the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie, they want to support the position that "Turkey attacked an independent UN member state" etc.) Until 1974 they all referred only to "Turks of Cyprus" and "Greeks of Cyprus". Neither the "greeks of Cyprus" felt oppressed by Greece, nor the "turks of Cyprus" felt oppressed by Turkey. Otherwise they would not have

85 If anyone thinks that in order to be imperialist a country must necessarily be a great power, with heavy industry, fleets and colonies, let him look at what Lenin wrote mainly about "little" Switzerland in 1916, but even about Bulgaria of the same period in his article "Defence of Neutrality", in Greek Collected Works vol.30 pp. 336.

used these names for themselves. So the belated “Greek Cypriot” and “Turkish Cypriot” bourgeoisie were neither “dependent” nor “incapable” of resisting some “foreign” imperialist bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they saw and still see themselves as parts of the Greek and Turkish nations and, despite their occasional oppositions and even tendencies towards “autonomy”, they linked their fate to their respective “metropolises”. All the other classes of Cypriot society had the same attitude as them. The characteristic complaint of the Greek Cypriots is not the “external” encroachments by Greece, but that Greece “left them alone”, that it “betrayed” them.

Ch. Eliades, considering Cyprus as a “semi-colonial” country, insists that the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie is “incapable” of “realizing and completing both the right of self-determination of the Cypriot people as well as national independence” and the “national liberation aim”.

“Right of self-determination of the Cypriot people”? “National independence”? “National liberation aim”? These are fairy tales for small children, for “nationally” disillusioned petty bourgeois nationalists and social patriots. All that ended many years ago, almost three decades ago. The only problem of this small but imperialist “family”, of the “mother” Greek bourgeoisie and of the “Greek Cypriot daughter”, is that, at least for the time being, they have lost a piece of territory in their competition with their counterpart Turkish “family”, with imperialist Turkey.

This is inevitable in inter-imperialist conflicts. Someone wins, someone loses... But to describe the results of the Greek defeat in the last round as problems of national independence etc. is just embellishing one side of a very dirty conflict. Germany lost territory and experienced unprecedented destruction and misery in both WWI and WWII, but that does not negate the imperialist nature of its participation in both imperialist wars. Even Greece in 1922 experienced the greatest defeat in its modern history with thousands of dead, missing persons, population movements and over a million refugees. But this in no way detracts from the imperialist and unjust nature of its attack on Turkey, which was (and many years have passed since then) making its bourgeois-democratic revolution and fighting the battle against feudalism and imperialism.

Thus the refugees created by the conflict in Cyprus are also one of the barbaric (to use a word so beloved by Eliades, which he prefers to use only for the actions of the Turkish bourgeoisie) results of a barbaric bourgeois war. But barbaric, reactionary, imperialist, **on both sides.**

PART B

The “incompetent” Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie became self-sufficient very quickly after 1960. From 1964 onwards, the development of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie was such that it allowed it to take over the “neo-colonial” state of Zurich and turn it into its own independent centre of control of capitalist accumulation in the Cypriot region and a base for economic infiltration in the “underdeveloped” surrounding region, neutralising the “restrictions” imposed on it by the Turkish Cypriots and the Zurich agreements. Even the British bases that remained were never an obstacle to its development, on the contrary, they ensured “peace” and “tranquillity” in the same areas of the Middle East where it was also extending its small but imperialist hands to grab what it could.

What else was left to do to realize “national independence” so that Eliades and others would not consider it “incompetent”? The union of “all of Cyprus” with Greece? The forced “reunification” of Cyprus against the will of the Turkish Cypriots? Or being able to “look after” its own interests in the region with its own, “independent” bases and not with those of the British or with accommodations to the Americans?

However, the myth that it is “imperialist dependence that nurtured and created the conditions of intercommunal bloodshed, chauvinism and intolerance”, as Eliades writes, prevails. But no one has a convincing explanation why American and NATO imperialism would want to create a split in its south-eastern wing. Instead, this convenient patriotic insistence on blaming everything on “foreign” imperialism prevents them from seeing something much more fundamental. That ethnic conflicts like the one in Cyprus are the result of **capitalism**, of the factionalism and competition that

lies at the heart of the system itself at all levels, in all its individual parts, and appears wherever it finds the opportunity. The “foreign thumbs” may shape them in one way or another, but to believe that they are the ones causing them is at best patriotic naivety and complacency, if not racism in reverse (“WE wouldn’t have been fooled if we were left alone”).

“analysis of the particular” 3: Were the French colonialists in Algeria “cheap labour”?

Where Ch. Eliades gives a great example of how not to avoid “ahistorical generalisation” is by equating the Turkish settlers, the vast majority of whom are migrant workers, with the French colonialists in Algeria before 1962:

“But apart from the Cypriot “social patriots” and the Palestinians, the Algerian revolutionaries showed similar “racist” feelings towards the French settlers whose removal they sought and achieved with the independence of Algeria (1962). ... the French revolutionary workers’ organisations not only did not consider the removal of the French settlers as “barbarism” but considered their removal as an expression of the implementation of the principle of self-determination of the Algerian people!”

What relationship can French landowners, senior state officials, oil company executives and privileged French workers of colonial Algeria have with the Turkish “settlers” whom they all accuse of causing problems for Turkish Cypriots as “cheap labour”, working even below the legal minimum wage?

For the “Marxism” of Ch. Eliades, it is not the actual economic and social situation that determines the character of the Turkish settlers and separates them from the French in Algeria, and thus the attitude we should take towards them, but the common factor that they are both foreigners. And this seems to be the only thing that Ch. Eliades considers. Both the French colonialists and the Turkish settlers, after all, crossed the sea from the north to come here. Since it was progressive that the local Algerians sent the French northwards, it would be equally progressive for us to send the Turkish settlers to the same direction. The fact that Algerians were the “cheap labour” in Algeria is of no importance to Ch. Eliades.

To the extent that Ch. Eliades understands that this contradiction exists, he solves it by baptizing the Turks as “settlers”, instruments of Turkish imperialism, and gets rid of the issue. That the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie are trying to use the “settlers” for their own purposes (one of which is to use them as cheap labour) there is no doubt. God forbid if the only thing determining the Marxists’ attitude towards a section of the working class was the goals the bourgeoisie wants to serve by using this section, unless we are told that the “settlers” are organised fascists and cops posing as cheap labour. But then how do you explain that in Davlos the “Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish settlers living in the area” took on the big businessman Asil Nadir and his multinational company “Polly Peck” and clashed with the police to resist their plans to “develop” the area? (“NEA” 22/12/88). Such would be the attitude of the settlers if they were “instruments” of Denktas and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie?

After all, if the settlers and the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie want to use the settlers to serve the goal of demographic change that will further their reactionary national interests, their expulsion would serve the reactionary goal of violent demographic reversion that will serve the equally reactionary national interests of the Greek and Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie. What should determine our attitude is the economic and social reality, the class position of the settlers as one of the most oppressed sections of the working class in northern Cyprus. The solidarity between workers of different ethnicities is not a “Christian” feeling, as Ch. Eliades wants to describe it. It is the essence of workers’ internationalism.

“analysis of the particular” 4: The State of Israel is similar to the TRNC
 In this “specific analysis”, of course, Ch. Eliades has not been a pioneer at all. The hypocritical propagandistic exploitation of the Palestinian struggle by Greek Cypriot patriots is on the agenda, especially during the last year with the heroic “intifada”. The catchphrase of the campaign is “Cyprus Palestine common struggle”. And Eliades’ corresponding words are:

*“It would be extremely interesting if Workers’ Democracy could enlighten us as to whether **by the same reasoning** it*

recognizes the right of the Zionist state of Israel (1947) to exist, which under the pretext of securing the democratic rights of the Jewish people.... placed the whole of Palestine under Zionist occupation."

Of course we are on the side of the Palestinians and against the existence of the Zionist state of Israel. But here in Cyprus, who were the real Palestinians? Only the Turkish Cypriots had in Cyprus slums like the ones we see on TV, where the Palestinians live. And as for sieges of camps, levelling and demolitions, does anyone remember what happened from 1963 to 1967 in Cyprus? What happened in Omorfita in 1963? In Kofinou in 1967, about the events of which even Papandreou said:

*"It was indeed a great provocation to Turkey. There were also **slaughters and looting**" (Speech of Papandreou in the Parliament on the "opening of the Cyprus file" 21/2/86).*

Nobody remembers? If we all do not accept the "right" of the Israelis to oppress the Palestinians and recognize the latter's right to self-determination, then why not recognize the right of self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots? Because they do not have, as Ch. Eliades writes, a "compact national-geographical" space? It may not be "historical", but this is something that might be of concern to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalists, not Marxists.

But Eliades, along with all the other social patriots or mere patriots, parties, the church, etc., has an "irrefutable" argument: "We don't accept the finality of violence". As he puts it:

"[T]his state (TRNC) has now materialized under specific conditions of barbarism and is the product of the displacement of the indigenous inhabitants, of military occupation and of mass colonization."

And he thinks he has settled the issue so well that he asks us to quote him "even one (only one) specific Leninist quote stating that the right to create a state implies the seizure and occupation of the territories of others, the displacement of the legitimate indigenous inhabitants of those territories..." etc. Of course Lenin didn't write such bullshit, just as we never said that the Turkish invasion was "necessary" or "justified". It's just that Eliades, as a patriot, believes that anyone who is not with him is a friend of his enemy.

We had answered all this long before Eliades put this “irrefutable” challenge to us. In the relevant section of the book “The Cyprus problem” we wrote:

Before 1974 the populations were indeed mixed and there was of course no way the Greek Cypriot revolutionaries could ask for separation of populations as a solution to the problem of the ethnic oppression of Turkish Cypriots. However, they could and should have fought against the ethnic oppression of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie within the state that existed at the time, and to uphold their basic democratic rights....

But all this ceased to apply after 1974. There are no more mixed populations in Cyprus. But the hypocritical response of the bourgeoisie to this is the “fait accompli of the invasion” and the “human rights” of the refugees in Cyprus.

That is, they say that the populations are no longer mixed because of **the violence of war** and that this “fait accompli” must and can be changed. What is our response to this argument?

First, it’s good to remember that refugees and the separation of populations as “the fait accompli of violence” existed before 1974, and the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie and politicians who are nowadays busting their asses over the “fait accompli of violence” achieved by their enemy, were responsible for it then.

Second, what should be the attitude of revolutionaries towards the various “fait accompli” for which **the working class is not responsible?** The Marxist tradition treats the results of historical processes without moralising; and independently of the aims and intentions of those who made them. What is of interest is what the new situation that has taken shape is and what it leads or can lead to.

*“The bourgeoisie makes it its business to promote trusts, drive women and children into the factories, subject them to corruption and suffering, condemn them to extreme poverty. **We do not “demand”** such development, **we do not “support”** it. We fight it. But how do we fight? We explain that trusts and the employment of women in industry are progressive. We do not want a return to the handicraft sys-*

tem, pre-monopoly capitalism, domestic drudgery for women. Forward through the trusts, etc., and beyond them to socialism! (Lenin, English Collected Works, vol. 23 p. 81)."

*"England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was **actuated only by the vilest interests**, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. (K. Marx "The British Rule in India" from "Marx Surveys from Exile", Pelican, p. 306)."*

*"All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, dependant not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. **Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?**" (K. Marx: *The Future Results of the British Rule in India, Ibid, p. 323*).*

So the fact that the situation after 1974 was shaped by the "force of arms", that it is a "fait accompli of the invasion", does not mean that we have any duty to support "our" bourgeoisie to return to the period of Greek Cypriot rule and the racist oppression of Turkish Cypriots, to persecute settlers and the like. The fact that the current situation is the result of the "fait accompli" cannot be decisive for the revolutionaries. After all, the vast majority of the world's current borders are the result, in one way or another, of some "acts of violence", sometimes distant in time and sometimes quite recent...

Separation is now an event which the revolutionaries and workers neither wished for nor have any responsibility for; it is a **reality**, a "fait accompli" created by capitalism by force and with terrible consequences for the workers and peasants, such as the change by British colonialism of Indian society by force and so much more.

The revolutionaries, unlike the hypocritical bourgeoisie, “recognise the fait accompli”, i.e. the present reality, and are looking for how to move forward, starting from this reality.

The entrenchment of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers in a separate region is by now an indisputable fact. The integration of the refugees in the South, i.e. their transformation into proletarians, petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie is also a fact; today there are no refugees as a separate social category. It would of course have been our duty, before these things happened, to fight against the war and its results, the barbaric population movements from 1963 to 1974 that both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie are responsible for, but it was never our duty to fight against the migration of Turks from Turkey to Cyprus in order to preserve the “Greekness of Cyprus”. Now, however, our duty is to fight to move forward starting from what presently exists: the geographical separation, the “sympathies” and will of the Turkish Cypriots, and the settlement of poor settlers from Turkey in the North. (“THE CYPRUS PROBLEM and the Internationalist Tasks of Greek Cypriot Revolutionaries” pp. 178-181.)

There are, of course, the refugees, for whom Ch. Eliades and all the others are so concerned about, while their stomachs turn upside down if one shows the same sensitivity and concern for the impoverished Turkish migrant workers who make up the majority of the settlers. There is a way to address the problem here too without being either insensitive or a hypocritical nationalist. Here is what we wrote in “The Cyprus Problem”:

...it does not mean that the demands of the poor refugees who lost the home they worked for and were deprived of are unjust or hypocritical. So how do the revolutionaries deal with the refugee problem? Refugees are not a single social stratum. They range from the big bourgeois refugees like the Catsellis and the Lordos families with the hotels and businesses they lost and “miraculously” regained in the South, to the poor working class and peasant who lost everything they had and regained nothing.

To the former, one can only say “well, you deserve it and worse things may come your way, only we would prefer that

next time it should be the working class and not the Turkish army that will take them from you”.

But what do we say to the poor working class refugees? First we have to explain how and why Turkish expansionism is **only half responsible** for the war. The other half is the responsibility of “our” ruling class, those who oppressed the Turkish Cypriots for so many years. The same ones who are now taking from our salaries for military spending so they can do the same thing again if they can.

And then, we have to say that **it is not possible now** to support their right of return without inevitably supporting the aggressive plans of “our” bourgeoisie, and forgetting the rights of other workers, of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers. Anyone who argues that in the current situation we can avoid this is politically naive to say the least.

But we must fight against “our” bourgeoisie for their remaining rights **as workers and as refugees**. That is, the right to work, which is constantly denied them by Greek Cypriot capitalism, and the right to receive from the state housing and compensation for what they have lost. It is our duty to fight against “our” bourgeoisie and the aggression of “our” government and this cannot be done today by supporting this aggression in any way, even if it is covered behind the slogan of “defending human rights” and the return of the refugees (Ibid p.183).

Our slogan should therefore be “houses for refugees” and not “all refugees in their houses”.

And the question that we asked from our first article in this magazine is still unanswered. Is there any progressive and non-“barbaric” way to undo the “fait accompli” of 1974, to remove the settlers and return all refugees to their homes? The only way to get the settlers out is by forcibly moving an entire population. This will be done either by a “victorious” Greek army, or even, after an agreement, by the Turkish army. If one thinks that a victorious proletariat can do the same in a progressive way, then one has a completely different conception of proletarian democracy and socialist revolution from that of the Marxist tradition.

A PLAIN CHAUVINIST

It is not surprising that the outcome of Ch. Eliades' politics is the justification of a "national liberation" war, joining his voice with other chauvinists:

*"Workers' Democracy reduces the substance of the matter more or less to a level of discussion about the ability or not of the Greek Cypriot ruling class to achieve a **victorious military confrontation** with the Turkish occupation army.*

*At the outset, we should note that freedom from Turkish military occupation is the **absolute right** of the entire Cypriot people, without excluding **any means**."*

Are we wrong when it seems to us that when Ch. Eliades "notes" that war is "the absolute right of the entire Cypriot people" inevitably includes among those who have this "right" the Greek Cypriot ruling class? Are we wrong to understand from this that if in the future the Greek Cypriot ruling class declares war, Ch. Eliades will support this war?

This is of course his "absolute right", but he cannot call it a Marxist position.

Lenin, in one of the most famous and intense cases of national oppression, that of Poland, which was under the subjugation of Tsarist Russia, made it clear whose "absolute" duty it was to fight for Poland's right to self-determination and whose it was not:

*"In **no** nation does **hatred of Russia sit so deep** as with the Poles; no nation dislikes Russia so intensely as the Poles... The Polish Social-Democratic comrades have rendered a great historic service by advancing the slogan of internationalism and declaring that the fraternal union of the proletariat of all countries is of supreme importance to them and that they will never go to war for the liberation of Poland. This is to their credit, and this is why we have always regarded only these Polish Social-Democrats as socialists. The others are patriots..."*

Why should we Great Russians... deny the right to secession for Poland? ... But people don't want to understand that to strengthen internationalism you do not have to repeat the same words. What you have to do is to stress, in Russia, the freedom of

secession for oppressed nations and, in Poland, their freedom to unite.” (Lenin, English Collected Works, Vol. 24 p.298).

INTERNATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

“In the age of imperialist decline....” writes Ch. Eliades “the realization of democratic national goals (self-determination, national independence) now falls on the shoulders of the working class”. This is not only the position of Ch. Eliades. It is the meeting point of almost all tendencies of the Greek Cypriot far left. We must cooperate with the bourgeoisie as long as the “national question” exists, says AKEL. The bourgeoisie is “incompetent”, so it is time for socialism, replies the far left, only the working class can “solve” the “national question”.

And so they think they prove that AKEL is reformist and they are revolutionaries. It seems completely self-evident to all of them, traditional leftists and far leftists, that [missing part of the text, probably was: a national liberation] struggle is needed and all the rest. They can’t even get past their social patriotic thinking that it is possible to question this. That is why it seems equally self-evident to them that the only problem is.... whether or not some part of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie can defeat the Turkish army and neutralize the (equally “self-evident”) anti-Hellenic (or “anti-Cypriot”) intentions of America and Western imperialism.

The only thing that this proves is that they are social patriotic supporters of class cooperation at least until now.

This is because in today’s southern Cyprus there is no question either of “solving” any “national problem” or of conducting any “national liberation struggle”, either with class cooperation or with socialist revolution.

The aim of the revolutionaries is indeed the socialist revolution, the seizure of power by the working class both here and internationally. But not to solve with it some non-existent “national question” here in Cyprus.

So what is the relation of the socialist revolution to the Cyprus problem, i.e. the reactionary and unjust conflict between the Greek and Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie on the one hand and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie on the other?

There is a direct connection. A clear internationalist stance by revolutionaries will contribute to the workers on each side ceasing to see the people of the other side as their enemies and thus to see “their” bourgeoisie as allies. In other words, it is necessary both for the class unity of the Greek, Turkish, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot workers and for breaking the class collaboration of each side with “their” bourgeoisie.

A clear internationalist stance is still necessary to enable the workers of all sides to make a victorious socialist revolution. Something that cannot be done unless the working class is trained in democracy, not bourgeois democracy, but socialist, internationalist democracy:

*“Capitalism and imperialism can be overthrown only by economic revolution. They cannot be overthrown by democratic transformations, even the most “ideal”. **But a proletariat not schooled in the struggle for democracy is incapable of performing an economic revolution...***

...Through utilisation of bourgeois democracy to socialist and consistently democratic organisation of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and against opportunism. There is no other path... We must direct free secession and free merging of nations along that path, not be afraid of them...” (Lenin, English Collected Works, Vol, 23, p, 25, 27).

If we see that the “emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself” (Marx), then we must also see the importance of the education of the working class in democracy. Socialism means democratic self-organisation and self-management of the masses, freedom for the workers and the oppressed. If the working class does not **learn** to be the most consistent supporter and protector of the rights of **all** the oppressed sections of society, be they women, homosexuals, whores, or even oppressed religious minorities and other marginalized social strata, then... it will not be able to take power, nor, if it does, will it be able to build a new liberated society. And what applies to other democratic issues also applies to the attitude towards ethnic conflicts.

How can **Greek Cypriot** workers and revolutionaries maintain a consistent (and not **hypocritical**) democratic stance on the Cyprus

problem in the present period? Only by supporting the democratic right of the Turkish Cypriots to have their own state, if they want it. In the current period, socialist internationalist democracy demands from the workers of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey neutrality, abstention from the imperialist in-fighting as to whether the Greek and Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie will control the whole of Cyprus, or share this control with the Turkish gang.

But that's not enough. In the present period, democracy always requires (and this is the most important thing) the active reaction to the OFFENSIVE ACTIONS of "our" bourgeoisie, which aims to impose its own interests on the Turkish Cypriots by force. Not only at the military level but also at the economic, political and even cultural level. This means in practice, for the Greek Cypriot and Greek working class, supporting the Turkish Cypriots' right to self-determination against "our" bourgeoisie which denies it to them.

And democracy and internationalism still demand from the working classes of Greece and southern Cyprus to **consciously** leave the task of practically confronting the Turkish army, and Turkish aggression in general, to those who have the obligation and duty to confront them. To the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot comrades and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot working class, for whom in turn this is the only way to educate themselves in internationalist and socialist democracy.

This is the only correct attitude towards the real danger of war. The problem for workers **is not** the risk of a Turkish attack, against which we need "defence". It is the danger of another war, for which both sides will be equally responsible, as they were in the previous ones.

The only thing that can really reduce the risks of new wars is to re-engage and restore trust between the workers of the two hostile sides. It is the only thing that can make any bourgeoisie more reluctant to start a war in which it is not sure that it will have its working class on its side.

Proclamations of workers' rapprochement that are not accompanied by a workers' struggle against the military armaments of "their" government cannot be considered sincere by workers on the other side. When Turkish Cypriot and Turkish workers see

us supporting our government and military armaments, they are easily convinced that all Greek Cypriots are their enemies and that Denktaş and Özal are their allies. Do similar feelings not prevail among the workers on “our” side?

THEY DO NOT WANT TO SEE

The problem with Ch. Eliades, as with others like him, is not that they cannot see and understand what is really happening in southern Cyprus. They just **don’t want** to understand and they won’t understand, because it doesn’t suit their nationalism.

Today the Greek Cypriot and Greek bourgeoisie dominate, as well as their social patriotic fellow travellers of the traditional left. Alongside them, there are those who do not cooperate (in words only) with “our” bourgeoisie because they consider it “incompetent”, because they want even more extreme measures than those it can implement today. Those of us who see the hypocrisy of all this can and must move on to discussion and joint action. The committee for the defence of conscientious objector Y. Parpas, who is being retried on 18 January, continues to provide this opportunity.

The nationalist “self-evident” and “self-explanatory” truths of Ch. Eliades are the same as those of almost the entire Greek Cypriot society. They express the current dominance of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology and nationalism. It is for this reason, and not because of their theoretical or logical strength, that they are very difficult to deal with.

But it is not impossible. At least the lowest strata of workers and youth are not as steeped in it, as anyone who has joined us outside the factories to campaign against the re-vote on the “emergency contribution for defence” could see. These “self-evident truths” need to be addressed, not just in theory but also in practice.

PUBLISHING GROUP “WORKERS’ DEMOCRACY”

Preliminary Note

The following text was published in 1993 in the tenth issue of the Cypriot anarchist magazine “Train in the City” in Limassol and was signed with the pseudonym “Marios Trotsky”. It was originally written as a commentary in connection with the 1993 presidential elections, where the political debate centered on supporting or opposing the “Ghali Set of Ideas”, a UN draft aimed at restarting talks for a resolution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bicomunal bizonal federation. The elections were won by the leader of the Democratic Rally (DISY), Glafkos Clerides, based on a campaign against the Ghali Set of Ideas, which were supported by his main rival and then president, George Vassiliou. The text is perhaps the most widely circulated Cypriot anarchist text of the 1990s. It is referenced in the 2010 text of the political group “Falies”, as well as the 2016 pamphlet “Oh Yes! Federation!”, of the anti-authoritarian group “Syspirosi Atakton” (both texts are included in this collection). It was also republished in 2017 in the tenth issue of the magazine “Entropy”, published by Syspirosi Atakton.

Marios Trotsky

Federation or Death

because even if federation did not exist
we would have had to invent it

Note: This text was written in the electoral period, but remains relevant in an era when the “district fellowships” of the political parties insist on ignoring the 70-80% of Cypriots who voted for federation in the first Sunday of the elections.

It is a fact that cannot be questioned, that every time we approach some form of resolution to the Cyprus Dispute, or when (even) some signs of a solution become -as we are accustomed to say- visible in the horizon, all sorts of “fronts” make their appearance, whether they are called “ethnic” or of “national salvation”, their aim being to destroy any hopes of co-understanding and co-habitation in this country. And unfortunately for all of us, they usually succeed. The situation in which we find ourselves today, is unfortunately also their success. All those who wave the banners of nationalism and hate -from both sides- have managed in just two decades to divide the island and to bring us in a situation where a possible war with all the known consequences (of which we know who is affected each time; and of course, since 1974), lingers threateningly over our heads.

Today, through specific procedures -procedures which we do not necessarily agree with- we again find ourselves in front of the possibility of a coming solution. A solution that is this time based on federation. And as it was more or less expected, a new front of “national salvation” is making its appearance. A front that in fact openly declares that its only goal is blocking the signing of

this possible solution. This front, with an admittedly mysterious composition, as it begins from the EDEK and DIKO⁸⁶ parties and concludes, through the archbishopric, with ex-members of EOKA B, holds, depending on the case, Enosist fantasies, but above all, fantasies that have to do with the pre-74 situation, when we literally had total Greek Cypriot domination, with the Turkish Cypriots in the role of the supporting actor squeezed in a corner -the enclaves-paying in poverty and misery for the whole situation. This front also has, whether it wants to or not, whether it admits it or not, the love of Denktaş and his clique, as they also -for their own reasons of course- do not want a federation.

This is why, by trisecting a hair, they try to convince us with national cries and unfounded arguments that in front of us we do not have a solution based on federation, but one based on co-federation and for this or that reason it will not work, but after all you know we do not want it to work, and after all it would be better to leave things the way they are until we find the opportunity to get the upper hand again and you never know, it may happen, everything can happen in this world, in time and in years [this is satirical reference to the hardly translatable Greek nationalist phrase, “πάλι με χρόνια με καιρούς πάλι δικά μας θα ’ναι”, roughly translating to “in time and years they will be ours again”]...

For many, even among the supporters of federation, the pre-74 situation, with the island supposedly unified, is a desirable arrangement, that is, an ideal, and if they stand in support for federation, it is because they recognize that a return to that arrangement is now impossible. This approach is completely mistaken. We have to finally understand that there exists on this island another community which wants to; and has the right to live, and that a return to the pre-74 arrangement is not only unattainable but also undesirable and catastrophic, because it would again lead, in a short period of time, to clashes, destruction and death. This is why we have to comprehend, beyond the fantasies of “national completion” and

86 Editor’s note: It refers to the Democratic Party (DIKO), a centrist party founded in 1976 by Spyros Kyprianou, later President of the Republic of Cyprus from 1977 to 1988.

other such nonsense, federation as not a solution out of necessity, but as an ideal solution. The faster we understand this, the better.

It would of course had been a desirable project if a real federation, in a free society of free individuals, could exist. This would mean the decentralization of power and the self-rule of the different communities (not merely the ethnic ones). This possibility has been destroyed (for the time being) by the very logic which creates today the fronts of “national salvation”. The only realistic adaptation, or even approach towards this desirable goal today, is bi-communal federation, where the “national enemies” who created the nationalists, will be able to at least co-exist together and rule themselves. There is always of course the possibility of failure. But this attempt is the risk we have to take if we do not want to live constantly as captives of the fantasies and the thirst for power of the nationalists. Federation (even in bi-communal form) is the only way for the reunification of society and the formation of possibilities for a real interaction between the two communities, and the challenging of the powers which oppress them through their claims of protection from the national enemies.

In a more practical and direct level -particularly in an era when nuclear weapons will soon be sold, as it seems, at convenience stores; and an era when those who happen to have the same surname go to war demanding secession- federation is an answer to the mania of armament supplies and the possibility of war: because no war ever solved any problem, because despite all the “heroic” ravings of the general secretary of EDEK in parliament, war means nothing more than dead, amputated, disabled and missing people, because war means hunger, cold and misery and finally because war means unprecedented and unrecoverable ecological catastrophe! (this is a gift to the “nationalist ecologists” -the only ones around the globe- of Greece and Cyprus).

Federation is therefore an imperative necessity for a number of reasons but also for life, laughter and eroticism. It is the need to feel all people as fellow humans without dividing them into Greeks and Turks, compatriots and barbarians and Europeans and Orientals.

Federation is a necessity because there is no other prospect for the inhabitants of this island, if they want to create a future

as peaceful and happy as possible, in these hard times we live in. Even if federation did not exist anywhere in the world, we would have had to invent it. In fact we are late, very late, we should had invented it long before 1974. What happened, happened though. At least let us not destroy this prospect by being fixated on emotions and driven by nationalist slogans. Because the issue is not which nationalism and which community will triumph and dominate, but if we are all going to survive by the end.

Marios Trotsky

Preliminary Note

The following text was published in 2002/3, at a time when the possibility of a solution to the Cyprus Problem based on the Annan plan was emerging. The Cypriot Anarchist Kernel rejected the plan, arguing that from an anarchist perspective, accepting or rejecting a plan proposed by the political elites was a false dilemma. The text was found in a collection of anti-authoritarian texts on Cyprus, published in 2004 in Athens by the Greek political group “Initiative B12”.

Cypriot Anarchist Kernel

In Relation to the Annan Plan

We are spectators to the same play once again. The solution, negotiations, the prospect of a Cyprus Problem resolution and finally the collapse. For most people who live close to the events, there is no surprise. They are now so tired of the levelling of everything in Cyprus due to its political problem that everyone feels powerless to react outside the sphere of their own self-interest.

The new fruit this time has been called the “Annan plan”, taken from the name of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the authoritarian puppet of the globalized murderers. There is no longer the slightest doubt about where the text of the plan which was given to the leaders of the two states in Cyprus, “pseudo” or not, has been drafted.

Starting from our own view that any project originating in authoritarian-statist perspectives does not aim, of course, for the liberating potentiality of society, but for the preservation of the institutions of power with ever greater control and repression, with the ultimate aim of the complete subordination of the whole of society to the dictates of state and capital, we should not even enter into dilemmas of acceptance or rejection of the plan.

With the above statement we would not like to imply that anarchists are also aligned with the nationalist(!) hysteria of recent times when people, until recently indifferent to everything that happens around them (from the suffocating policing in the streets to the ongoing massacres in Palestine) suddenly transformed into fanatical supporters of “human rights” and “international law”

demanding respect for human values such as freedom, respect and solidarity.

Misery, selfishness and hypocrisy from individuals who don't even know that millions of people have died from the war and the embargo in Iraq, that human bodies were and are being mutilated in wars of power that are still going on, that many people die every day from hunger, diseases, inhumane working conditions... The creation of even white room torture prison cells in their fucking Greece is a "detail" that is not even worth complaining about. Celebrate and praise the political ridiculousness of Cyprus and Greece for joining the "European Union" and when you have woken up and see that the real problems are still here then maybe you will realize that freedom is a word that is easy to pronounce but very difficult to obtain.

As for the notorious "Annan plan", we as anarchists, without having clairvoyant abilities, know very well that whatever plan is signed will be imposed from above based on the interests of the so-called new world order and the local bosses. The argument that the people will decide through a referendum is the same as saying that through elections we decide our lives and our future, forgetting the power of the manipulative mechanisms of state and power, where the construction of consciences has now become a science. Recently, a journalist in a political television program on the Cyprus issue pointed out to his guests that "we have to be careful what we say as we create public opinion"! Another typical example of propaganda by the media of mass deception occurred during the first day of the debate of the new plan by the National Council of Cyprus, when a TV channel that disagrees with the plan spoke of a "dynamic" protest outside the presidential building, apparently referring to the five or six people standing on the edge of the pavement holding their placards!!!

The prospect of the two communities living and fighting together was naturally worrying and infuriating for the national fascists on both sides, who are trying by every means to regroup their lost forces, first of all by doing the obvious. They are targeting people's subconscious, trying to awaken selective memories of massacres, expulsions and unrest, creating a climate of fear at the prospect of

any “solution” to the Cyprus Problem. And this is not so difficult when one considers how consciences are formed through the educational system, where the teaching of hatred and the mythologizing of abstract concepts such as the nation and racial superiority has not ceased to exist.

In this period, with a solution or with no solution, it is the duty of each and every one of us to fight in every way and by every means against nationalism in any of its forms and to develop stronger bonds of solidarity with those active in the struggle on the “other” side.

What difference can it make whether the identity card of the judge who tries me or the cop who follows me, who beats me, who arrests me, states that he is a Greek Cypriot or a Turkish Cypriot? What difference can it make if the boss who exploits me in the forced eight hours of boredom, while he enjoys more and more profits, is called Vasilis or Hassan? The anarchists will never stop saying it: “NATIONAL UNITY IS A TRAP, OPPRESSION HAS NO COUNTRY.”

To deal in detail with the Annan plan means that we will be entering into authoritarian logic, because it is at least contradictory to struggle, with all the consequences that this implies, towards a true possibility of social liberation and to be trapped in dilemmas of having, or not having, a co-presidency!!! This is ridiculousness for anyone who knows that whoever is at the top of the construct called the state knows his job very well, and if not, others will make sure to teach him very quickly. Yes, the Annan plan may be racist, unjust, problematic, but anyone who cannot see that our modern “democracies” are exactly the same thing is willingly staying blind to the facts. On this particular issue anyone who is interested in knowing why, they can ask the Filipinos, Sri Lankans and every impoverished migrant working on the island, and they might just be able to find out.

The petty bourgeois logic of despising whatever the word settler may mean, a monstrosity in most people’s minds, not that they are human beings and certainly worse off than us, it seems at least funny compared to the other “legal” colonization that is taking place in droves in the “free” part of the island by Englishmen, Rus-

sians and anyone who can afford to buy the “dream” that translates into a mansion in Paphos or Limassol.

But hasn’t the ideology of nationalism, the separation of people on the basis of color, language and race always been the means and one of the causes of the perpetuation of authoritarian institutions and the disorientation of society from its real problems?

How are we to interpret the fact that we had no reaction either from the state or from the “super patriots”, to the fact that the British bases are not only not mentioned anywhere in the “plan”, but also by agreement between Cyprus and the European Union, they will remain sovereign and free to continue their “social work”?

That is, we have on the one hand the bases that have been proven to murder, extort, and destroy, and no one protests beyond symbolic and knee-jerk actions and we are out to throw into the sea some of our fellow human beings, who are, like chess pieces, also the victims of a specific change that has essentially to do with authoritarian planning (demographic change). What else but hypocrisy and the search for “easy solutions” can this tactic be called?

We have pointed out above that whether or not what they call the Cyprus problem is “solved” will depend on the geopolitical and strategic interests of the world bosses, where control in the Middle East, an imminent attack on Iraq, as well as control of various energy sources, seem to determine the “fate” of the people who live in the geographical area of Cyprus.

But while these facts exist, the priorities of the island’s political power seem to be different, no matter how much they try to convince us otherwise. What they are trying to conceal so strongly and so artfully, and this will probably become more apparent after the Copenhagen “excitement”, is the “fear” on the part of the opposition that in a possible “solution” to the Cyprus problem the February presidential elections will be postponed and thus they will lose a certain, as things look at least so far, victory; and the conquest of the presidential chair. On the other hand -and this also explains the positive attitude of the otherwise “conservative” right-wing Clerides government to the Annan plan- is the government “entourage”, which is trying to “grab” the opportunity to stay in power for another three years, since this is provided for in the plan,

that is why any concessions would be for them a compensation for this unexpected “gift” in conditions of such low popularity, where social explosions follow one another, with the main one being the agricultural problem that has started to take “dangerous” dimensions for the state. This reality, which proves for the umpteenth time the wretchedness and the real aims of all those who constantly play with our lives and fates, should finally awaken the consciences of all of us, giving them the answers they deserve every day. And these are neither “protest” votes, nor symbolic demonstrations that merely reinforce the statist propaganda of “freedom of speech”, but a real and unrestrained struggle where real forms of freedom and life will emerge.

As for how we see a real solution to the Cyprus problem, we will borrow an excerpt from a pamphlet published in 1985 by Cypriot anarchists called “CYPRUS: THE NATIONAL ISSUE AND THE ANARCHISTS”⁸⁷ (which can be sent to anyone who requests it) where the following is noted:

“Of course, there will be criticisms of the style “so you don’t have anything to suggest?”. Not exactly. We simply refuse to give “solutions” in the style of a magic formula. We have to get over the logic and insecurities of leftism at some point and especially the insecurity that we are the enlightened vanguard that has readymade answers for all problems... The time for grand and beautiful answers is over. The only way we can begin to propose something alternative is through radical action...”.

ONLY SOLUTION IS BICOMMUNAL REVOLUTION

87 Editor’s note: The pamphlet was published in 1985 in Limassol and repeated the main conclusions of the 1984 pamphlet “Cyprus, the National Issue and Nationalism: a Libertarian Analysis”. It can be found at the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org).

Preliminary Note

The following text was written by the libertarian group “Falies” in 2010 in Nicosia, in the context of a new cycle of negotiations for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem and the new dynamic created for joint political action between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots after the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. It focuses on analyzing the Cyprus Problem from a libertarian perspective. It was released both in the form of a printed leaflet and online.

Falies

5 Positions on the Reunification Process

or For the Right to Live in Cyprus Without the Cyprus Problem

1 The Cyprus problem may be an issue of and for the bourgeoisie, but it spills over onto the entire Cypriot society. Therefore, it also concerns the libertarian⁸⁸/radical community. It is the historical outcome of the clash of the two nationalisms on the island as they were shaped during the colonial era, and of the imperialist interventions that instigated and shaped it. EOKA and TMT, and their evolution, were in fact two sides of the same coin; that of ethnic segregation and the dialectic of intolerance. The partitionist status quo which was imposed through the military interventions of both the Greek and Turkish states between 1963 and 1974 constitutes above all a consolidation of the irrationality of ethnic conflict on the island, and the entrapment of Cypriot history in ethnic antagonism. At the same time, it functions as a means of submission of our society to the authoritarian nationalist imperative on both sides of the green line, and as a permanent source of potential threat for a wider military conflict. We believe that solving the Cyprus problem and reunifying the country is a dire need and an immediate priority.

88 We use the term “libertarian” here as it was developed by the Spanish anarcho-syndicalists (*comunismo libertario*), denoting non-hierarchy and non-centralization in organization and not as it is currently used by American right-wing and neo-liberal groups, denoting fully fledged free market capitalism. Freedom for us is a positive and not a negative term. We aim to construct freedom through the creation of alternative institutions, not be left with freedom after the regulatory role of the state is abolished.

2 As a libertarian/radical group we are opposed to the concept of the state, the border, the boundaries and the carving up of the geographic and social space by imposed structures. As far as the state-formation to be implemented, the form of the solution concerns us to the degree that this affects the processes and mobilizations of the movement in the two communities. Under this light, a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation will allow the reunification of the geographic and social space. Those who oppose reunification question the adequacy, the functionality and even the justness of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, as it was agreed in 1977-1979 and reconfirmed in 2006-2008. The usual response of reunification arguments, whether leftist/socialist or liberal, is that federation is a necessary evil, the price to pay for peace, or the only realistic solution under the circumstances. However, the anti-authoritarian community had already pointed out since 1993 that “federation is not and should not be a solution of necessity, but the ideal solution” (Train in the City magazine, Issue 10 – Even if there was no federation we should have invented it).⁸⁹ We still stand by this position today. Bi-communality and bi-zonality reflect the historical clash of the nationalized identities of the two ethnic communities, while creating the framework to overcome it. This is because on one hand it doesn’t ignore the constructed ethnic identities, allowing for their preservation, while at the same time creating a federal Cypriot political space that is not exclusively defined by either of the two unidimensional nationalisms. Because it creates the conditions for both the autonomy of the two communities and their common activity. Because it constitutes the framework within which the Greek-centered, the Turkish-centered, and those with no regard for the nation, may coexist. The Greek-Cypriot anti-federal discourse today uses “leftist” arguments against “communalism”, which will allegedly “divide” the new unified state, reaching the point of calling bi-communality and bi-zonality “racism”. We believe that racism is the status quo of the (Greek-)Cypriot Republic and

89 Similar positions were expressed even before, in the 1980s, but it was in the conjuncture of 1993 that the question of also the form of the solution was articulated so clearly.

the TRNC.⁹⁰ The supposedly non-national form of a unitary state is deeply national and based on the current demographic power of the g/c community. The depoliticization of ethnicity is not going to come by decree (especially a unilateral one of the g/c!) and it definitely cannot be achieved in the current conditions of political and military conflict. A possible abolition of bi-communality and bi-zonality in a solution plan will lead, with mathematical certainty, to the marginalization of the t/c population, pushing it to either exclusion or assimilation. Therefore, the so called progressive position of depoliticizing the historically constructed ethnicities hides specific and deeply nationalist political implications. In any case, given the overwhelming rejection of a non-federal state by the t/c community (being de facto ethnically majoritarian if the logic “one person one vote” is implemented) it is impossible to reach a peace agreement. Obstructing a solution and prolonging the conflict is at the end of the day the basis on which both rhetorics of the g/c anti-federation movement meet – the Greek-centric (with Hellenism as the point of reference, under which Cyprus is supposedly subsumed) and the Greek Cypriot-centric (with the g/c controlled Republic of Cyprus as the point of reference). Their so called anti-occupation rhetoric (in reality only the t/c can resist occupation)⁹¹ not only serves, but also perpetuates the outcome of occupation: the partitionist status quo.

90 The racist stance of the Republic of Cyprus (that is supposedly a bi-communal partnership state) towards its t/c citizens today does not allow much room for a potential equal integration of the t/c community in a unitary and majoritarian Greek Cypriot political system, without constitutional guarantees for the numerically smaller t/c community. On the other hand, the separatist entity of the TRNC is characterized by less hypocrisy. It is racist not just in practice, but also in theory.

91 Occupation is essentially experienced by the t/c, that live under the highly militarized regime of the TRNC, experiencing in parallel their exclusion (despite some minor benefits) from the Republic of Cyprus, while the two nationalisms legitimize and reproduce it. Hence only if the t/c refuse the utility of Turkish occupation, we will be able to abolish it; and this presupposes the defeat of both nationalisms. Opposing occupation from the g/c side (especially with the anti-Turkish rhetoric that de facto accompanies it) brings the opposite outcome -it boosts t/c nationalism and exacerbates the ethnic conflict, strengthening in the last analysis both occupation and its outcome- the partitionist status quo.

3 In the context of the effort to invent another, different “leftist” discourse, the more benign (and more hypocritical) anti-federation trend, the Republic of Cyprus enthusiasts,⁹² articulate their arguments on the basis of “human rights”. Initially this rhetoric appears idealistic and formalistic, simply separated from political reality. A more careful analysis of the essence of this reasoning however, clearly highlights its bourgeois and conservative character, which is historically outdated and in this particular case nationalistically oriented.

a) The notion of human rights as a political framework, although inspired by modern revolutions, became -in the 1940s- a kind of bourgeois-liberal ideological response to the vision of proletarian socialism. For its time, especially after the end of WWII (and while proletarian socialism was under the shadow of the Stalinist distortion) it was progressive, as it recognized a series of universal human needs, while being crucial for the global consecration of the notion of the “citizen” over the imperial notion of the “subject”. Nonetheless, focusing on the individual and indirectly accepting the political framework of the nation-state set limits to the radicalism of this perspective from its inception. Limits which became obvious during the struggles of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, when the imperatives of cultural and political autonomy of communities arose within and beyond the nation-state, in the post-colonial era. The feminist and anti-racist movements brought forward the issue of protecting collective “minority” rights and oppressed social groups, the youth claimed sexual freedom and respect to diversity, indigenous populations and the environmentalist movement asserted autonomy, respect towards nature and protection of the environment – as limits to the positions of “majorities”, which expressed an internalized form of authority and tendencies of imposition. In today’s context the notion of “human rights”, as it accrues from the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human

92 This mutation of *g/c* nationalism has its roots in the burial of enosis in 1974, but was developed essentially during this decade and especially after 2004, when the national-minded loved suddenly the Republic of Cyprus and even raise its flag.

Rights of 1948, is not enough to inspire a movement of radical questioning.⁹³ Such a perception is both historically outdated and politically vague as it fails to express the multiplicity of rights, individual and collective/communal, to recognize the reality of multiculturalism as it has been created by expanding migratory waves, to prevent the tyranny of the majority and/or the reigning social group, to respect diversity and at the same time defend the acquired rights of past social struggles.

b) In the case of Cyprus, and particularly the g/c side (since t/c anti-federalists are at least honest enough to openly support division and partition) the anti-federal rhetoric sanctifies two specific rights that it considers superior to all others. According to the g/c anti-federalists, these two rights -the right to property and the right to return/residency- are inalienable and cannot be relativized by compensations, exchanges or quotas. The basic and immediate goal of this ideology is the retardation of a solution and the preservation of partition. By examining the implications of this ideology, one can easily deduce that behind the verbal use of “progressiveness” lies a clearly nationalistic reasoning; its target being to create a new g/c majority in population and land ownership in the north, thus negating the autonomy (and sense of security) of the t/c community as ensured in the notion of bi-zonality. This is why the “human rights” enthusiasts add at the end “of the legal residents of Cyprus”, thereby excluding all long term immigrants from Turkey and their descendants, as well as t/c who have not received a Republic of Cyprus citizenship. The right to a home and integration of long term immigrants (from Turkey and other countries) and their descendants born in Cyprus, do not exist for anti-federalists.⁹⁴ It is notably

93 The central contribution of this perspective – the individual vote, was clearly progress in comparison with the time of the rule of the property owning elders, however, simple voting can neither free nor be used as a defense against nationalist, racist, sexist etc. positions that might easily gain circumstantial electoral victories or majorities.

94 We recognize however that because of the small size of the t/c community and in order to prevent further demographic change in the north, there need to be placed (at least for the immediate future) some restrictions in the future migration waves from Turkey and in the naturalization of Turkish permanent residents of

ironic that “leftists” talk about the “sanctity” of property at the same time when the bourgeois state itself, which is based on property, accepts the relativity of this right against public interest – of peace, protecting vulnerable population groups, creating infrastructure, or even redistributing wealth. Anti-federal rhetoric, behind the curtain of protecting g/c refugee rights, concerns and enunciates the vital interests of big g/c land owners, private and ecclesiastic.

4 A solution to the Cyprus problem is not merely a political act of the elite that will be canonized in an agreement or a constitution. It is a process affecting society as a whole, a historical passage to a new era. Reunification is also a release of politics from the hegemony of nationalism and militarism (the basis of patriarchy) and an annulment of national censorship and historical alienation. Of course, we don’t believe in the illusion that reunification will solve social problems or bring forth a libertarian civilization. Social liberation and communism was, is, and will be, a matter of local and global struggle. What will change with a solution and reunification is the framework and conditions of that struggle in Cyprus. With the Cyprus problem out of the picture, a true reform of the education system becomes possible; one which will place education on a proper foundation that is more democratic, more secular, without nationalist stereotypes and intolerant ideals (which create little soldiers for both state formations). This is a precondition in the path towards a libertarian school. We will be able to legitimately question the political and economic authority of the church. Abolition of the military service will put an end to another irrational waste of time and energy for the youth. Demilitarization will push the nightmare of a military conflict away and political cooperation of the two communities in the framework of reunification will allow them to jointly demand the removal of the British military bases. At a societal level, the reunification of the working class (which was separated on an ethnic basis long after the bourgeoisie) will create the conditions for a joint island-wide front against capital,

Cyprus in the t/c constituent state so that the political and cultural autonomy of the t/c community is protected.

while bi-communal cooperation of Cypriot workers will develop a culture of tolerance and cooperation with immigrants working on the island.

5 The movement of rapprochement, as it was popularized and spread in the 1990s, and even more so after the opening of passages in 2003, constitutes important progress for Cypriot society. We actively participate in this bi-communal movement as we consider that it is the expression of a wider social dynamic for peace, against the two nationalisms, forming a third keystone that is anti-hegemonic. We maintain our differences with liberal and leftist allies in the struggle for reunification. However, since for us the solution of the Cyprus problem is a means, not an end, we don't focus on the structure of the new state, but instead on the dynamic of the historical transition. We are interested in the potential for the movement that this conjuncture will create, and the rupture with the existing order. Hence, on that night after the successful referendum, we will not go to the two presidential houses to celebrate the solution with fireworks – we will rush to the checkpoints in order to take down piece by piece the barbed wire of the green line.

Falies, libertarian network in the city
Nicosia, September 2010

Preliminary Note

The following text was published in 2016 by “Syspirosi Atakton”, both as a pamphlet and online. It was subsequently published in the tenth issue of the magazine “Entropia” in 2017. The position of Syspirosi Atakton repeats to a certain extent the positions expressed in the 1993 text “Federation or Death”, but extending and integrating them within the context of the Cypriot reality of the 21st century. It was published in three language versions (Cypriot Greek language variety, Modern Greek, and English).

Syspirosi Atakton

Oh Yes! Federation!

The Cyprus Issue has been, and continues to be an issue of power struggle between political elites. At the same time, it's a matter of conflicting nationalist ideologies. For us, as anarchists and anti-authoritarians, solving the Cyprus Issue is of great importance as it negatively affects our daily lives, the society and our social relations, our political actions, and our struggles. We are opposed to the barbed wire which divides the island, to the walls erected between people, and to the way the Cyprus Issue puts obstacles to societal progress and radical action. We recognize that its solution will allow for the possibility to overcome nationalistic hegemony, and to undo the division of the island.

The Cyprus Issue has monopolized political discourse and the political scene of the island for decades. The rise of competing nationalisms and the manufacture of the Cyprus Issue from the 1950s onwards, essentially marks a reactionary sociopolitical transformation, by means of imposing a nation-centric, socially conservative, and fiscally liberal political discourse. This transformation oppressed common struggles and led to the further division of the communities. The class struggle and workers' demands which became popular between the 1920s-1950s were pushed aside, the two most populous communities of the island were driven to conflict, and the smaller communities were marginalized, isolated, or assimilated. At the same time, the demands for unification with the "motherlands", be that "Enosis" for the Greek-Cypriot or "Taksim" for the Turkish-Cypriot community, gradually led to

the creation and domination of military and paramilitary groups, to the bicomunal unrests and the creation of enclaves in which the Turkish-Cypriots found a refuge. These were events which peaked, leading to the coup d'état of the Greek junta, the invasion by Turkey, and the division of Cyprus.

After the disappointments of 2004 and 2010, we experienced stagnation not only at a higher level and the official negotiations, but also at the level of joint bicomunal and intercommunal struggles and actions. Nevertheless, there were parts of the society which never stopped claiming a common space, envisioning a common future. The Turkish Cypriot protests of 2011, the Occupy Buffer Zone movement in 2011-2012, and the many common actions on issues like antimilitarism, education, and ecology, kept the bridges of reunification open. As we find ourselves in the middle of the negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus Issue, and as we are possibly before a very crucial moment which will either lead to failure or to a proposed plan that will be put to a referendum, we consider it our responsibility to publicly take a stance against the anti-federalists, and in support of the federal reunification of our country.

We consider that the political solution of the Cyprus Issue within the framework of the Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) is essential. A solution under a framework of a 'unitary state' ignores the failure of the 1960's 'unitary state' and its consequences. With the ethnic majority (namely the GC) imposing themselves upon the minority (TC) the conflict between the two communities intensified, something which led to the partition of the island. Supporting the unitary state accepts thus a *fait accompli*, and consequently to partition, whilst it fails to comprehend the mistakes and failures of the majority. We, contrary to the advocates (of various ideologies) of the 'unitary state', consider the 'unitary state', the one-person-one-vote principle, and thus the rule of the majority to be "racist" arrangements, since they always lead to the marginalization of ethnic and other minorities, creating political and social exclusions. It is time for the majority, the Greek Cypriot community, to recognize their privilege on one hand, in having the monopoly of the "legal" state for so many years, and to recognize the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot com-

munity on the other, within a regime that rendered them invisible to the global stage.

We support the BBF solution, not as a “painful compromise we are forced into in order to avoid partition”, but as the ideal institutional solution (“Even if Federation didn’t exist, we would have had to invent it”, Traino, Issue 10, 1993), since it recognizes the historical, geographical, and political reality of Cyprus; it gives autonomy to the communities but also space for coexistence for those who do not place themselves, nor recognize ethnic identities. We will have the opportunity, to redefine identities of “one-Self” and the “Other”, and the notion of borders. We will thus be able to create new identities; ones which will not be based on exclusions, since they will be relational and they will not rely on divisive dichotomies. Rather, they will be formed and transformed based on our contacts and relations between us, and between us and our environment.

On the other hand, we are not deluded. We know that after the solution, ethno-communal conflicts will not magically disappear. For us, a solution is something much more than a set of signatures. It is a process that starts before, and continues after a plan is agreed upon. It has as a prerequisite the emergence of a different narrative, and above all, of a different reality that overcomes borders and ethnocentrism. The political solution to the Cyprus Issue will disrupt the dominant order, something that will allow us to come together, to think, and to act within a new framework. The division will no longer be used as an excuse for any measure that attacks the interests of the people. The “State of Emergency”, that legal pretext upon which the actions of the G/C elite since 1964 rely on, will cease to exist. The integration of the geographical space, and the new framework of coexistence that will be created will facilitate our common struggles, which will become stronger and more effective.

Moreover, the two communities in Cyprus will experience more freedom, and considering the lessening of the T/C community’s dependency on Turkey, there will be a much wider room to constitute joint, bicomunal fronts protecting our independence from the “motherlands”, but also to oppose the British Bases.

Solving the Cyprus Issue will be the most grave defeat of militarism and its advocates, who truly benefited financially and

gained political surplus value from maintaining a state of war in the island. Beyond the immediate demilitarization of the island, the disbandment of all armies will offer us that framework we need to fight against the militarization that dominates all aspects of your life, the patriarchy and sexism on which militarism relies upon for its reproduction.

Even if at the same time the educational systems remain segregated, reunification will offer the opportunity to start a substantial dialogue -within the communities, as well as between them- with the aim of developing an educational system liberated from nationalism, racism, hatred, and the hegemonic discourse of the Church. In a reunified country, sensationalisms like the letter of the mother asking her child to be exempt from studying T/C poetry at school would fall flat, since cultivating a culture of peace won't be just a goal, but a generalized need.

The struggle for secularization, not just of the educational system but of the state and society in general, will be carried out by all communities, and the secular character of the T/C community will greatly help the advocates of secularization in the G/C community. Sentiments often expressed by the leadership of the Church on matters of gender and sexuality, for example, will be judged on a federal level and not just within the G/C community, exposing them to harsher criticism.

The struggle against the appropriation of the Commons, land-grabbing, and environmental destruction will have a much wider scope. Our actions to prevent environmental destruction in Mount Pentadaktylos/Beşparmak, in Androlykou/Gündoğdu, in Karpasia/Karpaz, and in Akamas will be united and will have the same goal: to combat the neoliberal and anti-environmental policies of the federal government and the business-owners who will operate under its protection.

We hope to fight shoulder to shoulder with all residents of the island, regardless of their constituent-state of residence, and without giving any merit to their designations as “illegal immigrants”, “gypsies”, “Anatolian settlers”, or “bureaucratic remnants from Greece” [kalamarades in the original Greek version of the text].

The notion of “rights” still is one of the central points, if not the most central, in the negotiation process. The Rejectionist camp, as well as the neoliberal supporters of the federal solution focus on one hand on the individual rights (mainly) to property, and on the common financial benefits of reunification on the other. Thus, the Cyprus Issue and its solution or non-solution is examined with the neoliberal lens of financial interests. Our “Commons” thus, are presented to the society by the political and economic elites, only as “common” interests which can only be financial. This can be seen especially in the case of the hydrocarbons reserves, the potential extraction of which is systematically presented as the catalyst for achieving a viable solution on the one hand, and as our ticket out of the financial crisis on the other. For us however, the notion of the “Commons” has a different meaning. It has to do with a new imaginary that is being created. It is a mosaic of ideas and consciousnesses that surface through a new understanding of our ‘common’ geographical, ecological, historical, social, and cultural – though some of these existed before 1960 when the Republic was formed, for example the common workers’ struggles and the mass strikes that reached their highest point in 1948, they are now being revitalized and recreated by old and new generations alike. It is this new imaginary that, we consider, will gradually lead to coexistence within and between the two communities, as well as of the society in general with its natural and urban environment.

It is obvious that after the solution we will not live in a post-state context. We will continue to live under the control of a state, operating within the capitalist system. That state will be called to react to certain geopolitical circumstances and it will use all the apparatuses in its disposal to enforce its power internally. We do know that we will have to fight against the policies of the federal state and the constituent states alike.

And we will do so. And we will do so together.

November 2016
Sypsirosi Atakton

Preliminary Note

The following text was published by the group “antifa lefkosha” in 2017. A few months later, the last round of negotiations for a Cyprus settlement collapsed, accompanied by strong accusations against Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades of sabotaging the process. The text was circulated both in print and online. It approaches the Cyprus Problem from an anti-fascist perspective, defending the federal reunification of Cyprus as a necessity to fight nationalism and militarism on the island, seeing in the reunification process a break with the status quo, opening up new possibilities and perspectives for future social demands in Cyprus.

antifa lefkosha

Nationalism, Natural Gas, Bi-communal Struggles

Positions on the Federation

As an anti-fascist collective we believe that the history of fascism in Cyprus is intertwined with the history of nationalisms and bicomunal conflicts. The genealogy of both fascism and the hegemony of the nationalist right on the island is traced through the rise of irredentist nationalisms in the 1950s, the murders of leftists from their community and members of the other community by EOKA and TMT, the paramilitary gangs of 1963 and 1967, the coup of 1974 and the final realization of the dream of Turkish nationalism. The political ancestors of fascism in Cyprus are none other than its national heroes, none other than those responsible for the conflicts, the division and repression of the working class, the present political cesspool in which the island finds itself. The struggle against fascism is therefore necessarily a struggle against nationalism and all the consequences it has caused.

The struggle against fascism in Cyprus can only be a struggle for a federal island. We consider the passage to a federal Cyprus a necessary step in the struggle against the political hegemony of nationalism and the division of the working class on the island. We are aware of the problems inherent in both the negotiations of the political leaders and the framework of the “solution from above”. But we do not see this passage as a “solution” - a solution would require the elimination of a problem, the successful outcome of a cause. On the contrary, we perceive the “solution” as a passage, as a means to fight the problem together with the Turkish Cypriots, as the beginning of our own cause. This passage is necessary from an anti-fascist, anti-nationalist, class

and ecological point of view. As long as there is a Cyprus Problem, nationalism will be rampant in the political discourse and thinking of the indigenous population. The recent vote in favour of commemorating the 1950 Enosis “referendum” by the parties of the “centre” and on the initiative of the neo-Nazis (with the convenient abstention of DISY) demonstrates the urgency of the demolition of the ethnocentric worldview that wants to be covered by the arms of the “motherlands”.

As long as the Cyprus Problem exists, education will continue to be the teaching of ethnic hatred, irredentist nationalism, the teaching of “I do not forget”, of which the ultimate goal is national purity on the island by any means. As long as there is a Cyprus Problem, militarism will remain the political expression of the true desire of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism: the state of readiness for war at any moment. The barrels will continue to block our marches, the borders will continue to block our struggles, the watch posts will continue to take our best years. As long as there is a Cyprus Problem we will not experience class struggles beyond the nation.

We recognise that the process for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem is driven by geopolitical and economic interests. The natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean make, for a section of capital, a possible solution to the Cyprus Problem an attractive option in terms of exploiting the deposits. The transport of natural gas from Israel to Turkey with the prospect of supplying areas in Europe, as has already been proposed, necessarily passes through the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which favours a federal Cyprus. It should be noted here that Israel, in addition to its recent policy of rapprochement with Turkey, maintains its alliance with the Cypriot and Greek states. Also, the cost of transporting Cyprus’ EEZ deposits through Greece makes the project unaffordable, making transport through Turkey a much more realistic and economically attractive option.

It is therefore a fact that for a part of Cypriot, Turkish and Greek capital, the solution of the Cyprus Problem is an economic and geopolitical pursuit. Furthermore, a possible solution would be a stabilising factor for the West in the troubled Eastern Mediterranean, while it would reduce both Russia’s strategic influence and Europe’s dependence on Russian energy reserves, through the

aforementioned Israel-Cyprus-Turkey-Greece cooperation for the transport of natural gas to Europe. Let us not forget that under any eventual plan, the British bases remain on the island, albeit to a lesser extent, which makes the solution legitimate for the British and their allied forces who use the bases for raids on Eastern Mediterranean countries. The solution is also legitimate for a part of the GC and TC capital for a multitude of reasons, such as the opening of the Turkish/European market respectively.

On the other hand, we recognize both that the geopolitical interests of the powers concerned can be settled in ways beyond the federalization of Cyprus, and that another significant part of capital and the ruling class from all parties involved is against a possible solution. The Greek-Turkish geopolitical disputes over the sovereignty of the Aegean, which have been expressed for some time now as a tawdry repetition in Imia, make it obvious not only that the Cyprus Problem is not the only issue on the agenda of the relationship between the two countries, but also that no one can guarantee that geopolitical developments will unfold peacefully on the island. It is obvious that the “motherlands” are not fundamentally interested in peaceful coexistence, nor in partition. What they are interested in is the best possible preservation and promotion of their geopolitical and economic interests – this can mean anything from supporting a possible federalisation plan for Cyprus, formal partition with trade agreements allowing the exploitation of the EEZs, to the launching of new war plans.

At the same time, as mentioned above, there are also parts of local capital and the ruling class that oppose any possible federalisation. Entire political careers have been built on the struggle to ensure the non-resolution of the Cyprus Problem – north and south of the Green Line. Those voices that will suffer a heavy defeat are of course the ones that are heard loudest on the rejectionist front that dominates public discourse. The same, of course, is true of business voices that see themselves as having more to lose than to gain the day after a solution to the Cyprus Problem.

The basic argument of the discourse produced both by these voices of the bourgeoisie, which have much to lose politically and/or economically, and by a significant part of the left (local and not only) is

that Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) is racist because it divides the population on the basis of ethnic origin. The argument is both ridiculous and dangerous. It is ridiculous because BBF is historically introduced as a result of ethnic hatred and violence, not as a promoter of them. That is, BBF is necessary precisely because nationalist ideology gave birth to nations and caused the events of 1958, 1963, 1967 and 1974.⁹⁵ The consequence of these events is the need to ensure the autonomy of each community. On the other hand, however, the racist BBF argument is also dangerous because it is adopted and promoted by the factions that express the most nationalist/racist discourse towards both Turkish Cypriots and other population groups on the island (LGBTQ+ people, migrants, etc.). In other words, there is a reversal of reality. While the unitary state is the institutional framework that allowed the oppression of an ethnic group (and phenomena like Sampson, Makarios, Grivas, etc.), it is presented as the most just because it supposedly does not discriminate against individuals based on their ethnicity.⁹⁶ But what it actually entails is the legitimization and institutionalization of oppression based on the ethnic origin of individuals.

The well-known slogan “one man, one vote”, the motto of the Greek Cypriot anti-federalist campaign, basically hides the authoritarianism that can arise from the principle of majority rule. Federalist thought understands that ensuring the autonomy of particular social groups is necessary because the majority principle can potentially permanently negate their political power and systematically exclude them. Whereby, the majority is neither always right nor entitled to act as it pleases without taking into account minorities or ethnic/religious minority groups, especially in the context of shaping public opinion⁹⁷ and of generating hysteria.⁹⁸

95 Editor’s note: Refers to the bicomunal violence of 1958, the bicomunal conflict of 1963, the Kofinou operations of 1967, and the coup and invasion of 1974.

96 By this very logic, applied to other issues, some consider feminism as sexist because it discriminates between men and women or the Black Lives Matter movement as racist because it focuses only on black people.

97 Chomsky, Noam (1998). *Propaganda and Control of the Public Mind*. USA: AK Press.

98 Panayiotou, Andreas (2011) The media and the attempts to manipulate public opinion after the Mari explosion. <http://koinoniologyka.blogspot.com.cy/2011/09/blog-post.html>

This slogan also fails to acknowledge the fact that in addition to individual rights there are also collective rights.

No one can guarantee that an upcoming federation-based agreement will solve all problems, nor are we under any such illusions. But we are not, as we have said, talking about the outcome, but about the beginning of our own cause. The Cyprus Problem is the result of the historical hegemony of nationalisms and its resolution will mean a break with this reality, without, of course, necessarily implying that it will be overcome. In any case, our position is that it is time for the indigenous people of this island to see their present and their future independently of the interests of the Greek and Turkish states. The reunification of Cyprus is necessary so that we can finally cut the umbilical cords with the so-called motherlands and overcome the nationalist ideologies imposed by them. There is no anti-fascist struggle on the island that is not inter-communal and there is no inter-communalism without an anti-national, federal consciousness. Its development is also a necessity to ensure that ethnic conflicts and nationalist outbursts are avoided. Beyond any agreement at the level of political leaders, it is necessary to build this federal consciousness, which involves an understanding of the historical evolution of the Cyprus Problem and of the ethnic conflicts in conjunction with the desire to transcend sterile national identities and to be able to see Cyprus not as a homogeneous nation-state but as it is, a place of many communities.

To return to our original position: the transition to a federal Cyprus is a necessity as it may provide a more fertile ground for fighting nationalism and militarism on the island, for changing ethnocentric education and for undoing the geographical division, through which we will be in a position to claim a total change in the ecological treatment of the island. From Akamas to Karpas, we will be called upon to fight for the protection of the last environmental lungs left on the island. In any case, this passage will be a break with the status quo. Through this break, we hope that issues that have been overshadowed all these years by the existence of the “Cyprus Problem” will finally be able to emerge: issues such as workers’ demands, ecology, the commons, gender issues, etc. Our struggles can finally become truly bicomunal, not separated by borders and

armies, in the hope that the class dimension can replace the national one – that we, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot workers, will fight for our own common interests.

antifa lefkosha

Preliminary Note

The following text was written by Phedias Christodoulides, a member of the group “Platypus Nicosia”, and published online on the “Platypus Affiliated Society” website in 2020. It approaches the Cyprus Problem from a distinct Marxist perspective. It was chosen as the last text of this collection because it comments on the positions and stances of various groups of the (Greek) Cypriot radical extra-parliamentary milieu, including groups whose texts were included in this publication, such as “Workers’ Democracy”, “Syspirosi Atakton” and the group “antifa lefkosha”. Several footnotes in the text that referred to sources contained only simple web links and were therefore rewritten, adding additional information.

Phedias Christodoulides

Towards a Marxist Approach to the Cyprus Problem Today

Despite the production of several generally left-wing analyses and positions on the so-called Cyprus problem in recent years, a Marxist approach to the problem is absent. The Greek Cypriot left approaches the Cyprus problem almost entirely from either a liberal or a nationalist point of view, being at the tail end of the intra-bourgeois dispute on the issue between liberals and nationalists. The vast majority of the left is on the liberal side of the dispute, supporting a bizonal bicomunal federation (BBF) as the best possible solution to the problem. BBF is presented as a necessary condition for national peace on the island, and sometimes also as a necessary condition for future class struggle. (The latter is the attitude of some far-left groups such as Anitifa Lefkoşa, Syspirosi Atakton and the Stasis group). On the nationalist side of the dispute, we find the Greek Cypriot supporters of KKE (Communist Party of Greece), along with a few former anarchists. KKE rejects BBF, considering it a solution that originates from and serves the NATO imperialism of the US, UK and Turkey. Instead of BBF, it supports a unitary Cypriot state.

Neither side of the controversy is Marxist, despite some claims to the contrary. KKE supporters in particular claim to be orthodox Marxists who base their analysis of the Cyprus problem on Marxism, but are simply Stalinists who misrepresent Marxism to justify their unconscious Greek nationalism. Their minimization of the responsibility of Greece and the Greek Cypriot community for the problem is indicative. Since their nationalism clearly con-

tradicts Marxist proletarian internationalism, I will not examine their approach to the Cyprus problem in this paper: their approach is clearly non-Marxist. On the liberal side of the controversy, only one organisation, Stasis, has attempted to base its support for BBF directly on Marxism. Below, I refute Stasis' analysis, and also examine some of the more important recent left and far-left analyses.

My aim here is to identify the Marxist framework for examining national issues and to make a start in applying this framework to the so-called Cyprus problem. I first examine the Marxist approach to the national question as it was historically shaped from the young Marx and Engels to the Second International and Lenin. It is necessary to look at the Marxist approach evolutionarily and historically as there is no single Marxist position that applies to all national issues everywhere and always. Instead, there is a basic principle that determines the Marxist position on each individual national question at each individual historical juncture. This principle is the Marxist commitment to the goal of the world proletarian revolution. Essentially, on each national question, Marxists adopt the position that contributes most to the revolutionary goal. The Marxist approach to the national question is therefore primarily a strategic approach; the individual positions adopted are all derived from the primary revolutionary objective.

I then apply my conclusions from the above analysis to the Cyprus problem. I will not examine the Cyprus problem in depth, nor will I examine how it has been shaped historically as a problem. I will limit myself to a few general points about the nature of the problem today, its relation to the Left and the tasks it calls us to undertake. These points are intended to guide any future Marxist approach to the problem. I ought to note here that my text owes much to the excellent Spartacus League text "The National Question in the Marxist Movement, 1848-1914".

MARX AND ENGELS ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Marx's and Engels' earliest position on the national question was expressed in the context of the revolutions of 1848 in relation to the goal of achieving European bourgeois-democratic revolutions. At this period, Marx-Engels argued that the advanced European states

needed to undergo a bourgeois-democratic revolution as a precondition for the future socialist revolution. They wanted bourgeois democrats to take over power from the reactionary aristocracy of Central and Eastern Europe and establish bourgeois democracies.

Their conception of the necessity of bourgeois-democratic revolutions for the socialist demand was the general principle that guided Marx's and Engels' individual positions on national questions in Central and Eastern Europe. Marx and Engels espoused no abstract universal principle of national self-determination for peoples; their positions on this question were strategic in nature. What interested them was to create the conditions for world socialist revolution, and they considered that the basic condition achievable in the revolutions of 1848 was a bourgeois-democratic Europe. Their positions on the various national issues of Central and Eastern Europe derived from the goal of a bourgeois-democratic Europe. They believed that some European nations were more progressive than others, and that only progressive nations, that is, those that had the potential to create bourgeois-democratic states, deserved support in their struggle for self-determination.

These nations were the Germans, the Poles and the Hungarians, the only nations with significant urban populations in Central and Eastern Europe. The other Slavic peoples were almost entirely agrarian nations, considered too underdeveloped to formulate bourgeois-democratic demands. Marx and Engels thus advocated the creation of three bourgeois democratic states, a Greater Germany, a Greater Poland and a Greater Hungary, where the remaining Slavs were expected to assimilate culturally. Consequently, Marx and Engels did not support the national struggles of the Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and disagreed with Bakunin's abstract support for self-determination for all peoples without exception. Tsarist Russia was also considered too underdeveloped and reactionary for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, with Marx and Engels advocating an independent Poland precisely as a bulwark against Russia.⁹⁹

99 Indicative of this period are Engels' articles "Hungary and Pan-Slavism" and "Democratic Pan-Slavism".

I do not wish to judge the correctness of Marx's and Engels' empirical conclusions about the progressiveness or backwardness of the various European nations/nationalities in 1848. Suffice it to say that the thesis that there are more progressive and more backward nationalities was later abandoned by Marxism, and rightly so: it makes no sense today to talk about progressive and reactionary nationalities/nations.

After the failure of the revolutions of 1848, Marx and Engels placed great emphasis on the need for European economic development, again as a fundamental precondition for the European and world socialist revolution. They considered that the failure of the revolutions was due to the economic backwardness of continental Europe, a backwardness that regulated the development of the proletariat as a class. Greater economic development, i.e. the progress and maturation of capitalism, implied for them a larger, stronger and more mature proletariat. Thus, they supported such development. Since they also believed that the unification of Germany and Italy would significantly accelerate economic growth, they also supported these unifications. They believed that a united Germany would give a huge boost to the economic growth of Europe and would produce the most advanced labour movement in Europe. In retrospect, they were right, as the growth of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) proved. They also continued to support the assimilation of all "backward" nationalities into the "progressive" nations of England, France, Germany, Poland and Hungary.

Marx began to move away from his view of assimilation in the late 1860s, in the context of the Irish question. While he first supported the assimilation of the Irish into Britain, in the late 1860s he changed his mind and began to support Irish independence. The reason for this change was that Marx concluded that the existence of an Irish proletariat in Britain was responsible for the otherwise inexplicable political backwardness of the economically and organisationally advanced British proletariat. Britain was the most economically and politically advanced country in Europe, but its proletariat lagged behind the continental proletariat. Marx came to believe that this was due to the division of the British proletariat into English and Irish. This coexistence was antagonistic and rein-

forced English and Irish nationalism, leading the English and Irish proletarians to identify with their bourgeois classes rather than to develop their class consciousness. As Marx wrote in 1870 in a letter to S. Meyer and A. Vogt: “This **antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class**, despite its organisation. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power.”¹⁰⁰ (Translator’s note: I have replaced the author’s Greek translations with the official English translations from the sources cited).¹⁰¹ Marx advocated Irish independence as a way of separating the English from the Irish proletariat, eliminating their antagonism. He came to regard the physical separation of the two proletariats as a precondition for their political unity.

Marx and Engels abandoned their assimilationist position in the last decades of their lives. In the late 1870s they began to believe in the possibility of a radical democratic revolution in Russia and even considered that this revolution could serve as a stepping stone for a proletarian revolution in the West.¹⁰² This possibility significantly reduced the importance of Polish independence in their eyes. Engels still supported Polish independence, but not as a bulwark to Czarist reaction. Instead, he argued that national independence was necessary for the development of class struggle in any “progressive” nation like Poland. As he wrote: “It is historically impossible for a great people even to discuss internal problems of any kind seriously, as long as it lacks national independence... So long as Poland is partitioned and subjugated, therefore, neither a strong socialist party can develop in the country itself, nor can there arise real international intercourse between the proletarian parties in Germany, etc, with other than émigré Poles... An international movement of the proletariat is possible only among

100 Editor’s note: Marx to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt in New York, London, April 9, 1870. Can be located at the “Marxists Internet Archive”.

101 All the following translations of passages from texts by Engels and Lenin are mine. [Translator’s Note: For the purposes of this translation, I have replaced all quotes by Engels and Lenin with the same quotes as they appear on the English version of the Marxist Archive. Quotes from Leandros Fischer originate from his article, which was originally written in English].

102 Their most famous reference to this possibility is found in the Introductory Note of the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto in 1882.

independent nations.” As always, the criterion for the legitimacy of national independence is whether independence facilitates the socialist revolution. At the same time, the Franco-Prussian War saw the unification of Germany but without Austria, leaving open the question of what to do with the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire. Engels became more open to Slavic self-determination at the end of his life, with the condition that it would only happen after the fall of Tsarism, so as not to be exploited by a reactionary Tsarist Russia.¹⁰³

As is clear from the above, Marx and Engels always approached the national question strategically and not as a matter of principle. They changed their views on specific national questions during their lifetimes, always with the overriding interest of the socialist revolution in mind. It should also be noted that Marx and Engels were strong internationalists who supported German unification only as a means to global socialist revolution. They proved their internationalism beyond doubt by supporting the French against Bismarck’s invasion of France during the Franco-Prussian War.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AT THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

During the period of the Second International (1889-1916) there were four main competing positions on the national question. These were: 1) the position of Karl Kautsky, the theoretical leader of German Social Democracy, 2) the position of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, the Austro-Marxist theoretical leaders of Austro-Hungarian Social Democracy, 3) the position of Rosa Luxemburg, and 4) the position of Vladimir Lenin. There are similarities and differences between the four positions, and their relationship is quite complex. I briefly summarize the first three before focusing on Lenin’s position, since it is this that has gone down in history as the ‘orthodox’ Marxist position and has been the victim of relentless abuse to this day.¹⁰⁴

103 Engels, *Foreign Policy of Russian Tsardom*, 1890.

104 Although Luxemburg’s position also needs to be studied and re-evaluated today.

Kautsky supported the right of nations to self-determination. He directed the International to reject the outmoded view of Marx and Engels that Russia was more backward than Germany and Austria-Hungary, and this led the International to adopt the principle of the right of nations to self-determination. Kautsky supported the right of nations to self-determination because he perceived multi-ethnic states such as Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire as reactionary, feudal remnants. He wanted the break-up of these states into their constituent nations as part of a necessary bourgeois-democratic revolution in Eastern Europe.

Kautsky never publicly supported the dissolution of the multinational states, because the Austrian Social Democrats disagreed with him on the issue. The national program of the Austrian Social Democrats, formulated at the 1898 Brunn Congress, called for a federal, democratic Austro-Hungarian state, not for national self-determination. Even the most radical of the Austrians did not express support for national self-determination. The main reason for this lack of support was the reasonable and widespread belief that the break-up of Austria-Hungary would lead to war between Germany and Russia over the former's territory. The Austrian social democrats thus sought to formulate a program that would mitigate the violent ethnic antagonisms in Austria-Hungary while preserving Austria-Hungary as an entity. The basis of this programme was the principle of so-called "cultural-national autonomy". According to cultural-national autonomy, nations should not be understood in territorial terms, but rather culturally, like religions. A nation is a non-territorial association of individuals. Different nationalities should have their own cultural institutions, e.g. their own separate schools, but living together in the same state or territory. Nationalities should be culturally -but not territorially- autonomous. Unlike Marx and Engels, the Austro-Marxists viewed nationality positively, i.e., they were nationalists. They wanted a communism where different nationalities organized autonomously; nationality was not something that had to be overcome.¹⁰⁵

105 Otto Bauer's "The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy" is the most representative Austro-Marxist position on cultural-national autonomy.

At the other end of the spectrum from the nationalist Austro-Marxists was Rosa Luxemburg. Luxemburg always countered nationalism by using internationalist propaganda. Her work on the national question focused on the issue of Polish independence (she was Polish). She opposed Polish independence on the grounds that Poland was too economically integrated with Russia for independence to be viable, and also because she saw Polish nationalism as a petty bourgeois reactionary phenomenon. More importantly, Luxemburg was optimistic that a socialist revolution could begin in Russia and then spread westward. In this she followed Trotsky, accepting his theory of permanent revolution as expressed, for example, in “Results and Prospects”. Poland was the most economically advanced part of the Russian Empire and Luxemburg believed that it would play an important role in a Russian revolution. As Spartacists correctly note, Luxemburg saw Russia in the same way that Marx saw Germany in 1848: as the springboard for the coming socialist revolution. Again, like Marx, her position on the national question was strategic, deriving from the primary goal of the global socialist revolution.

LENIN ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

At first glance, Lenin’s position on the national question appears to be the same as Kautsky’s. Lenin, like Kautsky, categorically supported the right of nations to self-determination: “The article of our programme (on the self-determination of nations) cannot be interpreted to mean anything but political self-determination, i.e., the right to secede and form a separate state.”¹⁰⁶ He noted that the right of nations to self-determination was an essential point in the Bolshevik programme because of the fact that the Russian Empire included many different nations/nationalities that were all oppressed by the tsarist monarchy, and also because of the fact that in Eastern Europe and Asia the bourgeois-democratic revolution that had previously led to the creation of independent nation-states in the West had just begun.¹⁰⁷ To the extent that Lenin recognized

106 Lenin, *Theses on the National Question*, 1913.

107 *Ibid.*, and also Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, 1914.

that national emancipation for Poland, Ukraine and other nations was an unfinished bourgeois-democratic task that required completion, his position is indeed similar to that of Kautsky. However, as will become clear in this part of my essay, Lenin's position differed significantly from Kautsky's.

Lenin was a strict advocate of equal rights for all nationalities in a state. Unlike the Austro-Marxists, he did not view nationalism *per se* positively; his support for national movements was negative in the sense that he wanted the oppression of national minorities to stop. As he put it: "The awakening of the masses from feudal lethargy, and their struggle against all national oppression, for the sovereignty of the people, of the nation, are progressive. Hence, it is the Marxist's bounden duty to stand for the most resolute and consistent democratism on all aspects of the national question. This task is largely a negative one. But this is the limit the proletariat can go to in supporting nationalism, for beyond that begins the "positive" activity of the bourgeoisie striving to fortify nationalism."¹⁰⁸ He recognised that nationalism was progressive and in the interests of the proletarian class struggle only insofar as it was an expression of the bourgeois-democratic struggle against feudal national oppression and the feudal privileges enjoyed by certain nations or languages. Working class support for the bourgeoisie on the national question had to be limited to these negative objectives: "The working class supports the bourgeoisie only in order to secure national peace (which the bourgeoisie cannot bring about completely and which can be achieved only with complete democracy), in order to secure equal rights and to create the best conditions for the class struggle."¹⁰⁹

As this last formulation shows, Lenin's position on the national question was guided by the interests of the proletarian class struggle. Indeed, like Marx, Engels, Luxemburg and Kautsky,

108 Lenin, *Critical Remarks on the National Question*, 1913. From the same text: "To throw off the feudal yoke, all national oppression, and all privileges enjoyed by any particular nation or language, is the imperative duty of the proletariat as a democratic force, and is certainly in the interests of the proletarian class struggle, which is obscured and retarded by bickering on the national question."

109 Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, 1914.

Lenin approached the national question primarily strategically. His support for the right of nations to self-determination was strategic, not a principled position as is usually presented: “While recognising equality and equal rights to a national state, it values above all and places foremost the alliance of the proletarians of all nations, and assesses any national demand, any national separation, from the angle of the workers’ class struggle.”¹¹⁰ Most importantly, Lenin’s strategic reason for supporting this right was different from Kautsky’s. Kautsky supported self-determination because he genuinely believed that the independence of nations would advance the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Eastern Europe in the same way that it advanced it in Western Europe. So he wanted that independence to become a reality. Lenin, however, did not support self-determination mainly for this reason; he did not expect Eastern Europe to repeat the long bourgeois-democratic development of Western Europe. He supported, instead, the right of nations to self-determination as a means of unifying the working class in multinational states like Russia.

Lenin believed that the defence of the right of self-determination was necessary as a means of unifying the working class in a multi-ethnic state. Unlike Kautsky, he did not aim for independence as such, and considered the legitimacy of independence a secondary issue to be decided on a case-by-case basis.¹¹¹ Before the 1917

110 Ibid.

111 See for example the following extract from *Theses on the National Question*, 1913: “The Social-Democratic Party’s recognition of the right of all nationalities to self-determination most certainly does not mean that Social-Democrats reject an independent appraisal of the advisability of the state secession of any nation in each separate case. Social-Democracy should, on the contrary, give its independent appraisal, taking into consideration the conditions of capitalist development and the oppression of the proletarians of various nations by the united bourgeoisie of all nationalities, as well as the general tasks of democracy, first of all and most of all the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism.” Or this quote from *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, 1914: “The demand for a “yes” or “no” reply to the question of secession in the case of every nation may seem a very “practical” one... With the proletariat, however, these demands are subordinated to the interests of the class struggle. Theoretically, you cannot say in advance whether the bourgeois-democratic revolution will end in a given nation seceding from another nation, or in its equality with the latter; in

revolution, the Bolsheviks did not take a position for or against the independence of Poland, Ukraine or Finland. In response to Luxemburg, Lenin argued that her abstract internationalist propaganda was insufficient to convince ethnic minorities such as the Poles and Ukrainians that the great Russian socialists were truly internationalist. He stressed that the labour movement of each oppressed nation should demonstrate in its programme and in practice that it supported the right of oppressed nations to independence. This is necessary to win the confidence of the workers of the oppressed nations: “The proletariat of the oppressing nations cannot confine itself to the general hackneyed phrases against annexations and for the equal rights of nations in general, that may be repeated by any pacifist bourgeois... The proletariat must demand the right of political secession for the colonies and for the nations that “its own” nation oppresses. Unless it does this, proletarian internationalism will remain a meaningless phrase; mutual confidence and class solidarity between the workers of the oppressing and oppressed nations will be impossible; the hypocrisy of the reformist and Kautskyan advocates of self-determination who maintain silence about the nations which are oppressed by “their” nation and forcibly retained within “their” state will remain unexposed.”¹¹²

The following extensive excerpt from Lenin’s *The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Self-Determination of Nations* is particularly informative: “The right of nations to self-determination means only the right to independence in a political sense, the right to free, political secession from the oppressing nation. Concretely, this

either case, the important thing for the proletariat is to ensure the development of its class. For the bourgeoisie it is important to hamper this development by pushing the aims of its “own” nation before those of the proletariat. That is why the proletariat confines itself, so to speak, to the negative demand for recognition of the right to self-determination, without giving guarantees to any nation, and without undertaking to give anything at the expense of another nation. This may not be “practical”, but it is in effect the best guarantee for the achievement of the most democratic of all possible solutions. The proletariat needs only such guarantees, whereas the bourgeoisie of every nation requires guarantees for its own interest, regardless of the position of (or the possible disadvantages to) other nations.”

112 Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, 1916.

political, democratic demand implies complete freedom to carry on agitation in favour of secession, and freedom to settle the question of secession by means of a referendum of the nation that desires to secede. Consequently, this demand is by no means identical with the demand for secession, for partition, for the formation of small states. It is merely the logical expression of the struggle against national oppression in every form. The more closely the democratic system of state approximates to complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the striving for secession be in practice; for the advantages of large states, both from the point of view of economic progress and from the point of view of the interests of the masses, are beyond doubt, and these advantages increase with the growth of capitalism. The recognition of self-determination is not the same as making federation a principle. One may be a determined opponent of this principle and a partisan of democratic centralism and yet prefer federation to national inequality as the only path towards complete democratic centralism. It was precisely from this point of view that Marx, although a centralist, preferred even the federation of Ireland with England to the forcible subjection of Ireland to the English.”

In other words, Lenin’s support for the right of nations to self-determination does not imply support for secession. Lenin was not necessarily a supporter of secession, but he respected the right of all nationalities to independence if they wanted it. Indeed, he hoped that by supporting the right of self-determination and fighting ethnic oppression, ethnic oppression would be reduced and minority nations would be more likely to remain in their multi-ethnic states and cooperate with the proletariat of the dominant nation for socialism.¹¹³ The Stalinists and New Leftists misrepresent Lenin when they portray him as a supporter of any demand put forward by an oppressed ethnic minority. They magnify his disagreement with Luxemburg and overlook his anti-nationalism. Lenin believed that large states are in the interests of both economic progress and socialism, although sometimes secession is inevitable to overcome ethnic hostility and inequality, as in the case of Ireland.

113 See for example Lenin’s comments on Ukraine in his *Critical Remarks on the National Question*.

Because Lenin's ultimate goal on the national question was the unity of the proletarians of all nations in the struggle against the Tsar and for Socialism, he strongly opposed cultural-national autonomy. He argued that the defence of cultural-ethnic autonomy divided the working class and brought the working and bourgeois classes of a nation closer together.¹¹⁴ He insisted that the working classes of all nations in Russia had to work together to overcome Tsarism and establish a democracy with equal rights for all nationalities, convinced that such a democratic struggle would unite the proletariat of the various nations. On the other hand, he criticized cultural-national autonomy for promoting the isolation of nations in the fields of culture and education, an isolation compatible with the preservation of national privileges.¹¹⁵ Like Luxemburg, he opposed federalism and favoured only limited regional autonomy for minority nations in a unitary state: "All areas of the state that are distinguished by social peculiarities or by the national composition of the population, must enjoy wide self-government and autonomy...".¹¹⁶ Lenin was also adamant that the proletarian organisations of any country, e.g. the party, trade unions, etc., should not be segregated on the basis of nationality. He was against party forms with separate ethnic groups like the Jewish Bund.¹¹⁷

114 Lenin, *Critical Remarks on the National Question*, 1913.

115 "The slogans of consistent democracy unite in a single whole the proletariat and the advanced democrats of all nations (elements that demand not isolation but the uniting of democratic elements of the nations in all matters, including educational affairs), while the slogan of cultural-national autonomy divides the proletariat of the different nations and links it up with the reactionary and bourgeois elements of the separate nations" (*Theses on the National Question*).

116 Lenin, *Theses on the National Question*, 1913.

117 *Ibid.* See also the following extract from *Critical Remarks*, 1913: "Working-class democracy contraposes to the nationalist wrangling of the various bourgeois parties over questions of language, etc., the demand for the unconditional unity and complete amalgamation of workers of all nationalities in all working-class organisations - trade union, co-operative, consumers', educational and all others- in contradistinction to any kind of bourgeois nationalism. Only this type of unity and amalgamation can uphold democracy and defend the interests of the workers against capital - which is already international and is becoming more so- and promote the development of mankind towards a new way of life that is alien to all privileges and all exploitation".

It is important to note here that Lenin was categorically opposed to the promotion of any national culture, considering such promotion to be contrary to Marxism. He agreed with the verdict of Marx and Engels in the Manifesto that under capitalism, “all economic, political and spiritual life is becoming more and more international”, making national cultures a relic of the past.¹¹⁸ Capitalism inevitably leads to globalisation: “capitalism’s world-historical tendency, to break down national barriers, obliterate national distinctions, and to assimilate nations”.¹¹⁹ Lenin, following Marx and Engels, considered this globalising tendency to be progressive, “one of the greatest driving forces transforming capitalism into socialism”. Globalisation is one of the preconditions for socialism, after all. As Lenin underlines: “No one unobsessed by nationalist prejudices can fail to perceive that this process of assimilation of nations by capitalism means the greatest historical progress, the breakdown of hidebound national conservatism in the various backwoods, especially in backward countries like Russia.”¹²⁰

Socialism would complete globalisation by making life “completely international”. The proletariat would create a new international culture that would accept only the democratic and socialist elements of other cultures. In other words, you cannot be a historical materialist committed to socialism and progress and at the same time advocate the preservation of national culture, as Bauer and Renner did.¹²¹ Socialists seek the fusion of all nations into a world communist society of maximum freedom. Lenin shared this goal, but he also dialectically recognized that to achieve the transcendence of

118 Ibid.

119 Lenin, *Critical Remarks on the National Question*, 1913.

120 Ibid.

121 “It is impermissible, from the standpoint of Social-Democracy, to issue the slogan of national culture either directly or indirectly. The slogan is incorrect because already under capitalism, all economic, political and spiritual life is becoming more and more international. Socialism will make it completely international. International culture, which is now already being systematically created by the proletariat of all countries, does not absorb “national culture” (no matter of what national group) as a whole, but accepts from each national culture exclusively those of its elements that are consistently democratic and socialist” (*Theses on the National Question*).

nationality there must be a transitional period in which all oppressed nations are fully free, i.e. have the possibility of self-determination: “Just as mankind can achieve the abolition of classes only by passing through the transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so mankind can achieve the inevitable merging of nations only by passing through the transition period of complete liberation of all the oppressed nations, i.e., their freedom to secede.”¹²²

Overall, Lenin’s position on the national question is strategic and more complex than it first appears. It may appear to some as a schizophrenic “all or nothing” position that accepts only national independence or national assimilation, but its strategy is clear and aligned with Marx and Engels. Lenin’s aim was to promote working class unity in the Tsarist state. If the working classes of different nations were willing to struggle together within the same state framework, the task of the Marxists was to overcome all national barriers between those classes, facilitating their gradual, organic assimilation. If the working classes of certain nations were too hostile to each other to wage class struggle unitedly, it was preferable to divide them into separate independent states. In every case, the aim was to accelerate the class struggle.

MARXISM AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

From the above it is clear that a Marxist approach to the Cyprus problem can only be strategic. The question for Marxists is how the Cyprus problem can be instrumentalised in favour of the task of world revolution, or at least, to recognise and support the approach or solution to the problem that is most favourable to the revolutionary task. An obvious problem arises here: there is no international revolutionary movement today and any mention of a socialist revolution sounds utopian and anachronistic. This social condition leads to the following legitimate questions: Is the traditional Marxist approach to the national question relevant in the 21st century? Doesn’t this approach at least need an update? Is Marxism itself irrelevant to contemporary national issues?

122 Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, 1916.

I consider it an indisputable fact that the Left, including the Marxist Left, failed miserably in the 20th century.¹²³ There were no successful socialist revolutions in the 20th century and by the end of it the workers' movement was literally non-existent. The state of the world thus differs dramatically from the time when Marx, Engels, Lenin and others were writing about the national question. There are no prospects for a socialist revolution on the scene, nor any workers' movement that can be supported by developments in national conflicts. The Marxist left is dead and most likely will not be resurrected. Consequently, a view that argues that the traditional Marxist approach to the national question is irrelevant to the Cyprus problem is perfectly reasonable and difficult to challenge. It is beyond the scope of this essay to argue for the viability of Marxism in the 21st century, so I will not attempt to do so here.

Instead, I take Marxism for granted and my essay is only about those who identify themselves as Marxists or at least as revolutionary leftists. I also take the following point for granted: one cannot be a Marxist if one does not consider the socialist revolution possible and necessary and if the goal of the socialist revolution does not guide one's political positions and actions. Consequently, I believe that Marxism still requires a strategic approach to national conflicts such as the Cyprus problem. However, given the lack of revolutionary prospects and the absence of a workers' movement in Cyprus and internationally, it is impossible to link the Cyprus problem directly to the revolution. What I believe we can do is to link the Cyprus problem with the reconstitution of a workers' movement and a Marxist left in Cyprus. Lenin's ultimate goal in relation to the national question was the unity of the proletarians of all nations in the struggle against Tsarism and in support of socialism. Cypriot Marxists can have the same goal with regard to the Cyprus problem. We should try to politicise the Cyprus problem in a way that promotes the unity of the Cypriot proletarians and the formation of a workers' struggle, and we should advocate the

123 The Marxist Platypus Group panel entitled "The Decline of the Left in the 20th Century" is an excellent summary of the failure of the Left. <https://platypus1917.org/the-decline-of-the-left-in-the-20th-century/>

approach or solution to the problem that is most favourable to that unity and formation.

Most Cypriot Marxists and revolutionary leftists would not disagree with the above formulation of what our goal should be in relation to the Cyprus problem. Some Cypriot far-left groups even refer to this goal. The real question is how this objective informs our practice and what political positions it leads us to adopt in relation to the problem. I move on to examine the most recent positions issued on the Cyprus problem by some of the far-left Cypriot groups that claim to have this objective as one of their goals. (As for those on the left who have adopted a liberal perspective on the Cyprus problem -and they are the vast majority- I have no objection to their stance given that Marxism and revolution do not seem viable today. However, I do find it a problem that some of them continue to call themselves Marxists or revolutionary leftists, as they are nothing of the sort. Leftists who support BBF on the grounds that it will bring national peace are expressing nothing more than a liberal position and need to acknowledge this.)

GREEK CYPRIOT FAR-LEFTISTS AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

I will start with the positions of Syspirosi Atakton and Antifa Lefkoşa, two mostly anti-fascist and intersectional groups with similar views on the Cyprus problem.¹²⁴ Both groups support a BBF solution on the grounds that such a solution is necessary to overcome the political hegemony of nationalism on the island. Antifa argues that a federal solution is only transitional, a necessary transitional step towards a collective bicomunal struggle against capitalism. Syspirosi claims that the construction of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s led to the domination of nationalism in Cypriot politics, and both they and Antifa note that as long as the Cyprus problem exists and dominates politics, political life on the island will be under the political hegemony of nationalism and

124 Editor's note: In this footnote, the author provided links to texts by "Syspirosi Atakton" and the group "antifa lefkosha". They are the texts included in this collection.

inter-communal conflict. Both groups claim that a federal solution is a break with the forces of nationalism: BBF is anathema to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalists. According to Antifa, the federation will give birth to a “federal consciousness” which is by definition anti-national and which it considers necessary to overcome nationalism in Cyprus. This consciousness is defined by the recognition that Cyprus is not a homogeneous nation-state, but the home of many communities. Such a consciousness creates the possibility for class struggle to replace ethnic conflict. In a similar way, Syspirosi claims that federation will facilitate bicomunal struggles. Both groups position themselves against a unitary Cypriot nation-state on the grounds that it will inevitably lead to the tyranny of the Turkish Cypriot minority by the Greek Cypriot majority. Syspirosi goes so far as to claim that BBF is the “ideal institutional solution” for the Cyprus problem for the left, because it simultaneously provides autonomy and space for the two communities to coexist.

My impression from reading these two texts is that the two groups are not writing from a revolutionary leftist perspective, but from an anti-right/anti-fascist perspective. They take for granted the false dilemma between BBF and the unitary state and choose BBF to go against the nationalists and right-wingers who choose the unitary state. But these two solutions are not the only ways to solve the Cyprus problem. Another form of resolution, at the moment the most likely one, is some kind of partition. Partition is anathema to the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot left because they see it as an outcome of nationalism and therefore its victory. However, as Marx and Lenin recognised, if the ethnic conflict is an insurmountable obstacle to the collective class struggle of different nationalities, separating them through partition and independence is the best way to promote the possibility of class struggle in the two ethnic communities. Moreover, while I agree with Antifa and Syspirosi that as long as the Cyprus problem exists and is politically dominated, political life on the island will be under the political hegemony of nationalism and bicomunal conflict, it does not follow from this recognition that a federal solution is necessary to overcome nationalism and start the class

struggle; partition could equally “solve” the problem and end its political domination.

It should also be noted that while a bizonal bicomunal federation is indeed a rupture with Cypriot nationalists, it is not necessarily a rupture with nationalism itself. A federal solution may provoke strong nationalist reactions and even reinforce nationalist conflicts in the long run. Lambros Lambrianou has written an article exploring this possibility and raising several valid concerns which I explore later. It is a great oversight on the part of Syspirosi and Antifa that they do not examine and refute this possibility. We cannot take it for granted that a federal solution will be a transitional step towards a collective bicomunal struggle against capitalism; it may give birth to a new cycle of nationalism and perpetuate the Cyprus problem for decades, which is not the case with partition. Not only that, but any federal solution will need a difficult transition and will indeed perpetuate the Cyprus problem for decades, as political life on the island will be dominated by the implications of the solution and the efforts made to make it work.

Finally, as far as the so-called federal consciousness is concerned, I disagree that this consciousness is by definition anti-national and therefore desirable. A federal consciousness that recognises Cyprus as the home of many communities will not necessarily overcome the national consciousness of each community. In fact, support for a federal consciousness is similar to support for cultural-ethnic autonomy. It is a consciousness that does not transcend nationality as such and does not promote the fusion of different nationalities. It is of importance that in a BBF the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities will have separate educational systems, which is a key feature of cultural-ethnic autonomy. In any case, a federal consciousness does not go beyond civic nationalism, i.e., political identities built around common citizenship within the state. Marxists advocate the cultivation of class consciousness and do not believe that there is a need for a transitional consciousness between the existing popular consciousness and class consciousness. Federal consciousness will be another obstacle that Marxists will need to overcome to cultivate class consciousness and there is no need to create this obstacle. The effort spent on replacing the

dominant Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot consciousnesses with a federal or so-called “Cypriot” consciousness should be spent on cultivating class consciousness. Therefore, it is absurd to argue that BBF is the ideal solution to the Cyprus problem from a leftist point of view.

The Stasis Stalinist group (which no longer exists)¹²⁵ is the only one that tried to explicitly base its support for BBF on Marxism. Specifically, it based its support for a federal solution on Lenin’s writings on the national question that I summarized above.¹²⁶ The Stasis group reiterates and agrees with Lenin’s view that Marxists need to oppose “all national oppression or inequality” and defend the equality of the nations that make up a state entity. It also reiterates and agrees with Lenin’s position that only the democratic elements of each nationality need to be promoted and that the fusion of nations on the basis of democratism and proletarian internationalism should be the aim. It reiterates and agrees with Lenin’s position that Marxists should “identify and support the most progressive practical solutions to a national question, even within the conditions of capitalism”, without postponing the solution of the questions until the achievement of socialism, but always positioning themselves in the interests of the masses and the prospect of socialist revolution. It recognises that support for the most progressive possible solutions implies a rallying of socialists and the proletariat with a portion of the bourgeoisie, and agrees with Lenin that this is acceptable as long as the proletariat does not become the tail of the bourgeoisie, identifying with its own perspective and its own aspirations on the national question. The working class holds its own internationalist aims and supports the bourgeoisie strategically, without sharing the bourgeois nationalism of the latter, supporting the latter only to the extent that the latter promotes democratisation, equality and the fusion of nations. Finally, the Stasis group reiterates and agrees with Lenin’s position

125 Editor’s note: The group appears to have been active during 2016-2017.

126 Editor’s note: In this footnote the author provided a link to the text of the “stasis” group. The text can be found on the website of the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org). It was published in 2017 under the title “Our Position on the Cyprus Question and Its Resolution”.

that the unification of different nationalities within a bourgeois state is a historically progressive step “from medieval disunity to the future socialist unity”.

While the above reading of Lenin is accurate, the Stasis group runs into problems when trying to apply the general principles of Lenin’s position on the Cyprus problem. First, the one point on which it is partially correct: despite the fact that the current context of the Cyprus problem is determined by the bourgeoisie, Marxists are obliged to intervene and have a place in the conflict. I say partly because the radical Cypriot left is politically insignificant and cannot influence the direction of this intra-bourgeois conflict in one way or another. We must indeed have an analysis of the present context of the problem and express our support for the kind of bourgeois solution (if any) that we believe is most conducive to the unity of the multi-communal Cypriot proletariat and the foundation of a revolutionary left in Cyprus. However, we must recognise that this support will not constitute a significant political intervention in the conflict, an intervention of the kind that revolutionaries like Lenin aimed for when there was a workers’ movement. What is important for us is to educate ourselves and orient ourselves properly on the issue, understanding the present and possible future circumstances, so that we are ready to take advantage of them when they come.

Unfortunately, the Stasis group proceeds to blatantly distort Lenin’s position on the national question, claiming that any approach to the Cyprus problem that accepts indirectly or directly the present *de facto* division of the Cypriot working class is contrary to Marxism-Leninism in principle: “Marxism-Leninism is by principle incompatible with any approach to the Cyprus Question that accepts, directly or indirectly, the *de facto* division of the Cypriot working class, cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious chauvinism, the refusal of equality and of the greatest possible democratism in the administration of the state.” The Stasis group implies here that *de facto* and by extension *de jure* partition is in principle incompatible with Marxism’s position on the national question. As we have seen above, this is far from the truth. The right of nations to self-determination implies the right to partition/secession and there is no Marxist principle against partition. Lenin posits the

principle of full equality between the nations of a state, but this principle does not imply that said nations must remain in the same state if they do not want to. The Stasis group conveniently ignores Lenin's willingness to seriously consider the option of partition when the working classes of different nations are too hostile to fight together. Such hostility was the case in Cyprus in the past, so I think it is safe to assume that Lenin would have supported partition in 1958, 1964 and 1974, followed by the incorporation of Greek Cypriots into Greece and Turkish Cypriots into Turkey if that was what the two nations wanted.

More generally, the Stasis group downplays the strategic dimension of Lenin's approach to the national question, despite the fact that they acknowledge this dimension in their summary of Lenin's approach. The Stasis group states that Marxists ought to position themselves on national questions in the interests of the cause of the socialist revolution, but ends up presenting Lenin's approach to the national question as a set of principles, undermining the strategic element despite the fact that this element is the central component of the approach. Because of this error, the Stasis group ends up turning Lenin's view that the unification of nations is desirable into the unconditional principle that partition must be avoided at all costs. In fact, the Stasis group's position is closer to Luxemburg than to Lenin, though of course the strategic dimension of the former is absent.

As far as the Stasis Group's analysis of the specifics of the Cyprus problem is concerned, its main point is that a federal Cyprus would constitute bourgeois-democratic progress. The reason they give for this view is that Greece and Turkey have a conservative influence on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie respectively, exporting nationalism, militarism, fascism and NATO imperialism to the island. A federal Cyprus would mean the independence of the Cypriot ruling class from the ruling classes of the two "motherlands" and is likely to make that class more progressive, promote the democratisation of the island and make it more likely for the working class to gain certain "basic freedoms". For my part, I really doubt that the Cypriot bourgeoisie will become more progressive in a federal Cyprus or that it will

offer basic freedoms to the working class. Perhaps the assumption can be made that the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie will be allowed to behave more progressively, as they are indeed less reactionary than the fascistic Erdogan government. But I don't think the Greek ruling class is more reactionary than the Greek Cypriot one. It is possible that a federal Cyprus will reduce nationalism and militarism (more on this below), creating space for class struggle, but the working class will only gain freedoms through radicalisation by a strong Cypriot left. We cannot expect our bourgeoisie to become more progressive in the 21st century when the trend has been in the opposite direction for many decades. And it is certain that a federal Cyprus, like any Cyprus under capitalism, will be part of the machinations of world imperialism.

The rest of the Stasis Group's analysis of the Cyprus problem has little relation to reality. It argues that if we do not have a bicomunal state but instead partition, then the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot states will be occupied by the "reactionary NATOist states" of Greece and Turkey. In my opinion, there is no possibility of the Republic of Cyprus being absorbed by Greece, although it is possible for Turkey to absorb the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. But this absorption is not a *fait accompli*: if the TRNC is internationally recognised, its dependence on Turkey can be reduced. In any case, a federal Cyprus would be no less reactionary than Greece and would very likely become part of NATO. Joining NATO is anathema to the Stasis group, but I don't understand why they think a BBF is less likely to be a member of NATO than a divided Cyprus. NATO membership will ensure peace on the island more than anything else. In general, the distinction that the Stasis group makes between the reactionary motherlands and the progressive future federal Cyprus is just post-colonial third world delirium. It also notes that because of the violent past and the *de facto* hostility and lack of trust between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the future federal state must be bizonal, at least for a transitional period, to allow time and space for inter-communal trust to develop. I will discuss the possible implications of a bizonal federation below, but it is notable that Lenin is absent from the justification for bizonality here. He might have accepted

bizonality if it were really a necessary means for the eventual fusion of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot proletariat, but as I will go on to show, this is very doubtful.

Perhaps the most sober left-wing assessment of the possible negative consequences of a BBF was made by Dr. Lambros Lambrianou in his article “The painfulness of the Bizonal Bicomunal Federation compromise and its nationalist trap”.¹²⁷ While Lambrianou’s negative assessment of the BBF is not the only negative left-wing assessment, I focus on it because of its clear anti-nationalism; as most other assessments come from a nationalist perspective. Unlike the nationalists, Lambrianou ends up supporting BBF as an inevitable compromise given the current socio-political conditions. However, he stresses that BBF should only be transitional in order to have the results we expect from it, i.e. to lead to the unification of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into a single society and thus facilitate the bicomunal struggle of the working class.

Lambrianou is particularly concerned about the dangers of the bizonality of the BBF. He believes that bizonality should be transitional and moderated by a central state that is institutionally stronger than the two constituent states of the federation: “It is necessary in a future constitution to lay those institutional foundations that will not only allow but also promote the gradual transcendence of bizonality in the form of ethnically pure regions, that will fully restore human rights and the basic freedoms of movement, settlement and property without discrimination on the basis of nationality. In this case, the most firm foundation is a strong common state in terms of its powers in relation to the powers of the constituent states.”

The bizonality of the BBF is equivalent to the existence of loose geographical borders between the two main Cypriot ethnic groups, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. As Lambrianou rightly points out, these geographical borders also constitute economic, political and social borders: “Political borders in the sense of non-interference in the management of the power of one zone in

127 Editor’s note: In this footnote the author provided a link to the text by Lambros Lambrianou. The link is now dead. The text was published on 16/07/2015 on www.typos.com.cy.

the other to the extent of the exclusive power granted to them by the common state and non-interference in the management of this power, even by the central government. Economic frontiers in the sense of economic activity and development that is -to a certain extent- independent of the economic policy of the common state. Social borders in the sense of an ethnic division based mainly on the characteristics of religion, language and ancestry.” Lambrianou sees the bizonality of the Federation as the legitimisation of the de facto Turkish occupation of a third of the island. The Republic of Cyprus accepted bizonality as a painful but necessary compromise after the violent events on the island and the ongoing mistrust between the two communities, and Lambrianou sees bizonality in the same way. He notes that the basis of all talks to date is the conflictual relationship between the two communities. All discussions have revolved around finding a compromise on the balance of power and the privileges of the two communities in a new state, with each side trying to reach the best possible agreement for its bourgeois national interests.

The question for Lambrianou, as well as for the rest of the left that wants reunification, is whether a BBF can be the means to overcome the aforementioned conflict between the two communities and to unify Cypriot society. In particular, his question is whether bizonality can be such a means or whether it will maintain the division and conflict of the two communities and possibly renew the nationalist conflict in the future: “If the answer is that we want the real unification of Cyprus and its society, then we must also answer the question that goes beyond the painful question of compromise: Is the bizonality of a bicomunal federation workable and viable? Or is it possible (and to what extent) that the ethnic separation of the two communities in the long run will create the ground for new conflicts? In sum, can the BBF prevent nationalism from again becoming a tool for imposing internal and external interests?” The Cypriot bourgeoisie conducting the talks sees bizonality and the safety valves it entails as a means to control and contain the conflict between the two communities, not as a means to overcome it. The Left, however, cannot accept the mere viable management of this relationship; it can only support bizonality if it can help overcome

the conflictual relationship and truly reunite the two main ethnic groups of Cyprus, facilitating the collective struggle of their respective working classes.

Lambrianou argues that bizonality is not only insufficient to overcome nationalism and the Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot conflict, but may in fact allow nationalist tendencies in the two communities to dominate the new federation and lead to the final partition of Cyprus. According to Lambrianou, nationalism is indicated by the social boundaries that one group of people, a community or a society in general, places in relation to another, and is facilitated by such social boundaries. Specifically, it is facilitated when different communities have their own separate educational systems and socialization processes: “The nationalist outlook and the attitudes in which it materializes are not so much of an spiritual, intellectual nature as mainly of an emotional identification and its systematic long-term consolidation, which is of course constituted on the basis of an one-sided socialization, above all an one-dimensional education.” The deep nationalism of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities cannot be overcome simply by low-policy confidence-building measures between the two communities, to which we have been limited so far. It is necessary to provide the two communities with common institutional reference points that offer the possibility of common identification. These common points of reference should include: “1. A common institutional framework for the functioning of society, i.e. a common rule of law; 2. Common economic structures that provide the opportunity for the creation of common interests that touch the daily lives of people; and 3. Common cultural institutions that preserve diversity and at the same time promote its coexistence not only as a necessary component of coexistence but above all as a constituent element of a multicultural society under construction.”

Lambrianou argues that a bizonal federation on the basis of ethnic difference would not provide these common institutional reference points. For him, a bizonal federation does not amount to a symbiosis of the two communities, but merely to the acceptance of the separate socio-political existence of each community by the other within the loose framework of a common state. He notes that

the weaker the common state is politically in relation to its constituent states, the less likely it is to be a common point of reference and determination for the two communities. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will identify with their constituent states in which they will live their daily lives: “With which common state will the Cypriot citizen -Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot- identify himself if the latter is truncated and unable to represent him effectively? The real point of reference and identification will obviously remain the respective “constituent state” in the respective zone, where he will live his daily life, seek solutions to his immediate problems and confront his history through a separate one-sided perspective, as it has been the case throughout the last century.” If the two communities mostly live separately, have separate education systems and listen to separate media, nationalism will not be overcome. Instead, it is likely that nationalist forces will take advantage of this situation to gain the upper hand and undermine the weak common state, renewing ethnic conflict on the island and leading to separation.

I generally agree with Lambrianou’s assessment of the nationalist pitfalls of bizonality. While it is not certain that a BBF will preserve nationalism, this is a distinct possibility that the Cypriot radical left should take seriously and prepare against. The radical left cannot simply support any federal solution, but only one with a strong central state and which tends towards a future transcendence of bizonality. More specifically, separate education systems should be avoided if possible, as they will be open to the influence of nationalist institutions such as the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Bicomunalism, i.e. the recognition of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as equal partners in a future state, is in line with Marxism. Bizonality, on the other hand, is reminiscent of cultural-ethnic autonomy and is questionable from a Marxist point of view.

Unfortunately, as I have partially shown above, the majority of Cypriot far-left groups assume that a BBF will constitute bourgeois-democratic progress and will create better conditions for bi-communal coexistence, without having seriously considered the above counter-arguments in their assessments. These groups wrongly assume that a BBF will weaken nationalism simply be-

cause nationalists oppose it. This is an unacceptable error. By being marginalized by the nationalists, these groups end up tailing the liberals whom the nationalists oppose. They are ready to uncritically support any federal solution brought by the liberal bourgeoisie, the EU and big capital, as evidenced by the fact that they do not set any criteria that a federal state should meet. Such a position of course has nothing to do with Marxism.

In a very good article in Jacobin magazine, the Greek Cypriot leftist Leandros Fischer expresses similar scepticism towards the uncritical support of the Greek Cypriot left for the reunification talks.¹²⁸ As he notes: “It is easy to point to the utterly reactionary character of the settlement’s opponents to bolster the “reunification or bust” argument. But we should view this uncritical support for the negotiations sceptically. Not only does it dramatically overestimate the Left’s current capacity to dictate the turn of events, but it is also premised on unadulterated wishful thinking. The current RoC government has made it clear that it intends to enshrine “fiscal responsibility” in the country’s future constitution. The Left could not resist the neoliberal onslaught in one part of the country; why it should be in a better position to do so in both stands as a more than valid question. Given the precedents of so-called conflict resolution in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, a quite plausible outcome would be a situation in which capitalists and the cosmopolitan elite from both sides reap the benefits of reconciliation while ordinary working people, confined in their separate constituent states, pay the bill and become even more susceptible to ethno-populist politics. This is a potentially dangerous outcome, made even more toxic by the fact that the settlement currently under discussion fails to address the privileges of the main institutions of nationalism and their influence over educational matters, like the Orthodox Church in the south... Peace, reconciliation, and mutual recognition cannot be preconditioned on deals aimed at harmonizing the region’s capitalist class interests, with faint hopes that the working class will benefit from

128 Editor’s note: Leandros Fischer’s text was published online in 2017 on “Jacobin”, under the title “Reuniting Cyprus?”. It can be found here: <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/cyprus-reunification-negotiations-akel-kke-greece-turkey>

a peace dividend.” Also, contrary to Stasis, he correctly notes that a federal solution would not challenge the influence of imperialism in Cyprus at all.

What Lambrianou omits is that the conflictual relationship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can also be eliminated through partition, and not only by living together in a common state. Partition has already significantly mitigated the conflict, so that today Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can move freely across the island in relative safety. Ending the negotiations serial surrounding the Cyprus problem will end the political domination of the problem and undermine the nationalist political forces whose *raison d’être* is the Cyprus problem. And of course, given that the borders between Greek and Turkish Cyprus remain open, it is possible for the left and the working class of the two communities to organise collectively despite the lack of a common state. Unfortunately, both Lambrianou and the far-left groups I mentioned before assume that partition is a disaster. This is to be expected from a liberal leftist like Lambrianou, but not from far-leftists or Marxists. It shows that despite their claims to the contrary, these groups actually see the reunification of Cyprus as an end in itself. The question for Marxism is whether a BBF will create better conditions for an intercommunal working class struggle, but this is not the question for the Greek Cypriot radical left.

I conclude the chapter with a brief reference to the attitude of two small Trotskyist groups, Workers’ Democracy and the New Internationalist Left (NEDA).¹²⁹ The two groups consider the main

129 Editor’s note: In this footnote the author provided links to texts of the groups “New Internationalist Left” and “Workers’ Democracy” with the comment “A typical position of the New Internationalist Left on the Cyprus problem [...] And here a typical position of Workers’ Democracy”. The first text is the article ““Bi-zonal bicomunal” or “unitary, independent”?” Controversies in the Left in Greece” by Andreas Pagiatos, which was published on the website of the New Internationalist Left in 2017. The other is the text by Dinos Ayiomamitis titled “How can we build a bicomunal movement of resistance to nationalism and austerity” which was his presentation at the conference “The Left and the Cyprus problem” held on 13 May, 2017. The text was subsequently published in issue 154 of the newspaper “Workers’ Democracy”. Both texts have been archived by the Cyprus Movements Archive (movementsarchive.org)

reason for the failure to find a solution to be the conflicting interests of the ruling classes in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, as well as the imperialist great powers, and therefore naturally consider it unacceptable that the talks should continue to depend on these classes and powers without the involvement of the working class. Both understand correctly that the ruling classes of the two communities see each other as antagonistic, and therefore, that what is at stake in the talks is which side will have the upper hand in a future agreement, not the good of a reunited Cypriot people. Therefore, both Workers' Democracy and NEDA express scepticism towards the prospect of a BBF, are pessimistic about the possibility of a viable bourgeois solution and consider the uncritical support of the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot left for the reunification talks to be naïve. Their counter-proposal is to build a bicomunal working class movement to overthrow the capitalist establishment in Cyprus and build a socialist federal Cyprus.

Unfortunately, although a bicomunal working class movement is needed in Cyprus, it is impossible to build a socialist Cyprus without a world socialist revolution, and this is not a realistic possibility in the near future. We can safely say that there will be a bourgeois solution to the Cyprus problem before there is a revolution. Therefore, Marxists cannot dismiss the bourgeois talks and developments on the Cyprus problem and put forward a socialist Cyprus as a viable alternative goal. As I have already said, they need to examine the possible contingencies of a bourgeois solution, from BBF to various partitionist settlements, and see how they can instrumentalise these contingencies for the benefit of the unity of the Cypriot proletariat and the constituting of class struggle.

WHAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS FOR MARXISM

Having examined some of the more indicative recent positions on the Cyprus problem by Greek Cypriot leftists, I conclude by presenting my own Marxist reading of the nature of the Cyprus problem in general terms. I should note that the Cyprus problem is not the same problem for everyone; it is a different problem for nationalists, liberals and Marxists, because nationalists, liberals and Marxists have different objectives for which the Cyprus problem

is an obstacle or a problem. I will address what the nature of the Cyprus problem is for Marxism and what a possible future Cypriot Marxist left needs to do about it.

There are many interpretations of the Cyprus problem. For right-wing nationalists, it is a problem of invasion and occupation, starting in July 1974 and resulting from Turkish expansionism. For left-wing nationalists, it is the result of an imperialist NATO conspiracy, the “treasonous” coup of the Greek Junta and the supposed British strategy of “divide and rule” during colonialism. For liberals and liberal leftists, it is a problem of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism. It is true that all these aforementioned factors played a role in the Cyprus problem on varying degrees.

It is also true that there is a significant conflict within the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie, between the liberal and nationalist wings of both. The dispute concerns the way of institutionally resolving the Cyprus problem. The way in which the problem ends up being resolved, e.g. by the creation of a BBF or by partition, will lead to changes in the economic, political and, more generally, social situation on the island. These real changes will affect the conditions under which we Marxists are called upon to build an independent revolutionary left, with some conditions being more amenable to this task than others. Therefore, we cannot be indifferent to the outcome of the bourgeois negotiations; we must consider the possible outcomes and see which are most amenable to our aims. Changes in the socio-political status quo can benefit the Cypriot radical left, even if they are not caused by it.

But it is one thing to say that the Cypriot radical left can benefit more from one solution than another, and it is another thing to say that the radical left cannot wage a class struggle on the island without a federal solution. Unfortunately, both the pseudo-leftist establishment AKEL party and the majority of the Greek Cypriot radical left hold the latter view. As Fischer notes, “conventional left-wing wisdom holds that nothing can happen before a solution to the Cyprus problem.”¹³⁰ This is a fundamental objectivistic misunderstanding of the nature of the Cyprus problem by the entire Greek

130 Editor’s note: From the same text by Leandros Fischer mentioned above.

Cypriot left, radical and non-radical alike. The Greek Cypriot left believes that it is objectively impossible to wage a class struggle in Cyprus as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved and Cyprus remains divided. This suggests that the left considers itself doomed to political helplessness as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved. Therefore, the fate of the Greek Cypriot left (especially the radical left) and the class struggle depends on the liberal bourgeoisie bringing in a “progressive” federal solution. The Greek Cypriot left is convinced that such a solution will change the objective situation on the island, making the collective struggle of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot workers possible.

The problem with this conception of the Cyprus problem is that it presents the Left as being at the mercy of the objective conditions shaped by the bourgeoisie. The Greek Cypriot left sees the federal solution as progressive in itself, that is, as objectively progressive: the federal solution will make objectively possible the collective struggle of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot workers, which is now objectively impossible. Nothing depends on the Left in this picture; everything depends on the bourgeoisie and the solution they bring. It goes without saying that such a picture is unacceptable from a Marxist point of view; a Marxist or radical left cannot leave its fate in the hands of the bourgeoisie. It is an image that ignores the subjective factor of history, a factor which must be the Left itself and the working class that the Left must lead.

The Cyprus problem has thus led the Greek Cypriot left to paralysis, paralysis for which the left itself is responsible but which it misunderstands as an inevitable objective necessity. From a Marxist point of view, the Cyprus problem is a problem to the extent that it prevents the existence of a revolutionary left and of class struggle in Cyprus. However, while the Greek Cypriot left sees the Cyprus problem as an objective obstacle to the class struggle in the form of an inevitable source of nationalism, in reality the Cyprus problem is only a subjective obstacle to the class struggle. The Cyprus problem has never been a problem of objective conditions that inevitably prevent the existence of class consciousness and class struggle in Cyprus. It was and still is the Greek Cypriot left’s eternal excuse for avoiding class struggle. The class struggle must wait

until the solution of the “national problem”. The Cyprus problem is therefore a problem of consciousness. It is the false consciousness of the Greek Cypriot left that traps it into awaiting for its right to exist politically as a left, based on the negotiations and decisions of the bourgeoisie. It is the false consciousness that prevents the formation of a real revolutionary Cypriot left that will cultivate class consciousness and lead the class struggle on the island.

The Cyprus problem is not the cause of the Greek Cypriot left’s inability to wage class struggle, but is in fact the result of that inability. It exists as a problem because of the failure of the left in Cyprus (and in Greece and Turkey) to conduct class politics. At least since the mid-1940s the Greek Cypriot left, dominated by AKEL, has not existed politically as a left, choosing to be the tail of the dominant nationalist wing of the bourgeoisie, a wing which traditionally scorns the left. AKEL has never acted independently of the nationalist right, always politically supporting the latter despite differences in rhetoric, while the radical left is equally at the tail of developments in the negotiations between the bourgeoisie, diplomats and technocrats. Since at least the mid-1940s, the Greek Cypriot left has given priority to resolving the national question at the expense of the class struggle. The Greek Cypriot left’s approach to the national question is in fact the opposite of that of Marx, Engels and Lenin: instead of giving priority to the class struggle and instrumentalising the national question for the purposes of the class struggle, it gives priority to the national question and suspends the class struggle until the former is resolved. The inability of the Cypriot left to wage class struggle and to escape the limits of nationalism left the island at the mercy of the nationalist forces and led to the development of what we now call the “Cyprus problem”. This problem in turn came to be perceived as an objective obstacle preventing class struggle, but it is only a subjective obstacle and the objective result of the lack of class struggle that preceded it: a classic case of false consciousness characterised by a cause-and-effect inversion.

This failure of the local left is mediated by the non-existence of an international revolutionary left. It is the way in which the international defeat of Marxism and the Left’s retreat to nationalism

-socialism in one country, popular “patriotic” fronts against imperialism, postcolonial theory, identity politics, etc.- were expressed in the Cypriot context. The Greek Cypriot left has traditionally approached the Cyprus problem in the light of identity politics, supporting first enosis with Greece and then Cypriot “patriotism”, while its small radical section has recently promoted the so-called “Cypriot consciousness” or a federal consciousness. I have dealt above with the federal consciousness, but I will add a couple more words about the so-called “Cypriot consciousness” here. There is not one but in fact two culturally distinct Cypriot identities, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. These cultural identities share many elements but also have divergences and cannot form the basis of Cypriot unity without modification, i.e. without the cultivation of a new Cypriot or federal consciousness that does not exist today. What already exists and unites Cypriot workers is their common material class interests and it is imperative for the radical left of the two communities to make these interests conscious in order to build unity that transcends nationality.¹³¹ As I said before, a non-discriminatory but classless Cypriot identity can neither substitute for class consciousness nor be a bridge to it, but on the contrary it is another obstacle to class consciousness.

Since for Marxism the Cyprus problem is a problem of false consciousness, this means that for Marxism the solution to the problem is to overcome this false consciousness. It is the realisation that whatever solution the bourgeoisie implements, i.e. with or without a bizonal bicomunal federation, the Cypriot radical left can and must wage a class struggle. Another implication of this perspective is that, in-itself, one solution is not better than another.

With or without a solution, with or without a BBF, neither the situation of the working class nor the prospects of working class struggle will change without a radical left that aims at cultivat-

131 Fischer says something similar in his article: “What already unites the workers of Cyprus is not their identity or geography, but their respective struggles against the constant deterioration of their living standards and their opposition to the island’s use as a launching pad for imperialist war. Socialists who wish to challenge the status quo in Cyprus and contribute to a viable, long-lasting peace must start from this premise.”

ing class consciousness. As I mentioned above, changes in the socio-political establishment can benefit the Cypriot radical left even if they are not caused by it, but I now add that they will not benefit it, if it is not prepared to take advantage of them. If there is no ideologically and organisationally independent left to exploit any intra-bourgeois conflicts to promote the unity of the Cypriot proletariat and the conduct of class struggle, this unity and this struggle will not emerge. If the Left is a tail of the bourgeoisie both ideologically and politically, it disintegrates itself and there ceases to be a preferable solution to the Cyprus problem.

Moreover, if the class struggle can be carried out even without a solution, then it can be carried out in the case of partition, and partition is not as destructive as the Greek Cypriot left thinks. Indeed, as I argued earlier, there are reasons to believe that partition may be preferable to BBF. Partition will end the political dominance of the Cyprus problem much earlier than a federal solution; a federal solution will take many years to be fully implemented, and during all that time political life will be dominated by the attempt to implement it. Moreover, given the mistaken belief of the Greek Cypriot left (and I assume the Turkish Cypriot left) that the Cyprus problem must be resolved before class struggle becomes possible, it is very likely that they will continue to postpone class politics throughout the period of the implementation of the federal solution and will be the tail of the liberals in their effort to make the new federation viable. On the other hand, a partition would bury the left's liberal hopes for reunification and is perhaps more likely to awaken the left from its national apathy, helping it to realize that it must try to exist politically on a divided island. But most importantly, the radical left needs to move beyond the confines of the national question and stop waiting for the bourgeoisie to bring a solution.

CONCLUSION

In this text I have tried to define the Marxist framework for the examination of the national question and to make a first attempt to apply this framework to the Cyprus problem. I have stressed that Marxism approaches the national question primarily strategically, taking the position it considers most favourable for unified class

struggle and for the task of global socialist revolution. I argued that this is also the way in which Cypriot Marxists (and radical leftists) should approach the Cyprus problem. Cypriot Marxists must try to politicise the Cyprus problem in a way that promotes the unity of Cypriot workers and the formation of a working class struggle, and must advocate an approach or solution to the problem that favours such a unity and such a formation.

I also tried to show that the current stance of the Greek Cypriot radical left on the Cyprus problem is inadequate. The Greek Cypriot radical left misinterprets the nature of the problem, seeing the de facto separation of Cyprus as an objective obstacle that excludes the possibility of class struggle, whereas it is precisely the Greek Cypriot left's long-standing misinterpretation of the problem that is the problem. From a Marxist perspective, the Cyprus problem is the priority the Cypriot left gives to the national question at the expense of its task of social transformation through class struggle. This misplaced priority, together with the self-definition of the radical left in relation to the nationalists, makes the radical left a mere tail of the bourgeoisie and leads it to place unfounded hopes in a possible federal solution and to demonise unjustifiably a possible partition.

Both Bizonal Bicomunal Federation and partition need to be reviewed more calmly. I have always been a supporter of BBF and I am still emotionally attached to the goal of federal reunification, but we cannot take it for granted that BBF is preferable to partition. At the very least, I hope I have shown that there are significant risks in a BBF that suggest that federation will not be automatically beneficial without a left ready to address the risks. And most importantly, I believe that the Greek Cypriot radical left must finally begin to rely on itself and not on any bourgeois solution.

Phedias Christodoulides

FAURA BOOKS PUBLICATIONS



001 David Graeber Are You An Anarchist? The Answer May Surprise You! [in Cypriot-Greek]

002 Emma Goldman The Child and Its Enemies [in Cypriot-Greek]

003 Anonymous The Guide to Peer-to-Peer, Encryption, and Tor: New Communication Infrastructure for Anarchists [in Greek]

004 Collection of Texts The Remainder of a Division: Anti-nationalist Approaches to the Cyprus Issue of Two Eras

005 John Tallent «There is no Ethical Consumption under Capitalism» [in Greek, translated by Erevides]

006 Movement's Reflection Club Weaving the Thread: Context, Class Composition and the Antagonistic Movement in the Republic of Cyprus [in Greek]

007 Antonis Pastellopoulos (editor) The Heroes Back in their Graves: Ten Radical Texts on the Cyprus Issue [in Greek & English]

THE HEROES BACK IN THEIR GRAVES

TEN RADICAL TEXTS
ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE

EDITED BY ANTONIS PASTELLOPOULOS

After multiple ideological conflicts and theoretical confrontations with the various tendencies of left-wing Greek Cypriot nationalism, Cyprocentric positions managed, if not to dominate, at least to become identified with the radical (Greek) Cypriot milieu and to remain an integral part of it. Radical anti-nationalist approaches were not, however, historically limited to the Cyprocentric political and theoretical analyses developed around Cypriot identity. A more comprehensive reading of the theoretical and political material of the Cypriot radical milieu reveals a number of texts that deviate from dominant Cyprocentric approaches, both in their emphasis of critique and in their theoretical orientations. This collection aims to make the content of these texts accessible to a new audience, bringing to the surface the alternative radical approaches through which the (Greek) Cypriot radical milieu has analysed and deconstructed the Cyprus Problem, as well as the Cypriot experience in general.